Create fvde2john.py

Removed trailing whitespace

doc/NEWS

@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ Major changes from 1.9.0-jumbo-1 (May 2019) in this bleeding-edge version:
   M1 (those are for the KeePass format with AES-KDF, which is extreme because
   all the heavy lifting is AES).  [magnum; 2024]
 
+- Add fvde2john.py to improve FileVault 2 hash extraction.  [holly-o; 2024]
+
 
 Major changes from 1.8.0-jumbo-1 (December 2014) to 1.9.0-jumbo-1 (May 2019):
 

doc/README.FileVault2

@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
 This document is about cracking password protected FileVault 2 encrypted
 volumes with JtR.
 
+FileVault 2 hashes can be extracted from an encrypted volume using the tool run/fvde2john.py. 
+Hash extraction example:
+
+$ python3 fvde2john.py FileVault2_image
+testuser:$fvde$1$16$270186d6758a4426d3f015a019eabc46$101082$63a758b61183c5d4d06dda5e8f14dd0b1555fe2a1f2d0304:Full Name:mypasswordhint
+
+The output of fvde2john.py is of the form username:password hash:full name:password hint
+
+
+Alternatively the "fvde2john" (https://github.com/kholia/fvde2john) tool can be used.
 First, build the "fvde2john" (https://github.com/kholia/fvde2john) project from
 source. See https://github.com/libyal/libfvde/wiki/Building for help.
 

