Latest data: Thu Dec 26 08:09:36 UTC 2024

audits/aider-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/ansible-lint-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/certsync-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/charmcraft-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/gdbgui-requirements.audit.json

@@ -279,6 +279,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -700,6 +705,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/gi-docgen-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/harlequin-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/icloudpd-requirements.audit.json

@@ -392,6 +392,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -522,6 +527,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/libplacebo-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [

audits/litani-requirements.audit.json

@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56201"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-gvvw-7w3r-7m54",
+          "CGA-mvqg-6j62-4pjm",
+          "CGA-whf8-42p9-686q"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through malicious filenames",
         "details": "A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.",
         "affected": [
@@ -147,6 +152,11 @@
         "aliases": [
           "CVE-2024-56326"
         ],
+        "related": [
+          "CGA-79fr-pvjg-j9xm",
+          "CGA-crfr-r549-cvmg",
+          "CGA-gm37-p355-3fq6"
+        ],
         "summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method",
         "details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
         "affected": [