HydraFlow operates in adversarial network environments where state-level actors actively attempt to detect and block circumvention traffic. Our security model considers:
Adversary capabilities:
- Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) on all network traffic
- TLS fingerprinting (JA3/JA4)
- IP/ASN correlation with SNI domains
- Traffic pattern analysis (timing, packet sizes, flow direction)
- Active probing of suspected proxy servers
- Replay attacks against proxy protocols
What we protect against:
- Traffic identification and blocking by DPI systems
- Server discovery through active probing
- User identification through traffic analysis
- Data exposure through protocol vulnerabilities
What is out of scope:
- Endpoint compromise (malware on user device)
- Physical access to server hardware
- Compromise of the CDN provider (Cloudflare, etc.)
- Legal compulsion of the server operator
- ISP/AS number (derived from client IP, IP is never stored)
- Protocol connection success/failure status
- Approximate latency measurements
- Client version and platform
- User IP addresses
- Traffic content or destinations
- Connection timestamps tied to users
- Any personally identifiable information
If you discover a security vulnerability in HydraFlow, please report it responsibly:
- Do not open a public GitHub issue
- Email: security@hydraflow.dev
- Include a description of the vulnerability and steps to reproduce
- We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours
- We aim to release a fix within 7 days for critical issues
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.x.x | Yes (current development) |
- Defense in depth — Multiple protocols ensure one being compromised doesn't affect others
- Minimal fingerprint — Each protocol implementation minimizes distinguishable network characteristics
- Forward secrecy — All protocols use ephemeral key exchange
- Fail closed — If censorship detection fails, fall back to the most robust (CDN-based) protocol
- Zero knowledge — The server operator cannot identify which user generated which traffic