feat(browser): support allowed_private_hosts for browser tools

[NiuBlibing]

Summary

• Base branch: master
• What changed and why:
  • Add [browser].allowed_private_hosts so the browser and browser_open tools can reach operator-listed private/LAN hosts — previously any private host was unconditionally blocked, with no escape hatch (only http_request/web_fetch had one). This unblocks legitimate internal-service automation.
  • Mirror the existing http_request design: exact/subdomain matches, and ["*"] permits all private/local hosts.
  • Listed private hosts bypass the SSRF block and the allowed_domains allowlist; the wildcard is scoped to private hosts only and never widens public reach.
• Scope boundary: Does not loosen URL schemes — browser_open stays HTTPS-only and file:// stays blocked everywhere. Does not touch http_request/web_fetch/text_browser/browser_delegate or the shared domain_guard SSRF logic. No DNS-rebinding posture change.
• Blast radius: browser/browser_open tool registration in zeroclaw-runtime; the [browser] config surface. Deny-by-default means zero behavior change unless an operator opts in.
• Linked issue(s): None.
• Labels: risk: high (touches crates/zeroclaw-tools/src/** SSRF access-control boundary per AGENTS.md), size: M — maintainers own final risk/size.

Validation Evidence (required)

cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test -p zeroclaw-tools -p zeroclaw-config -p zeroclaw-runtime --lib --tests

• Commands run and tail output:
  • cargo fmt --all -- --check → clean, exit 0.
  • cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings → Finished \dev` profile ... in 13m 37s`, exit 0, zero warnings across all crates.
  • Tests (lib + integration):
    • zeroclaw-tools lib: test result: ok. 1353 passed; 0 failed
    • zeroclaw-config lib: ok. 942 passed; 0 failed; tests/migration.rs: ok. 90 passed; tests/comment_writer.rs: ok. 8 passed
    • zeroclaw-runtime lib: 2342 passed; 1 failed — the one failure is cron::store::tests::remove_job_emits_structured_cron_delete_event, unrelated to this diff (cron module). It passes in isolation (ok. 1 passed); it shares global log-capture state (__private_test_writer_lock / subscribe_or_install) and races other tests under parallel run. Pre-existing flake.
• Beyond CI — what did you manually verify? Hand-traced every validate_url branch in both tools for {public,private}×{listed,unlisted}×{http,https}. Added adversarial tests: wildcard private allowlist does not widen the public allowed_domains allowlist; file:// stays blocked even with ["*"]; empty list still denies all private hosts; private host bypasses allowed_domains only when listed. Not verified: live agent-browser/system-browser execution against a real internal host — validation is at the URL-gate layer; no live network was exercised.
• If any command was intentionally skipped, why: cargo test --doc for zeroclaw-config skipped — pre-existing rustdoc env failure (error: Option 'default-theme' given more than once; rustdoc invoked with --default-theme=ayu twice), reproduced on a clean tree via git stash, independent of this change.

Security & Privacy Impact (required)

• New permissions, capabilities, or file system access scope? Yes — adds an opt-in capability for browser/browser_open to reach operator-listed private/LAN hosts that were previously always blocked. Off by default (empty list = deny).
• New external network calls? No — no new call sites; only which hosts pass validation changes.
• Secrets / tokens / credentials handling changed? No.
• PII, real identities, or personal data in diff, tests, fixtures, or docs? No — fixtures/tests use only RFC1918 addresses, localhost, and example.com.
• Risk & mitigation: This is an SSRF-control relaxation, so it is strictly opt-in and deny-by-default. The wildcard is scoped to private hosts only — a ["*"] in allowed_private_hosts never grants access to public hosts (those still flow through allowed_domains). file:// remains blocked; browser_open remains HTTPS-only. No change to DNS-rebinding posture or the shared domain_guard matcher.

Compatibility (required)

• Backward compatible? Yes — new field defaults to empty; existing configs behave exactly as before.
• Config / env / CLI surface changed? Yes — adds [browser].allowed_private_hosts (Vec<String>, default []).
• Upgrade steps: None required. To opt in, set [browser].allowed_private_hosts = ["10.0.0.5", "internal.local"] (or ["*"] for all private hosts).

Rollback (required for risk: medium and risk: high)

• Fast rollback command/path: git revert 3fe8e6b5b2.
• Feature flags or config toggles: [browser].allowed_private_hosts — set to [] (the default) to fully disable; no rebuild needed.
• Observable failure symptoms: browser/browser_open reaching unexpected internal hosts; in logs, an unexpected drop in Blocked local/private host rejections or tool-open events targeting RFC1918 / link-local / metadata addresses.

[NiuBlibing]

Closing as duplicate — submitted upstream as zeroclaw-labs#8171 (same branch/commit).