Fix: Auth Jwt Recipe Bugs #3330
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Summary of ChangesHello @stewartmbofana, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request addresses several reported bugs and significantly refactors the JWT authentication recipe. The primary goal is to enhance the application's architecture by introducing clear separation of concerns through new 'handlers', 'models', and 'services' layers. This restructuring not only fixes existing issues but also lays a foundation for better maintainability and scalability. Key additions include comprehensive authentication features like logout and refresh token mechanisms, making the JWT implementation more robust and user-friendly. Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a major refactoring to improve the project's architecture by separating concerns into handlers, services, and repositories. While this is a great step forward, the refactoring has introduced several critical bugs and inconsistencies, particularly around JWT authentication, database interactions, and business logic in handlers. My review focuses on fixing these critical issues, improving architectural consistency by properly using the new repository layer, and cleaning up leftover or duplicated code.
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Actionable comments posted: 17
🧹 Nitpick comments (10)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (1)
32-46: Manual timestamp management is unnecessary.GORM automatically populates
CreatedAtvia hooks when usinggorm.Modelor explicitCreatedAt time.Timefields. Manually settingCreatedAt: time.Now()is redundant and bypasses GORM's automatic handling.If you keep custom timestamp fields (per the model fix above), remove the manual assignment and let GORM handle it:
func (r *UserRepository) CreateUser(email, username, passwordHash string) (*User, error) { user := &User{ Id: uuid.New().String(), Email: email, Username: username, Password: passwordHash, - CreatedAt: time.Now(), }auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
17-32: Connection setup looks solid.The DSN construction and AutoMigrate configuration are correct. The panic on connection failure is an acceptable pattern for startup initialization, though you could log more details before panicking.
Optional: Provide more context in the panic message:
DB, err = gorm.Open(postgres.Open(dsn), &gorm.Config{}) if err != nil { - panic("failed to connect database") + panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to connect database: %v", err)) }auth-jwt/handlers/user.go (4)
41-48: Use the repository instead of direct DB accessgetUserByID bypasses UserRepository, breaking the new layering.
Refactor to
return uh.userRepo.GetUserByID(id)and remove database dependency here.
86-96: Avoid duplicating password hashing logic; reuse service helperYou already have services/password.go. Prefer a single hashing function and consistent cost.
Replace local hashPassword with services.HashPassword and remove the helper here.
145-147: Bypass of repository layer on update
database.DB.Save(user)skips UserRepository. Keep handlers repo-oriented for consistency, testability, and future migrations.Introduce
UpdateUseron the repo (or dedicated method to update Names) and call it here.
156-166: Password field in DeleteUser is parsed but unusedEither validate the password before deletion or drop it from the request to avoid confusion.
auth-jwt/handlers/product.go (1)
24-30: Use ProductRepository instead of direct DB in GetAllProductsKeeps handlers decoupled from persistence and consistent with other methods.
-func (ph *ProductHandler) GetAllProducts(c *fiber.Ctx) error { - var products []models.Product - database.DB.Find(&products) - return c.JSON(fiber.Map{ - "status": "success", - "message": "All products", - "data": products, - }) -} +func (ph *ProductHandler) GetAllProducts(c *fiber.Ctx) error { + products, err := ph.productRepo.GetAll() + if err != nil { + return c.Status(fiber.StatusInternalServerError).JSON(fiber.Map{ + "status": "error", + "message": "Failed to fetch products", + "data": err, + }) + } + return c.JSON(fiber.Map{ + "status": "success", + "message": "All products", + "data": products, + }) +}Remove the now-unneeded database import.
auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go (1)
82-88: Harden auth cookies (Secure/SameSite) and align cookie expiry with token TTLSet Secure and a SameSite policy; consider matching cookie expiry to JWT exp to avoid stale cookies.
