6,554 forensic artifacts. Every one enriched.

You're in an active IR. You need to know if a binary is abusable, right now, offline, without opening a browser.

brew install SecurityRonin/tap/4n6query
# or: cargo install forensicnomicon-cli

4n6query certutil.exe          # LOLBin lookup, ATT&CK techniques, use cases
4n6query userassist            # 5 artifact variants, decoded field schemas, triage priority
4n6query T1547.001             # all artifacts mapped to this technique
4n6query --triage              # Critical artifacts to collect first, RFC 3227 order

Building DFIR tools in Rust? The same data is a zero-dependency library:

[dependencies]
forensicnomicon = "0.1"

---

What makes it different

MITRE ATT&CK and lolbas-project.github.io are browser references. This is a binary.

• Offline. All 6,554 artifacts compile into the binary. Zero I/O at runtime, zero network calls.
• Enriched. Not just where an artifact lives — how to decode it, how strong the evidence is, what to collect alongside it, which KAPE targets and Velociraptor artifacts collect it.
• All six LOL/LOFL datasets unified. LOLBAS, GTFOBins, LOOBins, LOFL cmdlets, LOFL MMC snap-ins, LOFL WMI classes. One lookup, one API.

---

LOL + LOFL — six datasets, one lookup

LOL (Living Off the Land) is abuse of OS-shipped binaries. LOFL (Living Off Foreign Land) is abuse of third-party admin tools common on enterprise endpoints: cloud CLIs, container runtimes, Sysinternals, language runtimes. Both appear identically in process telemetry and EDR alerts. Unifying them in one lookup produces fewer missed detections.

Constant	Entries	Source
LOLBAS_WINDOWS	187	LOLBAS Project + LOFL Project
LOLBAS_MACOS	139	LOOBins (~61 native) + macOS LOFL catalog (~78, first catalog of its kind)
LOLBAS_LINUX	479	GTFOBins
LOLBAS_WINDOWS_CMDLETS	289	LOFL Project + native PS attack cmdlets + PS aliases (Event 4104/PSReadLine)
LOLBAS_WINDOWS_MMC	63	LOFL Project MMC snap-ins (.msc, LNK/UserAssist)
LOLBAS_WINDOWS_WMI	30	LOFL Project WMI classes (Event 5861)

Each constant is a &[LolbasEntry]. Every entry carries a name, MITRE technique IDs, a use_cases bitmask, and a description.

LOLBin lookup API

Constant	Detection source
LOLBAS_WINDOWS / LOLBAS_LINUX / LOLBAS_MACOS	Process telemetry, Prefetch, AmCache, EDR
LOLBAS_WINDOWS_CMDLETS	PowerShell ScriptBlock log (Event 4104), PSReadLine history, AMSI
LOLBAS_WINDOWS_MMC	LNK files, UserAssist MRU, Jump Lists
LOLBAS_WINDOWS_WMI	WMI Activity log (Event 5861), Get-CimInstance calls

use forensicnomicon::lolbins::{
    is_lolbas, lolbas_entry,
    LOLBAS_WINDOWS, LOLBAS_LINUX, LOLBAS_MACOS,
    LOLBAS_WINDOWS_CMDLETS, LOLBAS_WINDOWS_MMC, LOLBAS_WINDOWS_WMI,
    UC_EXECUTE, UC_DOWNLOAD, UC_BYPASS,
};

// Cross-platform check
assert!(is_lolbas("certutil.exe"));
assert!(is_lolbas("bash"));
assert!(is_lolbas("osascript"));

// Rich struct lookup
let entry = lolbas_entry(LOLBAS_WINDOWS, "certutil.exe").unwrap();
assert!(entry.use_cases & UC_DOWNLOAD != 0);
println!("{}", entry.description);

// Non-binary LOFL types
assert!(is_lolbas_windows_cmdlet("Invoke-Command"));
assert!(is_lolbas_windows_mmc("compmgmt.msc"));
assert!(is_lolbas_windows_wmi("Win32_Process"));

---

Artifact catalog

The catalog covers 6,554 artifacts across Windows, Linux, macOS, and cloud environments. Hundreds of entries are fully hand-curated with decoded field schemas, analyst-written meanings, triage priorities, evidence strength ratings, and detection pivots. The rest are generated from seven authoritative DFIR source corpora.

