Burn-after-reading secrets for AI agents.
Your MCP configs are full of plaintext API keys, and every agent you run can read all of them — and they keep working long after the agent is done. dazai inverts that: secrets live in locked, non-swappable RAM, are served to agents over MCP, and are destroyed after N reads — or the instant your session dies.
motokano --calls 1 --tool 'name=get_key,kind=static,value=s3cr3t' --armPoint any MCP client at it and call get_key once → you receive s3cr3t
→ the server wipes the value out of locked memory and SIGKILLs itself. Call
again → the process is gone.
# prebuilt binaries (macOS arm64/x86_64, Linux x86_64/arm64)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/New1Direction/ningen-shikkaku/releases/latest/download/dazai-installer.sh | sh
# or homebrew
brew install New1Direction/tap/dazai New1Direction/tap/motokano
# or from source (required for the Linux seccomp build)
git clone https://github.com/New1Direction/ningen-shikkaku
cd ningen-shikkaku/rs
cargo build --release # -> target/release/{dazai, motokano}
cargo build --release --features seccomp # Linux: seccomp syscall allowlistPrebuilt binaries are built with default features; the seccomp-confined daemon
is a from-source build (it links libseccomp — install libseccomp-dev +
pkg-config first).
# a one-shot secret an agent can read exactly once:
claude mcp add burn-once -- motokano --calls 1 --arm \
--tool 'name=get_key,kind=static,value=YOUR-SECRET'
# or the session-bound daemon: agents register their PID and get SIGKILLed
# the moment your session dies
dazai daemon --arm --grace 5 &
claude mcp add dazai -- dazai mcpAny MCP client works the same way — the transport is plain stdio.
The same daemon is a session kill-switch. Any MCP client registers its PID;
when your shell/SSH session dies, your heartbeat stops, or a panic signal
arrives, dazai SIGKILLs every registered process, overwrites its secrets
with a wipe the compiler can't optimize away, and exits. Walk away: agents
die, secrets burn.
dazai daemon --ping-timeout 15 # terminal A (dry-run by default; --arm makes it real)
dazai client --interval 5 # terminal B
# close terminal B -> the daemon wipes its secrets and exitsIt runs only on your own machine, on your own secrets and your own configured tools. It never touches another process, file, or host.
It ships in two layers:
- a hardened Rust daemon + tooling — the real thing:
mlock(no swap),madvise(MADV_DONTDUMP)+prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0)(no core dumps / no ptrace), a seccomp syscall allowlist (noexecve/open/connect/…), and a non-elidableexplicit_bzero/memset_swipe; and - a Python reference implementation — the original proof-of-concept that
established the mechanism (see
python-reference.md).
| Component | What it does |
|---|---|
dazai daemon |
The watchdog: holds mlock'd secrets + a UNIX-socket heartbeat; wipes and self-destructs on session loss. seccomp-confined on Linux. |
dazai client |
The heartbeat client — ties the daemon's life to a shell / SSH session. |
dazai mcp |
An MCP server exposing the daemon as tools, so any agent can register its PID for session-bound protection (it gets SIGKILLed if your session dies). |
motokano |
A standalone self-immolating MCP server: serve N tool calls, then wipe secret state and exit. |
| Python reference | secmem.py / deadman.py / heartbeat.py / shellrc.sh — the portable proof-of-concept. |
daZai shrinks the window and the surface in which plaintext secrets are reachable, and makes session-end deterministically destroy them.
It protects against:
| Risk | How |
|---|---|
| Secrets paged to swap | mlock locks the buffers into RAM |
| Secrets captured in core dumps | madvise(MADV_DONTDUMP) + prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) (Linux) |
| Session loss leaving secrets resident | heartbeat drop / logout → wipe + SIGKILL |
| Secrets lingering in process memory after use | explicit_bzero / memset_s — a wipe the compiler may not elide |
| A confined process escaping | seccomp allowlist denies execve / open / connect / ptrace / … (Linux) |
| ptrace snooping the daemon | prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) (Linux) |
It does NOT protect against (and the project is deliberately honest about this):
- GPU VRAM. If an attached LLM/agent copies a secret into GPU memory, killing the host process does not wipe VRAM. daZai controls host RAM and the processes it supervises — not an accelerator's memory.
exec-tool stdout.motokano'skind=exectools return a command's stdout, which is OS-buffered and not held in a locked buffer. Usekind=static(a pre-loaded, locked, wipeable value) when you need the wipe guarantee.- Managed-runtime residue (Python reference). CPython copies
bytesfreely, so a secret may transiently live in unlocked heap before/after the locked buffer. The Rust implementation eliminates this for its own buffers (data is written into the locked mapping and never copied to a GC heap); the Python tier is a reference, not a hard guarantee. - A privileged or same-UID attacker on the live box (root,
/proc/<pid>/mem, a debugger) reading memory before the wipe.mlockstops swap, not memory reads; seccomp +PR_SET_DUMPABLEraise the bar on Linux, but an adversary who already has privileged access to your running machine is out of scope. - Cold-boot / DMA / physical attacks on RAM.
- A hard crash (kernel OOM, an external
kill -9, power loss): the wipe path can't run, so nothing is zeroed. The mechanism is best-effort on these paths and never claims otherwise.
In short: daZai is not, and cannot be, a guarantee against an attacker who already owns your running machine. It is a sharp tool for making secrets ephemeral and session-bound, with every limitation stated up front.
- 66 tests across the Rust workspace (secure memory, the panic policy, the wire protocol, the MCP layer, the one-shot lifecycle) plus the 29-test Python reference.
- Linux seccomp is validated on both architectures under the real
KillProcessfilter —aarch64(locally) andx86_64(CI) — where the daemon installs the live filter and the full integration suite runs against it with noSIGSYS. - Every push runs the whole suite (default and
--features seccomp),clippy -D warnings, andrustfmt --checkon x86_64 Linux as a permanent regression gate.
Deep technical docs (per-crate design, the seccomp allowlist, the
adversarial-review history) live in rs/README.md; the Python
proof-of-concept is in python-reference.md.
Named for the novelist Osamu Dazai, whose work circles themes of disappearance and self-erasure — fitting for software whose defining act is to wipe itself out the moment it is no longer being watched over. The repository takes its name from his novel No Longer Human (人間失格, Ningen Shikkaku). It's flavor, not a manifesto; the software just self-destructs on cue.
MIT © 2026 New1Direction.
