feat(payments): add MPP core runtime scaffolding

.env.example

@@ -45,14 +45,44 @@ MINIMAX_API_KEY=
 MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY=
 # MINIMAX_CN_BASE_URL=https://api.minimaxi.com/v1  # Override default base URL
 
+# =============================================================================
+# LLM PROVIDER (OpenCode Zen)
+# =============================================================================
+# OpenCode Zen provides curated, tested models (GPT, Claude, Gemini, MiniMax, GLM, Kimi)
+# Pay-as-you-go pricing. Get your key at: https://opencode.ai/auth
+OPENCODE_ZEN_API_KEY=
+# OPENCODE_ZEN_BASE_URL=https://opencode.ai/zen/v1  # Override default base URL
+
+# =============================================================================
+# LLM PROVIDER (OpenCode Go)
+# =============================================================================
+# OpenCode Go provides access to open models (GLM-5, Kimi K2.5, MiniMax M2.5)
+# $10/month subscription. Get your key at: https://opencode.ai/auth
+OPENCODE_GO_API_KEY=
+
+# =============================================================================
+# LLM PROVIDER (Hugging Face Inference Providers)
+# =============================================================================
+# Hugging Face routes to 20+ open models via unified OpenAI-compatible endpoint.
+# Free tier included ($0.10/month), no markup on provider rates.
+# Get your token at: https://huggingface.co/settings/tokens
+# Required permission: "Make calls to Inference Providers"
+HF_TOKEN=
+# OPENCODE_GO_BASE_URL=https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1  # Override default base URL
+
 # =============================================================================
 # TOOL API KEYS
 # =============================================================================
 
+# Parallel API Key - AI-native web search and extract
+# Get at: https://parallel.ai
+PARALLEL_API_KEY=
+
 # Firecrawl API Key - Web search, extract, and crawl
 # Get at: https://firecrawl.dev/
 FIRECRAWL_API_KEY=
 
+
 # FAL.ai API Key - Image generation
 # Get at: https://fal.ai/
 FAL_KEY=
@@ -275,3 +305,27 @@ WANDB_API_KEY=
 # GITHUB_APP_ID=
 # GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH=
 # GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID=
+
+# Groq API key (free tier — used for Whisper STT in voice mode)
+# GROQ_API_KEY=
+
+# =============================================================================
+# STT PROVIDER SELECTION
+# =============================================================================
+# Default STT provider is "local" (faster-whisper) — runs on your machine, no API key needed.
+# Install with: pip install faster-whisper
+# Model downloads automatically on first use (~150 MB for "base").
+# To use cloud providers instead, set GROQ_API_KEY or VOICE_TOOLS_OPENAI_KEY above.
+# Provider priority: local > groq > openai
+# Configure in config.yaml: stt.provider: local | groq | openai
+
+# =============================================================================
+# STT ADVANCED OVERRIDES (optional)
+# =============================================================================
+# Override default STT models per provider (normally set via stt.model in config.yaml)
+# STT_GROQ_MODEL=whisper-large-v3-turbo
+# STT_OPENAI_MODEL=whisper-1
+
+# Override STT provider endpoints (for proxies or self-hosted instances)
+# GROQ_BASE_URL=https://api.groq.com/openai/v1
+# STT_OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1

.envrc

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+use flake

.github/workflows/docs-site-checks.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+name: Docs Site Checks
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - 'website/**'
+      - '.github/workflows/docs-site-checks.yml'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+jobs:
+  docs-site-checks:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: 20
+          cache: npm
+          cache-dependency-path: website/package-lock.json
+
+      - name: Install website dependencies
+        run: npm ci
+        working-directory: website
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: '3.11'
+
+      - name: Install ascii-guard
+        run: python -m pip install ascii-guard
+
+      - name: Lint docs diagrams
+        run: npm run lint:diagrams
+        working-directory: website
+
+      - name: Build Docusaurus
+        run: npm run build
+        working-directory: website

.github/workflows/nix.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+name: Nix
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - 'flake.nix'
+      - 'flake.lock'
+      - 'nix/**'
+      - 'pyproject.toml'
+      - 'uv.lock'
+      - 'hermes_cli/**'
+      - 'run_agent.py'
+      - 'acp_adapter/**'
+
+concurrency:
+  group: nix-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  nix:
+    strategy:
+      matrix:
+        os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest]
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: DeterminateSystems/nix-installer-action@main
+      - uses: DeterminateSystems/magic-nix-cache-action@main
+      - name: Check flake
+        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
+        run: nix flake check --print-build-logs
+      - name: Build package
+        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
+        run: nix build --print-build-logs
+      - name: Evaluate flake (macOS)
+        if: runner.os == 'macOS'
+        run: nix flake show --json > /dev/null

