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Fix bikeshed error.
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dajiaji committed Sep 17, 2019
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18 changes: 10 additions & 8 deletions index.bs
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Expand Up @@ -181,23 +181,25 @@ This section's description is written for [=Web PKI certificates=] with Server-a
following CA/BForum Baseline Requirement [[CAB-BR]].
However, a [=public CA=] cannot verify a local network’s local IP address.
So [=public CAs=] cannot generally issue certificates for [=devices=], barring an exception, which is technically constrained certificates.
- Technically constrained intermediate CA

#### Technically constrained intermediate CA #### {#approach-1-1}

The term "technically constrained intermediate CA" in CABForum's baseline Requirement might be confusing.
There is a term "technically constrained" in the [[CAB-BR]],
and "name constraint" is one of requirements for Certificates with "EKU = server-auth" to be "technically constrained"
If EE (End Entity) certificates will be technically constrained, issuing [=public CA=] do not need to verify the DNS name at the time of issuance,
and that [=public CA=] can publish certificates for [=devices=].

Name constraints seem to working well in many browsers now[[BETTER-TLS]].
The mechanism of name constraint is well explained by Netflix[BETTER-TLS],
Name constraints seem to working well in many browsers now [[BETTER-TLS]].
The mechanism of name constraint is well explained by Netflix [[BETTER-TLS]],
so we briefly explain how it works in the next paragraph.

- How technically constrained intermediate CA issues [=Web PKI certificates=]
#### How technically constrained intermediate CA issues [=Web PKI certificates=] #### {#approach-1-2}

We assume that the device vendor has to have control over ".camera.example.com," for example.

<div align="center">
<img src="figs/fig_sol_1_1.png" width="480px">
<img src="figs/fig_sol_1_1.png" width="360px">
</div>

A [=public CA=] validates the device vendor's control over .camera.example.com,
Expand All @@ -207,10 +209,10 @@ Since the vendor is controlling .camera.example.com and .camera.example.com has
validation of "device1.camera.example.com" can be skipped at that time, and that [=public CA=] would able to issue an EE certificate for device1.camera.example.com.
After transporting that certificate to a [=device=] somehow, that [=device=] can use a [=Web PKI certificate=].

- Possible use case
#### Possible use case #### {#approach-1-3}

<div align="center">
<img src="figs/fig_sol_1_2.png" width="480px">
<img src="figs/fig_sol_1_2.png" width="720px">
</div>

Here, we assume the DNS server of ".camera.example.com" has a record of [=device=] and
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