chore(deps): update vulnerabilities [security] (patch) by alma-renovate-bot[bot] · Pull Request #225 · alma/widgets

alma-renovate-bot · 2026-02-07T00:35:43Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
preact (source)	`10.26.5` → `10.26.10`
vite (source)	`5.4.18` → `5.4.21`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-22028

Impact

Vulnerability Type: HTML Injection via JSON Type Confusion

Affected Versions: Preact 10.26.5 through 10.28.1

Severity: Low to Medium (see below)

Who is Impacted?

Applications using affected Preact versions are vulnerable if they meet all of the following conditions:

Pass unmodified, unsanitized values from user-modifiable data sources (APIs, databases, local storage, etc.) directly into the render tree
Assume these values are strings but the data source could return actual JavaScript objects instead of JSON strings
The data source either:
- Fails to perform type sanitization AND blindly stores/returns raw objects interchangeably with strings, OR
- Is compromised (e.g., poisoned local storage, filesystem, or database)

Technical Details

Preact includes JSON serialization protection to prevent Virtual DOM elements from being constructed from arbitrary JSON. A regression introduced in Preact 10.26.5 caused this protection to be softened. In applications where values from JSON payloads are assumed to be strings and passed unmodified to Preact as children, a specially-crafted JSON payload could be constructed that would be incorrectly treated as a valid VNode. When this chain of failures occurs it can result in HTML injection, which can allow arbitrary script execution if not mitigated by CSP or other means.

Important Notes:

This regression was never present in preact-render-to-string
This is primarily an "expanded attack surface" issue rather than a standalone vulnerability
Exploitation requires either insecure API design (no type validation) or a compromised data source

Patches

Patched Versions:

10.26.10 (for 10.26.x users)
10.27.3 (for 10.27.x users)
10.28.2 (for 10.28.x users)

Users should upgrade to the latest patch version of whatever minor version they are on, which can be done via npm update preact or by installing one of the above versions directly.

The patch versions simply restore the previous strict equality checks that prevent JSON-parsed objects from being treated as valid VNodes.

Mitigations

If you cannot upgrade immediately, implement the following mitigations:

Validate input types: Don't accept arbitrary objects as inputs in your API and blindly store them. Enforce strict type contracts at API boundaries.
Cast or validate network data: Don't assume strings are strings if your code got them from the network. Always cast to the expected type or validate before rendering.
Sanitize external data: Validate that data from external sources (APIs, storage, databases) matches expected types before passing it to preact.
Use Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to prevent inline script execution as a defense-in-depth measure.

References

Reporter: YoungGeun Choi
Affected Versions: 10.26.5 - 10.28.1
Patched Versions: 10.26.10, 10.27.3, 10.28.2

Credits

Preact thanks YoungGeun Choi (Xvezda) for the responsible disclosure of this vulnerability and for providing detailed reproduction steps and proof-of-concept demonstrations.

Timeline

2026-01-04: Initial vulnerability report received
2026-01-05: Clarification requested regarding network/serialization boundary
2026-01-06: Network PoC provided demonstrating real-world exploitatibility
2026-01-06: Hotfix patches released (10.26.10, 10.27.3, 10.28.2)

Recommendation: All users of Preact 10.26.5 through 10.28.1 should upgrade to the appropriate patched version (10.26.10, 10.27.3, or 10.28.2) as soon as possible, and review their applications for proper input validation and sanitization practices.

Preact has JSON VNode Injection issue

CVE-2026-22028 / GHSA-36hm-qxxp-pg3m

More information

Details

Impact

Vulnerability Type: HTML Injection via JSON Type Confusion

Affected Versions: Preact 10.26.5 through 10.28.1

Severity: Low to Medium (see below)

Who is Impacted?

Applications using affected Preact versions are vulnerable if they meet all of the following conditions:

Pass unmodified, unsanitized values from user-modifiable data sources (APIs, databases, local storage, etc.) directly into the render tree
Assume these values are strings but the data source could return actual JavaScript objects instead of JSON strings
The data source either:
- Fails to perform type sanitization AND blindly stores/returns raw objects interchangeably with strings, OR
- Is compromised (e.g., poisoned local storage, filesystem, or database)

Technical Details

Preact includes JSON serialization protection to prevent Virtual DOM elements from being constructed from arbitrary JSON. A regression introduced in Preact 10.26.5 caused this protection to be softened. In applications where values from JSON payloads are assumed to be strings and passed unmodified to Preact as children, a specially-crafted JSON payload could be constructed that would be incorrectly treated as a valid VNode. When this chain of failures occurs it can result in HTML injection, which can allow arbitrary script execution if not mitigated by CSP or other means.

Important Notes:

This regression was never present in preact-render-to-string
This is primarily an "expanded attack surface" issue rather than a standalone vulnerability
Exploitation requires either insecure API design (no type validation) or a compromised data source

Patches

Patched Versions:

10.26.10 (for 10.26.x users)
10.27.3 (for 10.27.x users)
10.28.2 (for 10.28.x users)

Users should upgrade to the latest patch version of whatever minor version they are on, which can be done via npm update preact or by installing one of the above versions directly.

