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[group key addrs 2/5]: internal/ecies: add encrypt/decrypt with ECIES #1512

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Jun 25, 2025
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion go.mod
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ require (
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.14.0
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0
github.com/urfave/cli v1.22.14
golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20240325151524-a685a6edb6d8
golang.org/x/net v0.38.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.12.0
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -188,7 +189,6 @@ require (
go.uber.org/atomic v1.10.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/multierr v1.6.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/zap v1.23.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.21.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.31.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.23.0 // indirect
Expand Down
189 changes: 189 additions & 0 deletions internal/ecies/ecies.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
// This package implements an ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption
// Scheme) encryption. It uses ChaCha20Poly1305 for encryption and HKDF with
// SHA256 for key derivation. The package provides functions to encrypt and
// decrypt messages using a shared secret derived between two parties using ECDH
// (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman).

package ecies

import (
"bytes"
crand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"io"
"math"

"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcec/v2"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
)

const (
// protocolName is the name of the protocol used for encryption and
// decryption. This is used to salt the HKDF key derivation.
protocolName = "ECIES-HKDF-SHA256-XCHA20POLY1305"
)

// EncryptSha256ChaCha20Poly1305 encrypts the given message using
// ChaCha20Poly1305 with a shared secret (usually derived using ECDH between the
// sender's ephemeral key and the receiver's public key) that is hardened using
// HKDF with SHA256. The cipher also authenticates the additional data and
// prepends it to the returned encrypted message. The additional data is limited
// to at most 255 bytes. The output is a byte slice containing:
//
// <1 byte AD length> <* bytes AD> <24 bytes nonce> <* bytes ciphertext>
func EncryptSha256ChaCha20Poly1305(sharedSecret [32]byte, msg []byte,
additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {

if len(additionalData) > math.MaxUint8 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("additional data too long: %d bytes "+
"given, 255 bytes maximum", len(additionalData))
}

// We begin by hardening the shared secret against brute forcing by
// using HKDF with SHA256.
stretchedKey, err := HkdfSha256(sharedSecret[:], []byte(protocolName))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot derive hkdf key: %w", err)
}
Comment on lines +44 to +49
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Does this actually add "hardening"? I think that HKDF with a constant salt doesn’t add brute-force hardening.

I wander if we can't just use the nonce below as the salt here. And then protocolName can be the info arg in HkdfSha256 's hkdf.New call.

If we use the nonce as the salt then Encrypt... and Decrypt... will then have access to the same (random) salt and the serialization format doesn't change.

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At a high level, you can view it as just binding the shared secret we create to our particular context (eg: if we change the protocol name, for the same shared secret we get a diff stretched key). The Noise Protocol does something similar to create an initial hash accumulator value which gets mixed into the initial shared secrets.

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@ffranr ffranr Jun 25, 2025

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Yes, I see this as just a form of binding as well. I think we should update the comments in ecies.go to clarify that this isn't providing hardening, but rather serving as a binding mechanism.

Thanks for the link!

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IMO it does harden against brute force because you need to use more CPU cycles per shared secret you want to try. But I guess in this context that's not really relevant as you'd attack the encryption in different manners than doing brute force.


// We can now create a new XChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD cipher using the
// stretched key.
aead, err := chacha20poly1305.NewX(stretchedKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot create new chacha20poly1305 "+
"cipher: %w", err)
}

// Select a random nonce, and leave capacity for the ciphertext.
nonce := make(
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As we're using a random nonce here, we should use NewX, which is meant for cases where a counter-like nonce isn't used. Basically some extra security margin for when nonces are generated randomly.

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Ah, yes, makes sense. Changed to X.

