Runspector holds a Garmin session on your computer and can put workouts on your watch, so a flaw here can reach an account and a training day. Please report one privately.

Use Report a vulnerability on the repository's Security tab. That opens a private advisory only the maintainer sees. Please do not open a public issue for it.

Say what an attacker can do, the steps or a proof of concept, and the version (runspector --version). This is a one-person project: reports are read as soon as possible, and a fix goes out as a release with a note in its release text.

• The Garmin session: anything that reads or sends the stored session tokens (runspector login writes them under ~/.runspector/) somewhere other than Garmin.
• The write path: a workout put on, moved or taken off the watch without the athlete's yes to that proposal - through the web app, the MCP tools or the coach.
• Text from Garmin taken as an instruction: a workout name, calendar label or other free text that makes the coach act, approve, or skip a safety rule (pain, illness, energy).
• The local web server (runspector serve): a page on another site or another machine that reaches its API, despite the loopback default, the Host check and the token.
• Files: a path built from outside text that leaves ~/.runspector/.
• The release: the workflows that build, attest and publish the package.

Garmin's own services, the Claude apps and models, and a computer that is already compromised.

The latest release on PyPI. Fixes are not backported.