run/fvde2john.py

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+
+# Usage: python3 fvde2john.py <image_file>
+# The partition table is parsed to find the boot volume, often named 'Recovery HD'. The boot volume can be identified by its type GUID: 426F6F74-0000-11AA-AA11-00306543ECAC.
+# The boot volume contains a file called `EncryptedRoot.plist.wipekey`. This is stored on the volume at `/com.apple.boot.X/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.corestorage/EncryptedRoot.plist.wipekey`, where `X` is variable but is often `P` or `R`. This plist file is encrypted with AES-XTS; the key is found in the CoreStorage volume header, and the tweak is b'\x00' * 16.
+# The decrypted plist contains information relating to the user(s). This includes the salt, kek and iterations required to construct the hash as well as information such as username and password hints (if present).
+
+import plistlib
+import os
+import argparse
+import sys
+
+try:
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
+except ImportError:
+    sys.stderr.write("cryptography is missing, run 'pip install --user cryptography' to install it!")
+    sys.exit(1)
+try:
+    import pytsk3
+except ImportError:
+    sys.stderr.write("pytsk3 is missing, run 'pip install --user pytsk3' to install it!")
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+HEX_CORE_STORAGE_TYPE_GUID = '53746F72-6167-11AA-AA11-00306543ECAC'
+HEX_APPLE_BOOT_STORAGE_TYPE_GUID = '426F6F74-0000-11AA-AA11-00306543ECAC'
+LOCAL_USER_TYPE_ID = 0x10060002
+
+def uint_to_int(b):
+    return int(b[::-1].hex(), 16)
+
+def guid_to_hex(guid):
+    guid_parts = guid.split('-')
+
+    hex_str  = ''.join([guid_parts[0][i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(guid_parts[0]), 2)][::-1])
+    hex_str += ''.join([guid_parts[1][i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(guid_parts[1]), 2)][::-1])
+    hex_str += ''.join([guid_parts[2][i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(guid_parts[2]), 2)][::-1])
+    hex_str += guid_parts[3]
+    hex_str += guid_parts[4]
+
+    return hex_str.lower()
+
+# call in place of fp.read(), to stop reading out of bounds of file
+def try_read_fp(fp, bytes_to_read):
+    out = fp.read(bytes_to_read)
+    if len(out) != bytes_to_read:
+        sys.stderr.write("Error reading out of bounds of file, exiting.")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    return out
+
+def parse_partition_table(fp):
+    # determine whether sector size is 0x200 or 0x1000
+    sector_size = 0x0
+
+    # look for EFI PART at start of sector 1
+    fp.seek(0x200)
+    signature = try_read_fp(fp, 0x8)
+    if signature == b'EFI PART':
+        sector_size = 0x200
+
+    else:
+        fp.seek(0x1000)
+        signature = try_read_fp(fp, 0x8)
+        if signature == b'EFI PART':
+            sector_size = 0x1000
+
+    if not sector_size:
+        sys.stderr.write(f"[!] Invalid sector size {sector_size} (not 512 or 4096 bytes). Exiting.")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    fp.seek(2 * sector_size) # go to sector 2
+    partitions = []
+    partition_entry = b'1'
+    while any(partition_entry):
+        partition_entry = try_read_fp(fp, 0x80)
+        if any(partition_entry):
+            partitions.append(partition_entry)
+
+    partition_dict = {}
+    for p in partitions:
+        part_GUID, type_GUID, start, partition_name = parse_partition_entry(p)
+        sp = uint_to_int(start) * sector_size
+        partition_dict[part_GUID.hex()] = {'start':sp, 'partition_type':type_GUID.hex(), 'partition_name':partition_name.decode('utf-16').strip('\x00')}
+
+    return partition_dict
+
+def findall(p, s):
+    i = s.find(p)
+    while i != -1:
+        yield i
+        i = s.find(p, i+1)
+
+def parse_partition_entry(partition_entry):
+    type_GUID = partition_entry[0:0x10]
+    part_GUID = partition_entry[0x10:0x20]
+    start_LBA = partition_entry[0x20:0x28]
+    partition_name = partition_entry[0x38:0x80]
+    return part_GUID, type_GUID, start_LBA, partition_name
+
+def parse_corestorage_header(fp, start_pos):
+    fp.seek(start_pos + 176)
+    aes_key = try_read_fp(fp, 0x10)
+    return aes_key
+
+def AES_XTS_decrypt(aes_key, tweak, ct):
+    decryptor = Cipher(
+        algorithms.AES(key=aes_key + b'\x00' * 16),
+        modes.XTS(tweak=tweak),
+    ).decryptor()
+    pt = decryptor.update(ct)
+    return pt
+
+def parse_keybag_entry(uuid, pt):
+    uuid_iterator = findall(uuid, pt)
+    for sp in uuid_iterator:
+        ke_uuid, ke_tag, ke_keylen = pt[sp:sp+16], uint_to_int(pt[sp + 16:sp + 18]), uint_to_int(pt[sp + 18:sp + 20])
+        padding = pt[sp + 20:sp + 24]
+        keydata = pt[sp + 24: sp + 24 + ke_keylen]
+
+        # only tag 3 is needed for constructing the hash
+        if ke_tag == 3:
+            assert padding == b'\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+            return keydata
+
+    return None
+
+def get_all_partitions_of_type(partition_dict, part_type):
+    return [partition_dict[p]['start'] for p in partition_dict if partition_dict[p]['partition_type'] == guid_to_hex(part_type)]
