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Security fixes from the 2026-11-10 audit: pool API, redirects, NAT64, CSV, Discord embeds, SSH host keys, verified downloads - #375
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…l checks - Pool API (--serve): without --serve-password only requests addressed to an IP or localhost are answered (DNS rebinding); /pop, /delete and /report refuse cross-site browser requests (Sec-Fetch-Site / foreign Origin); upstream logins are masked unless the API is password-protected - netio: Authorization, Cookie and Proxy-Authorization are dropped when a redirect changes the host or goes from https to http - MCP fetch_url: use netpolicy.is_public_address (NAT64, 6to4, Teredo) - proxies.csv: text cells starting with = + - @ tab CR get a leading ' - Discord bot: escape markdown in third-party fields, no backticks in code - proxy-list workflow: pin GitHub's published SSH host keys - live list and geo/ASN databases: no unverified TLS fallback
![github-advanced-security[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/57789?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| ["evil.example", f"evil.example:{port}", f"127.0.0.1:{port}", f"localhost:{port}", f"[::1]:{port}"]} | ||
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| answers = run_server(client) | ||
| assert answers.pop("evil.example").startswith(b"HTTP/1.1 403") |
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| answers = run_server(client) | ||
| assert answers.pop("evil.example").startswith(b"HTTP/1.1 403") | ||
| assert answers.pop(next(h for h in answers if h.startswith("evil"))).startswith(b"HTTP/1.1 403") |
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Part of #369. Fixes from a full-project security audit (no critical or high findings).
/pop,/delete,/reportrefuse cross-site browser requests (Sec-Fetch-Site/Origin), also with a password. Without a password, upstream logins come back masked (user:•••@); with--serve-passwordthe full URL is returned as documented. New section in docs/proxy-server.md.fetch_url: target check now usesnetpolicy.is_public_address, which refuses NAT64-wrapped private addresses.StrictHostKeyChecking=yes); a test fails on accept-new anywhere.Behaviour changes users may notice: API by host name without a password → 403 (use localhost/IP or set a password); masked logins without a password; CSV cells with a leading apostrophe; behind a TLS-inspecting firewall the live list fails instead of loading unverified.