[]byte, aead.NonceSize(),
aead.NonceSize()+len(msg)+aead.Overhead(),
)

if _, err := crand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot read random nonce: %w", err)
}

ciphertext := aead.Seal(nonce, nonce, msg, additionalData)

var result bytes.Buffer
result.WriteByte(byte(len(additionalData)))
result.Write(additionalData)
result.Write(ciphertext)

return result.Bytes(), nil
}

// ExtractAdditionalData extracts the additional data and the ciphertext from
// the given message. The message must be in the format:
//
// <1 byte AD length> <* bytes AD> <24 bytes nonce> <* bytes ciphertext>
func ExtractAdditionalData(msg []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
// We need at least 1 byte for the additional data length.
if len(msg) < 1 {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ciphertext too short: %d bytes "+
"given, 1 byte minimum", len(msg))
}

// Extract the additional data length from the first byte of the
// ciphertext.
additionalDataLen := int(msg[0])

// Before we start, we check that the ciphertext is at least
// 1+adLength+24+16 bytes long. This is the minimum size for a valid
// ciphertext, as it contains the additional data length (1 byte), the
// additional data (additionalDataLen bytes), the nonce (24 bytes) and
// the overhead (16 bytes).
minLength := 1 + additionalDataLen + chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX +
chacha20poly1305.Overhead
if len(msg) < minLength {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ciphertext too short: %d bytes "+
"given, %d bytes minimum", len(msg), minLength)
}

additionalData := msg[1 : 1+additionalDataLen]
msg = msg[1+additionalDataLen:]

return additionalData, msg, nil
}

// DecryptSha256ChaCha20Poly1305 decrypts the given ciphertext using
// ChaCha20Poly1305 with a shared secret (usually derived using ECDH between the
// sender's ephemeral key and the receiver's public key) that is hardened using
// HKDF with SHA256. The cipher also authenticates the additional data and
// prepends it to the returned encrypted message. The additional data is limited
// to at most 255 bytes. The ciphertext must be in the format:
//
// <1 byte AD length> <* bytes AD> <24 bytes nonce> <* bytes ciphertext>
func DecryptSha256ChaCha20Poly1305(sharedSecret [32]byte,
msg []byte) ([]byte, error) {

// Make sure the message correctly encodes the additional data.
additionalData, remainder, err := ExtractAdditionalData(msg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

// We begin by hardening the shared secret against brute forcing by
// using HKDF with SHA256.
stretchedKey, err := HkdfSha256(sharedSecret[:], []byte(protocolName))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot derive hkdf key: %w", err)
}

// We can now create a new XChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD cipher using the
// stretched key.
aead, err := chacha20poly1305.NewX(stretchedKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot create new chacha20poly1305 "+
"cipher: %w", err)
}

// Split additional data, nonce and ciphertext.
nonce := remainder[:aead.NonceSize()]
ciphertext := remainder[aead.NonceSize():]

// Decrypt the message and check it wasn't tampered with.
plaintext, err := aead.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot decrypt message: %w", err)
}

return plaintext, nil
}

// HkdfSha256 derives a 32-byte key from the given secret and salt using HKDF
// with SHA256.
func HkdfSha256(secret, salt []byte) ([32]byte, error) {
var key [32]byte
kdf := hkdf.New(sha256.New, secret, salt, nil)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(kdf, key[:]); err != nil {
return [32]byte{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot read secret from HKDF "+
"reader: %w", err)
}

return key, nil
}

// ECDH performs a scalar multiplication (ECDH-like operation) between the
// target private key and remote public key. The output returned will be
// the sha256 of the resulting shared point serialized in compressed format. If
// k is our private key, and P is the public key, we perform the following
// operation:
//
// sx = k*P
// s = sha256(sx.SerializeCompressed())
func ECDH(privKey *btcec.PrivateKey, pub *btcec.PublicKey) ([32]byte, error) {
var (
pubJacobian btcec.JacobianPoint
s btcec.JacobianPoint
)
pub.AsJacobian(&pubJacobian)

btcec.ScalarMultNonConst(&privKey.Key, &pubJacobian, &s)
s.ToAffine()
sPubKey := btcec.NewPublicKey(&s.X, &s.Y)
return sha256.Sum256(sPubKey.SerializeCompressed()), nil
}
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