Also applies to: 173-178, 100-107
auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
12-19: Replace brittle string comparison with error type assertion or custom handler
The jwt middleware doesn’t export sentinel errors for missing/malformed tokens. Instead of comparingerr.Error(), asserterr.(*fiber.Error)and switch on itsCode(400 vs 401), or supply a custom ErrorHandler (or vendor-patch the middleware) to expose named errors for use witherrors.Is.auth-jwt/router/router.go (1)
42-50: Consider service layer for products to match auth pattern.Products use repositories directly without a service layer, while authentication uses the service layer pattern. If products eventually need business logic (validation, complex queries, cross-cutting concerns), a service layer would provide consistency and maintainability.
This is optional and can be deferred if products remain simple CRUD operations.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
auth-jwt/go.modis excluded by!**/*.mod
📒 Files selected for processing (23)
auth-jwt/.env.sample(1 hunks)auth-jwt/README.md(1 hunks)auth-jwt/database/connect.go(0 hunks)auth-jwt/database/database.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handler/api.go(0 hunks)auth-jwt/handler/auth.go(0 hunks)auth-jwt/handler/product.go(0 hunks)auth-jwt/handler/user.go(0 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/api.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/product.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/user.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/main.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/model/product.go(0 hunks)auth-jwt/model/user.go(0 hunks)auth-jwt/models/product.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/models/user.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/router/router.go(2 hunks)auth-jwt/services/auth.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/services/password.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/services/product.go(1 hunks)
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (7)
- auth-jwt/model/user.go
- auth-jwt/handler/user.go
- auth-jwt/database/connect.go
- auth-jwt/model/product.go
- auth-jwt/handler/auth.go
- auth-jwt/handler/api.go
- auth-jwt/handler/product.go
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (11)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (2)
auth-jwt/models/product.go (1)
Product(9-15)auth-jwt/models/user.go (1)
User(11-21)
auth-jwt/services/product.go (1)
auth-jwt/models/product.go (1)
ProductRepository(18-20)
auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go (2)
auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
RefreshToken(11-18)auth-jwt/services/auth.go (4)
AuthService(19-24)ErrInvalidCredentials(12-12)ErrInvalidToken(13-13)ErrExpiredToken(14-14)
auth-jwt/handlers/user.go (2)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
UserRepository(23-25)User(11-21)auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)
auth-jwt/services/auth.go (3)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
UserRepository(23-25)User(11-21)auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
RefreshTokenRepository(21-23)auth-jwt/services/password.go (2)
HashPassword(6-14)VerifyPassword(17-19)
auth-jwt/handlers/product.go (2)
auth-jwt/models/product.go (2)
ProductRepository(18-20)Product(9-15)auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)
auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)
auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
local-development-testcontainers/utils/errors.go (1)
ErrorHandler(15-29)
auth-jwt/router/router.go (10)
auth-jwt/handlers/api.go (1)
Hello(6-12)auth-jwt/models/user.go (1)
NewUserRepository(27-29)auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (2)
NewRefreshTokenRepository(26-28)RefreshToken(11-18)auth-jwt/services/auth.go (1)
NewAuthService(27-34)auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go (1)
NewAuthHandler(47-51)auth-jwt/handlers/user.go (1)
NewUserHandler(20-24)auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
Protected(9-28)auth-jwt/models/product.go (1)
NewProductRepository(22-24)auth-jwt/handlers/product.go (1)
NewProductHandler(16-20)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (3)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)auth-docker-postgres-jwt/handler/user.go (2)
DeleteUser(125-151)UpdateUser(99-122)gorm-mysql/routes/routes.go (1)
Delete(60-68)
auth-jwt/models/product.go (1)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)
🪛 dotenv-linter (3.3.0)
auth-jwt/.env.sample
[warning] 4-4: [UnorderedKey] The DB_PASSWORD key should go before the DB_PORT key
(UnorderedKey)
[warning] 5-5: [UnorderedKey] The DB_NAME key should go before the DB_PASSWORD key
(UnorderedKey)
🔇 Additional comments (10)
auth-jwt/README.md (1)
67-68: Documentation additions look good.The new endpoint descriptions for logout and refresh-token align with the restructured authentication flow.
auth-jwt/services/password.go (1)
6-19: LGTM! Solid bcrypt implementation.The password hashing and verification functions correctly use bcrypt with appropriate defaults and error handling.