+
+def load_plist_dict(pt):
+    # resultant pt has one extra malformed line in the xml, so we remove this.
+    plist_str = b''.join(pt.split(b'\n')[:-1]).decode()
+    d = plistlib.loads(plist_str)
+    return d
+
+# Recursive traversal - Recovery HD partition does not contain a lot of files, and so this approach is fine
+def traverse_filesystem(fs_object, target_file, path='/'):
+    for entry in fs_object.open_dir(path):
+        if entry.info.name.name in [b'.', b'..']:
+            continue
+
+        file_path = os.path.join(path, entry.info.name.name.decode('utf-8'))
+
+        if entry.info.meta and entry.info.meta.type == pytsk3.TSK_FS_META_TYPE_REG:
+            if entry.info.name.name == target_file.encode():
+                file_data = recover_file(fs_object, file_path)
+
+                # this returns to previous call i.e. the dir layer
+                return file_data
+
+        # Traverse lower layer if entry is a dir
+        elif entry.info.meta and entry.info.meta.type == pytsk3.TSK_FS_META_TYPE_DIR:
+            file_data = traverse_filesystem(fs_object, target_file, file_path)
+
+            if file_data:
+                return file_data
+
+def recover_file(fs_object, file_path):
+    file_obj = fs_object.open(file_path)
+    size = file_obj.info.meta.size
+    offset = 0
+    data = file_obj.read_random(offset, size)
+
+    return data
+
+def get_EncryptedRoot_plist_wipekey(image_file, start_pos):
+    img = pytsk3.Img_Info(image_file)
+    fs = pytsk3.FS_Info(img, offset=start_pos)
+    target_file = 'EncryptedRoot.plist.wipekey'
+    EncryptedRoot_data = traverse_filesystem(fs, target_file)
+
+    if not EncryptedRoot_data:
+        sys.stderr.write("EncryptedRoot.plist.wipekey not found in image file, exiting.")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    return EncryptedRoot_data
+
+def construct_fvde_hash(PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct):
+    salt = PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct[8:24]
+    kek  = PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct[32:56]
+    iterations = uint_to_int(PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct[168:172])
+    fvde_hash = f"$fvde$1${len(salt)}${salt.hex()}${iterations}${kek.hex()}"
+
+    return fvde_hash
+
+def format_hash_str(user_part):
+    if user_part == None:
+        return ''
+    # remove colons so that hash format is consistent and strip newlines
+    return user_part.replace("\n","").replace("\r","").replace(":","")
+
+def main():
+
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    p.add_argument('image_file')
+    args = p.parse_args()
+    image_file = args.image_file
+
+    with open(image_file, 'rb') as fp:
+        partition_dict = parse_partition_table(fp)
+
+        core_storage_volumes = get_all_partitions_of_type(partition_dict, HEX_CORE_STORAGE_TYPE_GUID)
+        if core_storage_volumes == []:
+            sys.stderr.write("[!] No CoreStorage volumes found, exiting.")
+            sys.exit(1)
+        boot_volumes = get_all_partitions_of_type(partition_dict, HEX_APPLE_BOOT_STORAGE_TYPE_GUID)
+
+        # Unlikely to have more than one boot volume, but loop anyway
+        for boot_start_pos in boot_volumes:
+            EncryptedRoot_data = get_EncryptedRoot_plist_wipekey(image_file, boot_start_pos)
+
+            for cs_start_pos in core_storage_volumes:
+                aes_key = parse_corestorage_header(fp, cs_start_pos)
+
+                tweak = b'\x00' * 16
+                pt = AES_XTS_decrypt(aes_key, tweak, EncryptedRoot_data)
+                d = load_plist_dict(pt)
+
+                user_index = 0
+                for i in range(len(d['CryptoUsers'])):
+                    # We want the local user login details i.e. not iCloud
+                    if d['CryptoUsers'][i].get('UserType') == LOCAL_USER_TYPE_ID:
+                        user_index = i
+                        passphrase_hint = d['CryptoUsers'][user_index].get('PassphraseHint')
+
+                        name_info = d['CryptoUsers'][user_index].get('UserNamesData')
+                        full_name_info = ''
+                        username_info  = ''
+                        if len(name_info) == 2:
+                            full_name_info, username_info = name_info[0].decode(), name_info[1].decode()
+
+                        full_name_info = format_hash_str(full_name_info)
+                        username_info  = format_hash_str(username_info)
+                        passphrase_hint = format_hash_str(passphrase_hint)
+
+                        # Hash info stored in the PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct in decrypted plist
+                        PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct = d['CryptoUsers'][user_index].get('PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct')
+                        fvde_hash = construct_fvde_hash(PassphraseWrappedKEKStruct)
+
+                        sys.stdout.write(f"{username_info}:{fvde_hash}:{full_name_info}:{passphrase_hint}")
+
+    return
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()