Take UserAssist. Every artifact registry gives you the key path. This catalog gives you:

Field	Value
Decode	Value names are ROT13. Payload is a 72-byte struct: run count at offset 4, last execution FILETIME at offset 60
Meaning	Proves a specific user account interactively launched a program
Reliability	Strong, but the key can be cleared. Absence does not prove non-execution.
Triage priority	Critical
Volatility	Persistent (on-disk registry). Grab RAM first per RFC 3227.
Detection pivots	T1204.002, 3 Sigma rules, YARA template

What's in the catalog

Execution evidence: UserAssist, Prefetch, Shimcache/AppCompatCache, Amcache, BAM/DAM, MUICache, SRUM, AppShim, Windows Timeline, Background Activity Moderator

Persistence: Run/RunOnce keys (HKLM + HKCU), Scheduled tasks, Startup folders, Active Setup, IFEO debugger hijacking, AppInit DLLs, WMI subscriptions, Services ImagePath, Boot Execute, Print monitors, LSA packages, COM hijacking, Winlogon, Screensaver executable, Netsh helpers, Password filter DLLs

Registry MRU and shell history: ShellBags, Jump Lists, LNK files, OpenSave MRU, LastVisited MRU, Run MRU, TypedURLs, TypedPaths, WordWheelQuery, Recent Documents

File system: $MFT, USN Journal, Recycle Bin, Thumbcache, Windows Search database

Windows Event Logs: Security, System, PowerShell/ScriptBlock (4104), Sysmon, and 22 additional named channels including RDP, WinRM, WMI, Defender, BITS, AppLocker, Firewall, NTLM, SMB, Task Scheduler

Credential artifacts: SAM hive, LSA secrets, DPAPI master keys, Windows Credential Manager, Windows Hello/NGC keys, certificate stores, DCC2/MSCachev2

Network and remote access: RDP bitmap cache, RDP client server history, VPN/RAS phonebook, WinSCP, PuTTY, WiFi profiles, NetworkList, MountPoints2, portable devices

Cloud, browser, and third-party: Chrome, Edge, Firefox credential stores; TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, RustDesk; OneDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive FS, MEGAsync; Teams, Slack, Discord, Signal; WinRAR history

Active Directory: NTDS.dit, SYSTEM boot key, DPAPI SYSTEM master key

macOS: LaunchAgents, LaunchDaemons, emond, Unified Log, CoreAnalytics, KnowledgeC, Keychain, TCC database, Quarantine Events, Safari, Gatekeeper, bash/zsh sessions

Linux: bash/zsh history, cron, systemd units, XDG autostart, SSH keys, sudoers, /etc/passwd, auth.log, systemd journal, wtmp/btmp/utmp, ld.so.preload, PAM, udev rules, cloud credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes), Docker config, git credentials

Generated entries by source:

Source	Entries
KAPE targets (EricZimmerman/KapeFiles)	2,422
ForensicArtifacts YAML	2,545
EVTX/ETW channels	995
Velociraptor artifacts	122
RECmd batch files	44
Browser artifacts (20 browsers)	37
NirSoft tools	28

Catalog API: query, decode, evidence, volatility

use forensicnomicon::catalog::{CATALOG, TriagePriority};
use forensicnomicon::volatility::acquisition_order;

// RFC 3227 acquisition order: RAM first
let order = acquisition_order();

// Triage-ordered list, Critical first
let critical: Vec<_> = CATALOG
    .for_triage()
    .into_iter()
    .filter(|d| d.triage_priority == TriagePriority::Critical)
    .collect();

// Keyword search
let hits = CATALOG.filter_by_keyword("prefetch");

// MITRE technique lookup
let hits = CATALOG.by_mitre("T1547.001");

// Decode a raw artifact
let d = CATALOG.by_id("userassist_exe").unwrap();
let record = CATALOG.decode(d, value_name, raw_bytes)?;
// record.fields     — Vec<(&str, ArtifactValue)>: typed field pairs
// record.timestamp  — Option<String>: ISO 8601 UTC when present

Built-in decoders: Rot13Name (UserAssist), FiletimeAt (FILETIME to ISO 8601), BinaryRecord, MruListEx, MultiSz, Utf16Le.

use forensicnomicon::evidence::{evidence_for, EvidenceStrength};
use forensicnomicon::volatility::{volatility_for, acquisition_order};

let e = evidence_for("prefetch_dir").unwrap();
// e.evidence_strength — EvidenceStrength::Strong
// e.evidence_caveats  — &["Disabled by default on Server SKUs", ...]

let order = acquisition_order();
// order[0] → mem_running_processes (Volatile)
// order[n] → mft_file (Persistent)

---

Abusable sites

The abusable_sites module maps domains attackers use for C2, phishing, payload delivery, and exfiltration. These are trusted domains that enterprises cannot block.

BlockingRisk encodes the key tradeoff. GitHub and AWS carry BlockingRisk::Critical because blocking them breaks your own CI/CD and cloud workloads. Use this field to choose between blocking (low risk) and detect-and-alert (high or critical risk).

Data from the LOTS Project and URLhaus.