auth-jwt/.env.sample (1)
4-6: LGTM! Sample values are appropriate.The populated values provide good examples for local development. The static analysis warnings about key ordering are purely stylistic and don't affect functionality.
auth-jwt/main.go (1)
6-7: Import path updates look correct.The module path changes align with the project restructuring.
auth-jwt/handlers/api.go (1)
6-12: LGTM! Simple and effective health check endpoint.The Hello handler provides a clean status response for API availability verification.
auth-jwt/services/auth.go (1)
141-167: LoginWithRefresh returns empty refresh token unless repo sets TokenBlocked by the RefreshTokenRepository bug. After setting Token on creation, this will work.
auth-jwt/router/router.go (4)
3-14: LGTM!The imports are well-organized and appropriate for the modular architecture with repositories, services, and handlers.
31-31: Consider protecting the logout endpoint.The logout endpoint is currently unprotected. While logout can work with just a refresh token in the request body, requiring authentication ensures only authenticated users can revoke their tokens and prevents unauthenticated abuse.
Should the logout endpoint require authentication? If yes, apply this diff:
- auth.Post("/logout", authHandler.Logout) + auth.Post("/logout", middleware.Protected(), authHandler.Logout)
34-40: User routes design looks sound.All user endpoints are protected, which is appropriate. The protected
POST /usersappears to be an admin-only endpoint for user management, while public registration occurs via/auth/register. This separation is a good practice.
23-23: DB initialization verified
database.ConnectDB()is invoked beforerouter.SetupRoutes(app)in main.go. No further action required.
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Actionable comments posted: 6
♻️ Duplicate comments (2)
auth-jwt/handlers/user.go (1)
163-171: Potential panic: Unsafe type assertion on Locals("user").Line 165 performs an unsafe type assertion
c.Locals("user").(*jwt.Token)without checking if the value exists or is the correct type. While theProtected()middleware should set this value, defensive coding prevents potential panics from middleware ordering issues or future changes.Apply this diff to add safe type assertion:
func (uh *UserHandler) DeleteUser(c *fiber.Ctx) error { id := c.Params("id") - if !validToken(c.Locals("user").(*jwt.Token), id) { + tok, ok := c.Locals("user").(*jwt.Token) + if !ok || !validToken(tok, id) { return c.Status(fiber.StatusUnauthorized).JSON(fiber.Map{ "status": "error", "message": "Invalid token id", "data": nil, }) }auth-jwt/services/auth.go (1)
26-34: JWT secret coordination with middleware already flagged.The past review comment correctly identifies that this service's jwtSecret must match the middleware's verification secret. The DI pattern used here (accepting jwtSecret as a parameter) is appropriate, but coordination with middleware configuration is essential.
🧹 Nitpick comments (4)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (1)
67-67: Fix formatting: missing space after comma.The function signature is missing a space after the comma between parameters.
Apply this diff:
-func (r *UserRepository) UpdateUser(id uint,updateUser User) (*User, error) { +func (r *UserRepository) UpdateUser(id uint, updateUser User) (*User, error) {auth-jwt/.env.sample (1)
7-7: Optional: Consider key ordering for consistency.The static analysis tool suggests ordering
ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTESbeforeDB_HOST(alphabetically). While this is a minor style preference and not functionally important, consistent ordering can improve readability in larger configuration files.Based on learnings: In recipe/example projects, hardcoded or empty credentials in sample files are acceptable as they serve as templates for users to modify.
auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
30-41: Token generation fixed; consider stronger entropy for refresh tokens.The critical issue has been resolved—
CreateRefreshTokennow generates and assigns a token value usinguuid.New().String()(Line 32). This ensures the refresh token flow will work correctly.However, refresh tokens are long-lived credentials. For enhanced security, consider using cryptographically secure random bytes instead of UUIDs, which are designed for uniqueness rather than unpredictability.
