v42.3.0

v42.3.0 — Share-Link Compact Proof Bundle (KAS + ZK) + Deflate-Bomb Guardrails

What changed

• Restored social-shareable VerifyPage links while still carrying the full public proof bundle (KAS WebAuthn attestation + Groth16/Poseidon ZK proof + public inputs + hashes) fully self-contained in the URL.

• Introduced compact share payload ?p= using a versioned codec:

  • ?p=c1:<base64url(deflateRaw(JCS(JSON)))>

• Kept full backward compatibility:

  • Legacy ?r= links still decode and verify exactly as before.

Why it matters

• Short links are postable again on Twitter/X and other platforms without breaking the “all-proof-in-the-link” offline verification experience.
• Offline-first remains intact: opening a shared link renders and verifies directly from embedded public proof material—no server lookup required.

Security / Performance hardening

• Added strict decode limits to prevent DoS / deflate-bomb expansion:

  • Caps on encoded param length (MAX_P_CHARS)
  • Caps on compressed bytes (MAX_COMPRESSED_BYTES)
  • Caps on inflated output bytes (MAX_INFLATED_BYTES)
  • Fail-fast decoding with safe abort during inflation

• Legacy ?r= path also bounded to prevent accidental oversized payloads.

Implementation highlights

• Added a dedicated codec module (shareBundleCodec) with:

  • encodeSharePayload() / decodeSharePayload() for ?p=
  • encodeLegacyRParam() / decodeLegacyRParam() for ?r=
  • Canonical JSON via JCS before compression to maximize determinism + compression ratio.

Result

• VerifyPage share URLs are compact, deterministic, offline-verifiable, and safe against decompression abuse—without changing any KAS or ZK verification semantics.

What's Changed

• v42.3.0 by @Phinetwork in #120

Full Changelog: v42.2.0...v42.3.0