AlphaReasoning · tattoosonmyskin · Jun 20, 2026 · Jun 19, 2026 · Jun 19, 2026 · Jun 19, 2026
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes
@@ -14,3 +14,11 @@ jinn-guard-v1.0-review.zip export-ignore
 # Rust-dominant reality) and collapses it in diffs.
 bpf/vmlinux.h linguist-vendored
 bpf/vmlinux.h linguist-generated
+
+# Jinn Guard is pitched and built as a Rust project; the eBPF/BPF-LSM C objects
+# under bpf/ are the in-kernel enforcement layer, but by byte count they dominate
+# GitHub's language bar and misrepresent the repo as a C codebase. Mark the whole
+# bpf/ tree linguist-vendored so the language bar reflects the Rust-primary
+# reality. The source stays in the repo and fully visible — this only affects
+# Linguist's stats, and GitHub re-indexes the language bar on the next push.
+bpf/** linguist-vendored
diff --git a/BENCHMARKS-03.md b/BENCHMARKS-03.md
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ expected-deny); safe mode ran 250 (all expected-allow, audit-only).
 ## 3. Kernel path resolution (Tier 3 — audit-only)
 
 The LSM hooks loaded in safe mode and resolved **full absolute file paths**
-(the CVE-2026-002 fix) on 6.17 — audit-only, nothing blocked. PASS.
+(the JG-ADV-2026-002 fix) on 6.17 — audit-only, nothing blocked. PASS.
 
 ---
 

diff --git a/BENCHMARKS-04.md b/BENCHMARKS-04.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 > Purpose: extend coverage into the **RHEL family** (a third, distinct kernel
 > lineage) under **SELinux Enforcing**, and validate real eBPF-LSM allow/deny
 > enforcement there. This run also **found and fixed a real fail-open bug**
-> (CVE-2026-003) — see §6 — which is itself the strongest argument that a
+> (JG-ADV-2026-004) — see §6 — which is itself the strongest argument that a
 > distro-matrix is worth running.
 
 ---
@@ -70,15 +70,15 @@ SELinux denial**, enforcing allow/deny in-kernel. Each surface: 500 operations
 
 > **2,750 enforced operations on AlmaLinux 9 / kernel 5.14 under SELinux
 > Enforcing: 0 fail-open, 0 incorrect decisions, 0 timeouts** — *after* the
-> CVE-2026-003 fix (§6). The eBPF programs verified and loaded cleanly on a third
+> JG-ADV-2026-004 fix (§6). The eBPF programs verified and loaded cleanly on a third
 > kernel lineage; SELinux and the BPF-LSM coexisted without interference.
 
 ---
 
 ## 3. Kernel path resolution (Tier 3 — audit-only)
 
 LSM hooks loaded in safe mode and resolved full absolute file paths
-(CVE-2026-002 fix) on 5.14 — audit-only, nothing blocked. PASS.
+(JG-ADV-2026-002 fix) on 5.14 — audit-only, nothing blocked. PASS.
 
 ---
 
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Two reads, deliberately kept separate:
 
 ---
 
-## 7. What this run found and fixed — CVE-2026-003
+## 7. What this run found and fixed — JG-ADV-2026-004
 
 On the **first** armed run, AlmaLinux 9 / 5.14 exposed a **fail-open** in
 `socket_connect`: a *variable* fraction (~30–55% under load) of denied TCP
@@ -195,5 +195,5 @@ connects were wrongly allowed, while UDP/exec/file held at 0. Investigation
      tripped a fail-open type gate. Fixed by reading the correct width. (This bug
      was **latent on every distro** — Debian/Ubuntu merely got zero padding.)
 