Optional enhancement for stronger security:
import ( "crypto/rand" "encoding/base64" ) func generateSecureToken() (string, error) { b := make([]byte, 32) if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil { return "", err } return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil } // In CreateRefreshToken: tokenString, err := generateSecureToken() if err != nil { return nil, err } token := &RefreshToken{ Token: tokenString, // ... rest of fields }auth-jwt/services/auth.go (1)
36-43: Consider removing unnecessary wrapper.This method simply delegates to the repository without adding any business logic or value. Consider accessing the repository directly where this method is called, or add meaningful service-layer logic here.
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📒 Files selected for processing (10)
auth-jwt/.env.sample(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/product.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/user.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go(2 hunks)auth-jwt/models/product.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/models/user.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/router/router.go(2 hunks)auth-jwt/services/auth.go(1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- auth-jwt/handlers/product.go
🧰 Additional context used
🧠 Learnings (2)
📚 Learning: 2024-11-25T19:36:09.712Z
Learnt from: norri
PR: gofiber/recipes#2701
File: clean-code/app/config_test.go:10-20
Timestamp: 2024-11-25T19:36:09.712Z
Learning: In this codebase, the database URLs used in test code contain placeholder credentials that are not real passwords.
Applied to files:
auth-jwt/.env.sample
📚 Learning: 2025-02-07T10:16:22.915Z
Learnt from: SadikSunbul
PR: gofiber/recipes#2797
File: email-verification/config/config.go:15-23
Timestamp: 2025-02-07T10:16:22.915Z
Learning: In recipe/example projects, it's acceptable to use hardcoded credentials and configuration values to demonstrate the implementation, as they serve as clear templates that users can modify for their own use.
Applied to files:
auth-jwt/.env.sample
🧬 Code graph analysis (8)
auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
local-development-testcontainers/utils/errors.go (1)
ErrorHandler(15-29)
auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go (2)
auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
RefreshToken(11-17)auth-jwt/services/auth.go (5)
AuthService(19-24)ErrInvalidCredentials(12-12)ErrEmailInUse(15-15)ErrInvalidToken(13-13)ErrExpiredToken(14-14)
auth-jwt/models/product.go (2)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)gorm-mysql/routes/routes.go (2)
Update(47-57)Delete(60-68)
auth-jwt/router/router.go (10)
auth-jwt/handlers/api.go (1)
Hello(6-12)auth-jwt/models/user.go (1)
NewUserRepository(22-24)auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (2)
NewRefreshTokenRepository(25-27)RefreshToken(11-17)auth-jwt/services/auth.go (1)
NewAuthService(27-34)auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go (1)
NewAuthHandler(47-51)auth-jwt/handlers/user.go (1)
NewUserHandler(18-22)auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
Protected(11-30)auth-jwt/models/product.go (1)
NewProductRepository(20-22)auth-jwt/handlers/product.go (1)
NewProductHandler(15-19)
auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)
auth-jwt/services/auth.go (3)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
UserRepository(18-20)User(9-16)auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
RefreshTokenRepository(20-22)auth-jwt/services/password.go (2)
HashPassword(6-14)VerifyPassword(17-19)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)auth-docker-postgres-jwt/handler/user.go (2)
DeleteUser(125-151)UpdateUser(99-122)
auth-jwt/handlers/user.go (1)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
UserRepository(18-20)User(9-16)
🪛 dotenv-linter (3.3.0)
auth-jwt/.env.sample
[warning] 7-7: [UnorderedKey] The ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES key should go before the DB_HOST key
(UnorderedKey)
🔇 Additional comments (8)
auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
11-30: LGTM! JWT secret issue resolved.The middleware now correctly reads the JWT secret from the
SECRETenvironment variable (Line 13), resolving the critical mismatch that was previously flagged. This aligns with the secret used byAuthServiceinrouter.go(Line 25), ensuring tokens will validate correctly.The inlined error handler properly distinguishes between malformed JWT (400) and invalid/expired JWT (401) with clear error messages.