.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+name: Supply Chain Audit
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  scan:
+    name: Scan PR for supply chain risks
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Scan diff for suspicious patterns
+        id: scan
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+
+          BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
+          HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
+
+          # Get the full diff (added lines only)
+          DIFF=$(git diff "$BASE".."$HEAD" -- . ':!uv.lock' ':!*.lock' ':!package-lock.json' ':!yarn.lock' || true)
+
+          FINDINGS=""
+          CRITICAL=false
+
+          # --- .pth files (auto-execute on Python startup) ---
+          PTH_FILES=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep '\.pth$' || true)
+          if [ -n "$PTH_FILES" ]; then
+            CRITICAL=true
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: .pth file added or modified
+          Python \`.pth\` files in \`site-packages/\` execute automatically when the interpreter starts — no import required. This is the exact mechanism used in the [litellm supply chain attack](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/24512).
+
+          **Files:**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${PTH_FILES}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- base64 + exec/eval combo (the litellm attack pattern) ---
+          B64_EXEC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'base64\.(b64decode|decodebytes|urlsafe_b64decode)' | grep -iE 'exec\(|eval\(' | head -10 || true)
+          if [ -n "$B64_EXEC_HITS" ]; then
+            CRITICAL=true
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: base64 decode + exec/eval combo
+          This is the exact pattern used in the [litellm supply chain attack](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/24512) — base64-decoded strings passed to exec/eval to hide credential-stealing payloads.
+
+          **Matches:**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${B64_EXEC_HITS}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- base64 decode/encode (alone — legitimate uses exist) ---
+          B64_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'base64\.(b64decode|b64encode|decodebytes|encodebytes|urlsafe_b64decode)|atob\(|btoa\(|Buffer\.from\(.*base64' | head -20 || true)
+          if [ -n "$B64_HITS" ]; then
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### ⚠️ WARNING: base64 encoding/decoding detected
+          Base64 has legitimate uses (images, JWT, etc.) but is also commonly used to obfuscate malicious payloads. Verify the usage is appropriate.
+
+          **Matches (first 20):**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${B64_HITS}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- exec/eval with string arguments ---
+          EXEC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -E '(exec|eval)\s*\(' | grep -v '^\+\s*#' | grep -v 'test_\|mock\|assert\|# ' | head -20 || true)
+          if [ -n "$EXEC_HITS" ]; then
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### ⚠️ WARNING: exec() or eval() usage
+          Dynamic code execution can hide malicious behavior, especially when combined with base64 or network fetches.
+
+          **Matches (first 20):**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${EXEC_HITS}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- subprocess with encoded/obfuscated commands ---
+          PROC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -E 'subprocess\.(Popen|call|run)\s*\(' | grep -iE 'base64|decode|encode|\\x|chr\(' | head -10 || true)
+          if [ -n "$PROC_HITS" ]; then
+            CRITICAL=true
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: subprocess with encoded/obfuscated command
+          Subprocess calls with encoded arguments are a strong indicator of payload execution.
+
+          **Matches:**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${PROC_HITS}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- Network calls to non-standard domains ---
+          EXFIL_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'requests\.(post|put)\(|httpx\.(post|put)\(|urllib\.request\.urlopen' | grep -v '^\+\s*#' | grep -v 'test_\|mock\|assert' | head -10 || true)
+          if [ -n "$EXFIL_HITS" ]; then
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### ⚠️ WARNING: Outbound network calls (POST/PUT)
+          Outbound POST/PUT requests in new code could be data exfiltration. Verify the destination URLs are legitimate.
+
+          **Matches (first 10):**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${EXFIL_HITS}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- setup.py / setup.cfg install hooks ---
+          SETUP_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep -E '(setup\.py|setup\.cfg|__init__\.pth|sitecustomize\.py|usercustomize\.py)$' || true)
+          if [ -n "$SETUP_HITS" ]; then
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### ⚠️ WARNING: Install hook files modified
+          These files can execute code during package installation or interpreter startup.
+
+          **Files:**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${SETUP_HITS}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- Compile/marshal/pickle (code object injection) ---
+          MARSHAL_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'marshal\.loads|pickle\.loads|compile\(' | grep -v '^\+\s*#' | grep -v 'test_\|re\.compile\|ast\.compile' | head -10 || true)
+          if [ -n "$MARSHAL_HITS" ]; then
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
+          ### ⚠️ WARNING: marshal/pickle/compile usage
+          These can deserialize or construct executable code objects.
+
+          **Matches:**
+          \`\`\`
+          ${MARSHAL_HITS}
+          \`\`\`
+          "
+          fi
+
+          # --- Output results ---
+          if [ -n "$FINDINGS" ]; then
+            echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            if [ "$CRITICAL" = true ]; then
+              echo "critical=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            else
+              echo "critical=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            fi
+            # Write findings to a file (multiline env vars are fragile)
+            echo "$FINDINGS" > /tmp/findings.md
+          else
+            echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            echo "critical=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+      - name: Post warning comment
+        if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true'
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          SEVERITY="⚠️ Supply Chain Risk Detected"
+          if [ "${{ steps.scan.outputs.critical }}" = "true" ]; then
+            SEVERITY="🚨 CRITICAL Supply Chain Risk Detected"
+          fi
+
+          BODY="## ${SEVERITY}
+
+          This PR contains patterns commonly associated with supply chain attacks. This does **not** mean the PR is malicious — but these patterns require careful human review before merging.
+
+          $(cat /tmp/findings.md)
+
+          ---
+          *Automated scan triggered by [supply-chain-audit](/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml). If this is a false positive, a maintainer can approve after manual review.*"
+
+          gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY"
+
+      - name: Fail on critical findings
+        if: steps.scan.outputs.critical == 'true'
+        run: |
+          echo "::error::CRITICAL supply chain risk patterns detected in this PR. See the PR comment for details."
+          exit 1

.gitignore

@@ -53,3 +53,8 @@ environments/benchmarks/evals/
 
 # Release script temp files
 .release_notes.md
+mini-swe-agent/
+
+# Nix
+.direnv/
+result

.gitmodules

@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-[submodule "mini-swe-agent"]
-	path = mini-swe-agent
-	url = https://github.com/SWE-agent/mini-swe-agent
 [submodule "tinker-atropos"]
 	path = tinker-atropos
 	url = https://github.com/nousresearch/tinker-atropos