-Both fixes landed (CVE-2026-003) and this run is the **post-fix re-validation**:
+Both fixes landed (JG-ADV-2026-004) and this run is the **post-fix re-validation**:
 `fail_open=0` on every surface. The distro-matrix did exactly its job.
diff --git a/BENCHMARKS-05.md b/BENCHMARKS-05.md
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+# Jinn Guard — Benchmark Run 05
+
+**Test #:** 05 (launch-hygiene re-validation) · **Run date:** 2026-06-19
+**Branch:** `chore/launch-hygiene` · **Host:** local dev sandbox (`jinn-dev`)
+**See also:** [`BENCHMARKS-01.md`](BENCHMARKS-01.md) · [`BENCHMARKS-02.md`](BENCHMARKS-02.md) · [`BENCHMARKS-03.md`](BENCHMARKS-03.md) · [`BENCHMARKS-04.md`](BENCHMARKS-04.md)
+
+> Purpose: re-run the full **userspace** test + benchmark suite after the
+> launch-hygiene pass (advisory-ID rename, README register fix, doc cleanups —
+> all docs/comments, **no logic**) to confirm behavior and performance are
+> unchanged. This host runs the **same CPU family and kernel** as Run 01
+> (AMD Ryzen 5 7520U / Debian 13 / kernel 6.12), so the numbers are directly
+> comparable to that baseline.
+
+---
+
+## Environment
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| CPU | **AMD Ryzen 5 7520U** (8 threads, scaling ~83%, max 4.38 GHz) — same model as Run 01 |
+| Distribution | **Debian 13** (trixie family) |
+| Kernel | **Linux 6.12.90+deb13.1-amd64** |
+| RAM | ~5.75 GiB |
+| `/tmp` | **tmpfs** — audit log + lineage are CPU-isolated from disk-fsync latency (as in Run 03/04) |
+| Toolchain | rustc/cargo **1.95.0**, release profile, clang 19 |
+| Privilege | **uid 1000, no `bpftool`** → kernel-LSM Tier 4 (armed allow/deny) **not run here** |
+
+> **Scope note.** Kernel in-kernel allow/deny enforcement (Tier 4) requires root +
+> BPF load and is **not** exercised on this unprivileged sandbox. It is already
+> validated on three real hosts in [`BENCHMARKS-01..04`](BENCHMARKS-04.md)
+> (Debian 6.12, Ubuntu 6.17, AlmaLinux 5.14 — 2,500–2,750 ops, 0 fail-open).
+> This run covers the **full automated suite + userspace performance**.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Full automated test suite
+
+`cargo test --workspace --release`:
+
+| Binary | Result |
+|---|---|
+| `ts_checker` (Z3 SMT) | 4 passed |
+| `ts_cli` unit | 87 passed |
+| `integration` | 13 passed |
+| `swarm_attack` (adversarial) | 12 passed |
+| `kernel_lsm` (Tier 4) | 6 **ignored** (env-gated: needs root + BPF) |
+
+> **116 passed · 0 failed · 6 ignored** (122 defined). Identical pass profile to
+> Run 04. The launch-hygiene changes did not alter any behavior.
+
+## 2. Attack resistance (adversarial suite)
+
+`swarm_attack`: **12/12 passed, 0 fail-open** — replay storm, signature forgery,
+intent injection, quota abuse, anonymous flood, impersonation, path traversal,
+forged delegation, bad-protocol, and the all-at-once mixed assault.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Userspace latency & throughput (`cargo bench --bench stress_bench`)
+
+### Single-client latency (10,000 sequential, full decision pipeline)
+