auth-jwt/models/product.go (1)
8-13: LGTM! Product model is now correctly structured.The previous critical issue regarding conflicting primary keys has been resolved. The
Productstruct now correctly uses onlygorm.Modelfor ID and timestamps, with no conflicting customIdfield. The structure is clean and follows GORM conventions.auth-jwt/router/router.go (1)
25-35: LGTM! Configuration and security improvements implemented.The router now correctly:
- Validates that the
SECRETenvironment variable is set (Lines 25-28), preventing silent failures- Makes the access token TTL configurable via
ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTESwith a sensible 15-minute default (Lines 29-34)- Uses the same
SECRETvalue that the middleware expects (matching Line 13 inmiddleware/auth.go)These changes resolve the critical issues flagged in previous reviews and align with production best practices for configuration management.
auth-jwt/services/auth.go (5)
66-85: LGTM!Login implementation is secure and correct. It appropriately returns
ErrInvalidCredentialsfor both "user not found" and "invalid password", which prevents email enumeration attacks.
87-111: LGTM!Access token generation is correctly implemented with HS256 signing and appropriate claims (sub, username, email, exp, iat). The TTL is configurable via the service constructor.
113-137: LGTM!Token validation is robust and secure. It correctly validates the signing method (preventing algorithm confusion attacks), distinguishes between expired and invalid tokens, and properly extracts claims.
139-167: LGTM!LoginWithRefresh correctly implements the dual-token flow, authenticating the user and issuing both access and refresh tokens. The refresh token TTL is configurable per-request.
169-200: LGTM!RefreshAccessToken properly validates the refresh token (existence, revocation status, expiration) before issuing a new access token. The user is re-fetched to ensure they still exist in the system.
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Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (1)
67-67: Add space after comma for consistency.Minor formatting: the function signature is missing a space after the comma between parameters.
Apply this diff:
-func (r *UserRepository) UpdateUser(id uint,updateUser User) (*User, error) { +func (r *UserRepository) UpdateUser(id uint, updateUser User) (*User, error) {
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/handlers/user.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/models/user.go(1 hunks)auth-jwt/services/auth.go(1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- auth-jwt/handlers/auth.go
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (3)
auth-jwt/handlers/user.go (2)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
UserRepository(18-20)User(9-16)auth-docker-postgres-jwt/handler/user.go (2)
UpdateUser(99-122)DeleteUser(125-151)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
auth-jwt/database/database.go (1)
DB(14-14)auth-docker-postgres-jwt/handler/user.go (2)
DeleteUser(125-151)UpdateUser(99-122)
auth-jwt/services/auth.go (3)
auth-jwt/models/user.go (2)
UserRepository(18-20)User(9-16)auth-jwt/models/refresh_token.go (1)
RefreshTokenRepository(20-22)auth-jwt/services/password.go (2)
HashPassword(6-14)VerifyPassword(17-19)
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
15-29: Consider more robust error type checking instead of string comparison.The error handler correctly distinguishes between malformed (400) and invalid/expired (401) JWT errors. However, using
err.Error() == "Missing or malformed JWT"is fragile and may break if the library updates its error messages.Consider using error type assertions for more robust error handling:
ErrorHandler: func(c *fiber.Ctx, err error) error { status := fiber.StatusUnauthorized message := "Invalid or expired JWT" - if err.Error() == "Missing or malformed JWT" { + // Check for specific error types or use errors.Is if the library provides sentinel errors + if err.Error() == "Missing or malformed JWT" || err.Error() == "missing or malformed JWT" { status = fiber.StatusBadRequest message = "Missing or malformed JWT" } return c.Status(status).JSON(fiber.Map{ "status": "error", "message": message, "data": nil, }) },Alternatively, consult the
gofiber/contrib/jwtdocumentation to see if it provides specific error types that can be checked witherrors.Asorerrors.Is(similar to the pattern inlocal-development-testcontainers/utils/errors.go). This would be more maintainable across library version updates.That said, the overall error handling structure with appropriate status codes and JSON response format looks good.
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📒 Files selected for processing (1)
auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (1)
auth-jwt/middleware/auth.go (1)
local-development-testcontainers/utils/errors.go (1)
ErrorHandler(15-29)
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