The patch versions simply restore the previous strict equality checks that prevent JSON-parsed objects from being treated as valid VNodes.

Mitigations

If you cannot upgrade immediately, implement the following mitigations:

Validate input types: Don't accept arbitrary objects as inputs in your API and blindly store them. Enforce strict type contracts at API boundaries.
Cast or validate network data: Don't assume strings are strings if your code got them from the network. Always cast to the expected type or validate before rendering.
Sanitize external data: Validate that data from external sources (APIs, storage, databases) matches expected types before passing it to preact.
Use Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to prevent inline script execution as a defense-in-depth measure.

References

Reporter: YoungGeun Choi
Affected Versions: 10.26.5 - 10.28.1
Patched Versions: 10.26.10, 10.27.3, 10.28.2

Credits

Preact thanks YoungGeun Choi (Xvezda) for the responsible disclosure of this vulnerability and for providing detailed reproduction steps and proof-of-concept demonstrations.

Timeline

2026-01-04: Initial vulnerability report received
2026-01-05: Clarification requested regarding network/serialization boundary
2026-01-06: Network PoC provided demonstrating real-world exploitatibility
2026-01-06: Hotfix patches released (10.26.10, 10.27.3, 10.28.2)

Recommendation: All users of Preact 10.26.5 through 10.28.1 should upgrade to the appropriate patched version (10.26.10, 10.27.3, or 10.28.2) as soon as possible, and review their applications for proper input validation and sanitization practices.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.2 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

CVE-2025-46565

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env
Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

CVE-2025-58752

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:

echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

CVE-2025-58751

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)
a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root

CVE-2025-46565 / GHSA-859w-5945-r5v3

More information

Details

Summary

The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env
Examples of other patterns: **/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.0 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite's `server.fs` settings were not applied to HTML files

CVE-2025-58752 / GHSA-jqfw-vq24-v9c3

More information

Details

Summary

Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details

The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
echo  "secret" > /tmp/secret.html
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:

echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "secret_files/*")]}}})'  >  [vite.config.js](http://vite.config.js)
mkdir secret_files
echo "secret txt" > secret_files/secret.txt
echo "secret html" > secret_files/secret.html
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because everything in the secret_files directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secret_files/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secret_files/secret.html.

Severity

CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory

CVE-2025-58751 / GHSA-g4jq-h2w9-997c

More information

Details

Summary

Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)
a symlink exists in the public directory

Details

The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC

Execute the following shell commands:

npm  create  vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo  'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo  "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Severity

CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

vite allows server.fs.deny bypass via backslash on Windows

CVE-2025-62522 / GHSA-93m4-6634-74q7

More information

Details

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.0 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

preactjs/preact (preact)

`v10.26.10`

Compare Source

Fixes

Enforce strict equality for VNode object constructors

`v10.26.9`

Compare Source

Fixes

Export test-utils from compat by @rawrmonstar in #4783
Escape style object value in precompile transform by @marvinhagemeister in #4795
Fix signal attribute values not working with precompile transform by @marvinhagemeister in #4798

Maintenance

Bump browserslist by @rschristian in #4785
Avoid caching so file-saves work first try by @JoviDeCroock in #4786
Make previous benchmark results not required by @marvinhagemeister in #4796
Point release workflow to 10.x by @marvinhagemeister in #4797

`v10.26.8`

Compare Source

Fixes

Fix defaultProps applying on null values (#4775, thanks @JoviDeCroock)

`v10.26.7`

Compare Source

Types

Add name to <details> (#4766, thanks @marvinhagemeister)

Improvements

Reduce raf timeout to 35ms (#4750, thanks @JoviDeCroock)
Only one toLowerCase invoke during props diffing (#4764, thanks @JoviDeCroock)
Golf some portal bytes (#4763, thanks @JoviDeCroock)

Maintenance

Add node prefix + script string args for deno compatability in demo (#4759, thanks @marvinhagemeister)

`v10.26.6`

Compare Source

Fixes

Ensure useId works in portals (#4752, thanks @JoviDeCroock)

Types

Change HTMLMediaElement.controlsList type to string (DOMTokenList) (#4744, thanks @piotr-cz)

Maintenance

Switch testing from karma to vitest (#4687, thanks @JoviDeCroock)
Dedupe preact in vitest setup (#4702, thanks @sheremet-va)

vitejs/vite (vite)

Configuration

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chore(deps): update vulnerabilities [security]

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alma-renovate-bot bot added the type: security label Feb 7, 2026

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chore(deps): update vulnerabilities [security] (patch)#225

chore(deps): update vulnerabilities [security] (patch)#225
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Preact has JSON VNode Injection issue

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PoC

Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root

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Impact

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PoC

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Vite's server.fs settings were not applied to HTML files

Details

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Impact

Details

PoC

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References

Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory

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PoC

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vite allows server.fs.deny bypass via backslash on Windows

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References

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Maintenance

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Vite's `server.fs` settings were not applied to HTML files