+| Percentile | Run 05 (Ryzen 5 7520U) | Run 01 baseline (same CPU) |
+|---|---|---|
+| P50 | **259 µs** | 257 µs |
+| P75 | 304 µs | — |
+| P90 | 435 µs | — |
+| P95 | **533 µs** | 366 µs |
+| P99 | **782 µs** | 463 µs |
+| P99.9 | 1,243 µs | — |
+| Max | 2,962 µs | 1,900 µs |
+| Single-client RPS | **~3,219** | ~3,640 |
+
+> P50 matches Run 01 to within noise (259 vs 257 µs). Tail percentiles (P95/P99)
+> are higher here — this is a **shared, non-CPU-isolated sandbox** at ~83% scaling,
+> not a dedicated host, so tail latency is noisier. The median (the pipeline's
+> real cost) is unchanged.
+
+### Concurrent throughput (tmpfs `/tmp`; 0 errors at every level)
+
+| Agents | Total RPS | P50 | P95 | Errors |
+|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
+| 10 | **6,208** | 1,220 µs | 1,874 µs | 0 |
+| 50 | 6,055 | 1,220 µs | 2,432 µs | 0 |
+| 100 | 6,159 | 1,233 µs | 2,535 µs | 0 |
+| 500 | 5,741 | 1,252 µs | 37,107 µs | 0 |
+
+> Peak **~6,208 RPS**, flat to 100 concurrent agents, **0 errors** throughout.
+> At 500 agents throughput holds but the P95 tail balloons (scheduling
+> congestion on 8 threads) — consistent with Run 01 (~6,500 peak).
+
+### Mixed allow/deny (70/30)
+
+5,000 requests → **3,500 allow / 1,500 deny classified correctly, 0
+misclassifications** (~3,517 RPS).
+
+### Saturation sweep
+
+| Threads | RPS | P99 |
+|---|---:|---:|
+| 2 | 4,556 | 1 ms |
+| 4 | 4,809 | 1 ms |
+| 8 | 5,111 | 2 ms |
+| 16 | 4,781 | 5 ms |
+| 32 | 4,888 | 9 ms |
+| 64 | **saturated** (P99 > 10 ms) | — |
+
+---
+
+## 4. Component micro-benchmarks (criterion)
+
+| Path | Median | Throughput |
+|---|---:|---:|
+| Core decision pipeline (in-process) | **73.2 µs** | ~13.6 K/s |
+| UDS framed roundtrip (persistent conn) | **16.2 µs** | ~61.6 K/s |
+| End-to-end serial roundtrip (new conn/request) | **151.1 µs** | ~6.6 K/s |
+
+> The UDS transport (~16 µs) is a small fraction of the full decision (~73 µs+);
+> the pipeline, not the socket, dominates. *(The persistent-connection case in
+> `socket_throughput` hit a `BrokenPipe` in the bench harness mid-run — a
+> harness-robustness quirk, not a daemon fault; the e2e new-connection figure
+> above completed cleanly.)*
+
+---
+
+## 5. Scope & honesty notes
+
+- Userspace only; **kernel Tier 4 not run on this unprivileged sandbox** — see
+  Runs 01–04 for live in-kernel enforcement.
+- Shared sandbox at ~83% CPU scaling: treat **P50/medians** as representative and
+  **tails** as noisier than a dedicated host would show.
+- Still a validated research prototype / controlled-pilot MVP, not independently
+  audited. See [`THREAT_MODEL.md`](THREAT_MODEL.md) and
+  [`SECURITY/ADVISORIES.md`](SECURITY/ADVISORIES.md).
+
+**Bottom line:** post-launch-hygiene, the suite is **116/116 green (0 fail-open
+in the adversarial suite)** and userspace performance is in line with the Run 01
+baseline on identical silicon — confirming the docs/comment-only hygiene pass
+changed nothing operational.
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -124,10 +124,10 @@ Linux 6.12 host across all four validation tiers.
   log, and disclosed residual risks.
 
