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Editorial: Corrected typos #8

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Editorial: Corrected typos #8

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8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions draft-ietf-tls-mlkem.md
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Expand Up @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ informative:
--- abstract

This memo defines ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024 as `NamedGroup`s
and and registers IANA values in the TLS Supported Groups registry for use
and registers IANA values in the TLS Supported Groups registry for use
in TLS 1.3 to achieve post-quantum (PQ) key establishment.

--- middle
Expand All @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ in TLS 1.3 to achieve post-quantum (PQ) key establishment.
## Motivation

FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) {{FIPS203}} is a FIPS standard for post-quantum {{RFC9794}}
key establishment via lattice-based key establishment mechanism (KEM). Having
key establishment via lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Having
a purely post-quantum (not hybrid) key establishment option for TLS 1.3 is
necessary for migrating beyond hybrids and for users that want or need
necessary for migrating beyond hybrids and for users who want or need
post-quantum security without hybrids.

# Conventions and Definitions
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ ciphertexts.

## Binding properties

TLS 1.3's key schedule commits to the the ML-KEM encapsulation key and the
TLS 1.3's key schedule commits to the ML-KEM encapsulation key and the
ciphertext as the `key_exchange` field as part of the `key_share` extension
are populated with those values are included as part of the handshake
messages, providing resilience against re-encapsulation attacks against KEMs
Expand Down