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@aibrahim-oai aibrahim-oai changed the title update sandbox update sandbox and approvals for review Oct 30, 2025
@aibrahim-oai aibrahim-oai marked this pull request as ready for review October 30, 2025 01:25
@aibrahim-oai aibrahim-oai enabled auto-merge (squash) October 30, 2025 01:27
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Comment on lines +88 to +89
sub_agent_config.sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
sub_agent_config.approval_policy = AskForApproval::Never;
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P0 Badge Keep review approvals

Setting the review delegate’s config to AskForApproval::Never removes all approval prompts for shell/apply_patch/tool executions. The delegate still has access to the regular shell tool (we only disable StreamableShell), and even under a read‑only sandbox it can read the entire filesystem. Before this change, the user’s existing policy (default OnRequest) caused ShellRuntime::wants_initial_approval and the orchestrator to route every shell/run approval through Session::request_command_approval, so the user had to consent before any command ran. After this change the reviewer can invoke exec_command/shell calls without any user approval and can exfiltrate sensitive data in its review output. That’s a security regression.

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auto-merge was automatically disabled October 30, 2025 19:37

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