 ### Fixed
-- **CVE-2026-002 (Critical) — filesystem policy bypass via relative paths.**
+- **JG-ADV-2026-002 (Critical) — filesystem policy bypass via relative paths.**
   Kernel now resolves the full absolute path before the denylist check
   (`jg_read_dentry_path`, depth-12 dentry walk). Verified audit-only and armed.
-- **CVE-2026-001 (High) — execve bypass via interpreter chains.** Governed agents
+- **JG-ADV-2026-001 (High) — execve bypass via interpreter chains.** Governed agents
   are denied known interpreters (`DENY_INTERPRETER_NOT_ALLOWED`).
 - **Fail-open regression (enterprise18).** The `system_immunity` and
   "out-of-scope" ALLOW fast-paths ran *before* the gate chain, letting

diff --git a/LAUNCH_CHECKLIST.md b/LAUNCH_CHECKLIST.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Launch Checklist
+
+Hygiene pass before the first distribution push to a security-literate audience
+(r/netsec, HN, AFWERX/DIU-adjacent). The repo's intellectual-honesty framing
+(validation-status section, `THREAT_MODEL.md`, "what it does NOT claim") is the
+core asset — everything here aligns the rest of the repo up to that bar.
+
+## Automated pass (branch `chore/launch-hygiene`)
+
+- [x] **A — Kill self-assigned CVE identifiers.** Renamed project-assigned CVE
+      identifiers to internal `JG-ADV-*` advisory IDs across docs and (in the
+      follow-up pass) code comments + script output strings. Rename record:
+      - `CVE-2026-001` -> `JG-ADV-2026-001` (execve interpreter-chain bypass)
+      - `CVE-2026-002` -> `JG-ADV-2026-002` (filesystem relative-path bypass)
+      - `CVE-2026-003` -> `JG-ADV-2026-003` (agent impersonation / UID spoofing)
+      - `CVE-2026-003` -> `JG-ADV-2026-004` (socket-LSM fail-open — renumbered to
+        resolve the duplicate-`003` collision; the newer finding takes the new
+        number)
+
+      A one-line disclaimer was added at first use in `README.md` and
+      `THREAT_MODEL.md` ("`JG-ADV-*` are internal, self-identified advisory IDs,
+      not CVE records issued by a CNA"). Canonical registry:
+      [`SECURITY/ADVISORIES.md`](SECURITY/ADVISORIES.md).
+- [x] **B — Fix the register collision.** Retitled the README headline from
+      "Enterprise Semantic Firewall" to "Kernel-level enforcement firewall for
+      autonomous AI agents (research prototype)" to match the validation-status
+      section. The Fleet & Enterprise feature-tier section (feature-gated, off by
+      default) is legitimate and left as-is.
+- [x] **C — Repo metadata.** About/description + topics command prepared (run
+      manually — `gh` not available in the working environment; exact command in
+      the PR summary).
+- [x] **D — Fix the language bar.** Marked `bpf/**` `linguist-vendored` in
+      `.gitattributes` so the language bar reads Rust-primary. GitHub re-indexes
+      on the next push.
+
+## Manual (human, not agent)
+
+- [ ] **MANUAL** — Re-record demo: screen-recorder window must never overlay
+      terminal content (currently covers the open and the closing thesis card).
+- [ ] **MANUAL** — Post demo as a **native LinkedIn video** (uploaded, not a
+      link). Put the repo URL in the **first comment**, not the post body.
+- [ ] **MANUAL** — Warm DM to a named contact for a repost into the
+      AFWERX/DIU-adjacent network.
diff --git a/OWASP-MAPPING.md b/OWASP-MAPPING.md
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ can cause.
 An agent generates, modifies, or runs code/commands unsafely.
 The kernel `bprm_check_security` LSM hook denies execution of non-allowlisted
 binaries for governed agents, with interpreter-chain mitigation
-(CVE-2026-001, `DENY_INTERPRETER_NOT_ALLOWED`). Enforcement is in the kernel and
+(JG-ADV-2026-001, `DENY_INTERPRETER_NOT_ALLOWED`). Enforcement is in the kernel and
 cannot be bypassed by the agent process.
-*Evidence:* `bpf/lsm/jg_bprm_check_security.c`; `CHANGELOG.md` (CVE-2026-001);
+*Evidence:* `bpf/lsm/jg_bprm_check_security.c`; `CHANGELOG.md` (JG-ADV-2026-001);
 Tier-4 armed validation.
 
 ### ASI06 — Memory and Context Poisoning · **Out of scope**

diff --git a/PROFESSOR_VALIDATION.md b/PROFESSOR_VALIDATION.md
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ then prints a PASS/SKIP/FAIL summary. Skipped tiers tell you what they need.
 |------|----------------|--------------|------------------|
 | **1. Build + tests** | The full automated suite passes (≈117 tests: Z3 engine, governance pipeline, 13 integration, 12 swarm-attack). | Rust (`cargo`) | No |
 | **2. Mandatory mediation** | A maximally-locked agent container (no network, read-only FS, all capabilities dropped, seccomp, socket-only) **cannot** act directly; only broker-mediated actions through Jinn Guard succeed. | Docker | No (containers) |
-| **3. Kernel path resolution** | The eBPF-LSM hooks load and resolve **full file paths** in the kernel (the CVE-2026-002 fix), in **audit-only** mode. | root + BPF-LSM + clang | **No** (audit-only) |
+| **3. Kernel path resolution** | The eBPF-LSM hooks load and resolve **full file paths** in the kernel (the JG-ADV-2026-002 fix), in **audit-only** mode. | root + BPF-LSM + clang | **No** (audit-only) |
 | **4. Kernel enforcement** | Real allow/deny across execve, TCP, UDP, file create, and file unlink. | root + `--arm` + cgroup v2 | **Only inside a dedicated test cgroup** — see below |
 