Abusable sites API

use forensicnomicon::abusable_sites::{
    is_abusable_site, abusable_site_info, sites_with_tag, sites_above_risk,
    BlockingRisk, TAG_C2,
};

assert!(is_abusable_site("raw.githubusercontent.com"));

let site = abusable_site_info("api.telegram.org").unwrap();
// site.blocking_risk        → BlockingRisk::Medium
// site.abuse_tags & TAG_C2  → true

// C2-capable domains you cannot block
let critical_c2: Vec<_> = sites_with_tag(TAG_C2)
    .filter(|s| s.blocking_risk >= BlockingRisk::Critical)
    .collect();

---

4n6query CLI

Look up any binary, domain, or artifact from the terminal. All queries are offline.

$ 4n6query certutil.exe                    # LOLBin lookup, all platforms
$ 4n6query certutil.exe --platform windows # restrict to one platform
$ 4n6query curl --platform linux
$ 4n6query raw.githubusercontent.com       # abusable domain lookup
$ 4n6query userassist                      # artifact search, all variants
$ 4n6query T1547.001                       # technique lookup

$ 4n6query --triage                        # Critical artifacts first (RFC 3227 order)
$ 4n6query --triage --scenario ransomware  # filter by incident type
$ 4n6query --triage --type lateral-movement

$ 4n6query dump --format json              # full dataset for SIEM/SOAR integration
$ 4n6query dump --format yaml --dataset lolbas
$ 4n6query dump --format json --dataset catalog
$ 4n6query certutil.exe --format json      # JSON output for any query

--scenario options: ransomware, data-breach, bec, insider, supply-chain

--type options: execution, persistence, lateral-movement, credential-access, defense-evasion, discovery, collection, exfiltration, command-and-control, privilege-escalation

---

Indicator table modules

Module	Covers	Key API
ports	C2, Cobalt Strike, Tor, WinRM, RAT defaults	is_suspicious_port(u16)
lolbins	All six LOL/LOFL datasets	is_lolbas(&str), lolbas_entry(catalog, name)
abusable_sites	LOTS Project + URLhaus	is_abusable_site(&str), sites_above_risk(BlockingRisk)
processes	Malware and masquerade process names	is_masquerade_target(&str)
commands	Reverse shells, download cradles, WMI abuse	is_reverse_shell_pattern(&str)
paths	Suspicious staging and hijack paths	path slices
persistence	Run keys, cron, LaunchAgents, IFEO, AppInit	WINDOWS_RUN_KEYS, LINUX_PERSISTENCE_PATHS
antiforensics	Log-wipe, timestomping, rootkit indicators	indicator slices
remote_access	LOLRMM/RMM tool indicators	is_lolrmm_path(&str)
third_party	PuTTY, WinSCP, OneDrive, Chrome, Dropbox	identify_application(&str)

Enrichment modules

Module	Key API
attack_flow	flow_by_id(&str), flows_for_artifact(&str)
chainsaw	hunt_rules_for(&str)
dependencies	dependencies_of(&str), full_collection_set(&[&str])
eventids	event_entry(u32), events_for_artifact(&str)
navigator	generate_navigator_layer(&str), covered_techniques()
playbooks	playbook_by_id(&str), playbooks_for_artifact(&str)
sigma	sigma_refs_for(&str)
stix	stix_mapping_for(&str)
temporal	temporal_hints_for(&str)
toolchain	kape_mapping_for(&str), kape_target_set(&[&str]), velociraptor_artifact_set(&[&str])
volatility	acquisition_order(), volatility_for(&str)
yara	yara_rule_template(&str)

ArtifactDescriptor field reference

Field	Type	Description
id	&'static str	Machine-readable identifier, e.g. "userassist_exe"
name	&'static str	Human-readable display name
artifact_type	ArtifactType	RegistryKey, RegistryValue, File, Directory, EventLog, MemoryRegion
hive	Option<HiveTarget>	Registry hive, or None for file/memory artifacts
key_path	&'static str	Path relative to hive root
file_path	Option<&'static str>	Absolute file path where applicable
scope	DataScope	User, System, Network, Mixed
os_scope	OsScope	Win10Plus, Linux, LinuxSystemd, MacOS, MacOS12Plus
meaning	&'static str	Forensic significance
mitre_techniques	&'static [&'static str]	ATT&CK technique IDs
fields	&'static [FieldSchema]	Decoded output field schema
triage_priority	TriagePriority	Critical / High / Medium / Low
related_artifacts	&'static [&'static str]	Cross-correlation artifact IDs
sources	&'static [&'static str]	Authoritative source URLs

---

Docs

API Reference	Full rustdoc for all modules
Architecture	Data-flow: raw bytes to ArtifactRecord

---

Used by

• RapidTriage — live incident response triage tool
• blazehash — high-speed forensic hash verification