 ---
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ denied operation was actually denied, and every allowed operation succeeded.
   security-critical cases — resolve to full absolute paths.
 - **Interpreter chains.** An agent explicitly allowed to run an interpreter can
   invoke other tools through it; Jinn Guard denies interpreters by policy for
-  governed agents (CVE-2026-001 mitigation), but per-binary execve limits are
+  governed agents (JG-ADV-2026-001 mitigation), but per-binary execve limits are
   only as strong as the allowlist.
 - **Not independently audited; single-distribution validated (Debian).**
 

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-# 🛡️ Jinn Guard — Enterprise Semantic Firewall
+# 🛡️ Jinn Guard — Kernel-enforced semantic firewall for autonomous AI agents (validated research prototype)
 
 [![CI](https://github.com/AlphaReasoning/The-Jinn-Guard/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/AlphaReasoning/The-Jinn-Guard/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
 
 **Jinn Guard** is an asynchronous, kernel-aware semantic firewall designed to enforce mathematical safety constraints on autonomous AI agents before any tool execution is permitted. It intercepts high-level natural language intents and processes them through a lifetime-anchored **Z3 SMT solver pipeline** — verifying state transitions and risk ceilings against formalized compliance models before granting or denying execution authority.
 
-Operating locally over high-throughput **UNIX domain sockets** on AlphaOS, the platform binds user-space proxy validation with low-level **eBPF kernel telemetry** and namespace tracking to guarantee absolute zero-trust process isolation and immutable anti-replay protection across the entire host subsystem.
+Operating locally over high-throughput **UNIX domain sockets**, the platform binds user-space proxy validation with low-level **eBPF kernel telemetry** and namespace tracking to enforce zero-trust process isolation and anti-replay protection for governed cgroups.
 
 > ### ▶️ See it live in 5 minutes
 > ```bash
@@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ Kernel Layer (eBPF)
                                         └─→ governance loop (telemetry feed)
 ```
 
+> **A note on languages.** The probes in `bpf/` are C — small, separately-compiled
+> eBPF programs loaded into the kernel. The governance core (the daemon, the Z3
+> verification pipeline, the policy engine, and the CLI) is **Rust**, under `ts_cli/`.
+> `bpf/**` is marked `linguist-vendored`, so GitHub's language bar reflects the Rust
+> core rather than the volume of low-level kernel C.
+
 ---
 
 ## 📦 Components
@@ -246,7 +252,11 @@ Validated on three distributions / three kernel generations: **Debian 13 / kerne
 
 ## Known Limitations
 
-### Filesystem path resolution — mount boundaries (was CVE-2026-002, now fixed)
+> **Advisory registry:** the canonical list of `JG-ADV-*` IDs, status, and fix commits lives in [`SECURITY/ADVISORIES.md`](SECURITY/ADVISORIES.md).
+>
+> **Note on identifiers:** `JG-ADV-*` are internal, self-identified advisory IDs, not CVE records issued by a CNA.
+
+### Filesystem path resolution — mount boundaries (was JG-ADV-2026-002, now fixed)
 
 The BPF `inode_create`/`inode_unlink` hooks now resolve the **full absolute
 path** of a file operation in the kernel (a bounded `d_parent` walk), closing the
@@ -260,7 +270,7 @@ on a single-root install) — the security-critical cases — resolve to full
 absolute paths. Crossing mount boundaries requires path-family LSM hooks or
 `bpf_d_path` and is tracked for a future release.
 
-### Interpreter chains (CVE-2026-001, mitigated)
+### Interpreter chains (JG-ADV-2026-001, mitigated)
 
 An agent explicitly allowed to run an interpreter can invoke other tools through
 it. Jinn Guard denies known interpreters by policy for governed agents (any