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+- Feature Name: `usize_panic_on_overflow`
+- Start Date: 2019-02-02
+- RFC PR:
+- Rust Issue:
+
+# Summary
+[summary]: #summary
+
+In `release` builds, adopt the current `debug_assertions` behavior of panicking
+on overflow for arithmetic with `usize` (but not other sizes/types of integers).
+
+# Motivation
+[motivation]: #motivation
+
+One of Rust's motivations is to make programming safer, particularly against
+memory corruption vulnerabilities. In safe Rust code, integer overflows do not
+lead to memory unsafety, however when combined with `unsafe`, integer overflow
+is a frequent source of security vulnerabilities. We consider four examples:
+
+- [CVE-2018-1000810](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/rustlang-security-announcements/CmSuTm-SaU0/AzVznVcTCgAJ):
+  Integer overflow leading to heap buffer overflow in `str::repeat`.
+- [CVE-2017-1000430](https://github.com/alicemaz/rust-base64/commit/24ead980daf11ba563e4fb2516187a56a71ad319):
+  Integer overflow leading to heap buffer overflow in the `base64` crate.
+- [CrosVM](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=892904): Integer
+  overflow leading to heap buffer overflow in ChromeOS's hypervisor.
+- [ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring/issues/742): Near-miss integer
+  overflow, which would have led to heap buffer overflow.
+
+A panic-by-default behavior would have ensured that none of these bugs would
+have been a vulnerability. All four of these cases involved operations on
+`usize` values. Because Rust is very strict in how integer types are handled, it
+is exceedingly likely that overflows which lead to memory corruption will happen
+on `usize` values: `usize` is consistently used in `core`/`std` APIs which deal
+in lengths, buffer sizes, etc., the kind of values where overflow can be
+dangerous, so it's no coincidence that historic integer-overflow vulnerabilities
+occured with `usize` values.
+
+Rust's current behavior of `panic` in `debug_assertions` builds and twos
+complement overflow in `release` builds does not provide protection against
+these vulnerabilities.
+
+# Guide-level explanation
+[guide-level-explanation]: #guide-level-explanation
+
+When an integer overflow is encountered when performing an arithmetic operation
+(e.g. `+` or `*`), Rust has two possible different behaviors. In
+`debug_assertions` builds, this will always cause a `panic`. In `release` builds
+the operation will succeed and twos complement wrapping will occur - with one
+exception, if the operation is being performed on `usize` integers you'll get
+the same `panic` as in a `debug_assertions` build.
+
+For most use cases, simply using the default arithmetic operators works well,
+however if you need more control, such as to avoid the `panic` and return a
+clear error, several methods are available:
+
+- `checked_add` will return an `Option<$integer_type>`.
+  `200u8.checked_add(200u8)`  will return `None`.
+- `saturating_add` will return the maximum value the type can hold when an
+  integer overflow occurs. `200u8.saturating_add(200u8)` will return `255`.
+- `wrapping_add` performs the arithmetic with twos complement overflow.
+  `200u8.wrapping_add(200u8)` will return `145`.
+
+If you are using `unsafe`, it's important that you be aware that wrapping
+overflow can lead to memory corruption. See
+[CWE-190](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/190.html) for more details.
+
+# Reference-level explanation
+[reference-level-explanation]: #reference-level-explanation
+
+All current integer overflow semantics would remain the same, with one
+exception: `usize` in `release` builds would gain the `panic` behavior it
+currently has in `debug_assertions` builds.
+
+# Drawbacks
+[drawbacks]: #drawbacks
+
+There are three arguments against making this change:
+
+1. Performance: Adding additional overflow checks on all `usize` arithmetic will
+   slow down programs.
+2. Consistency: Having special behavior for just `usize` is weird, if we want
+   this behavior it should apply to all primitive integer types.
+3. No changes at all: The current behavior is the desired end state, and thus we
+   shouldn't deviate from it.
+
+# Rationale and alternatives
+[rationale-and-alternatives]: #rationale-and-alternatives
+
+The three design considerations I was attempting to balance in designing this
+solution were performance, protection, and predictability.
+
+Performance is best served by adding the minimum number of checks in `release`
+builds. We maximize protection against vulnerabilities by checking as many
+things as possible. And a solution which is most consistent and easy to reason
+about is best for predictability.
+
+To consider the extremes of these:
+
+- Adding no checks by default in `release` builds is best for performance, but
+  worst for protection. Is it predictable (though suffers from the fact that
+  many programmers do not think proactively about integer arithmetic as
+  fallible).
+- Checking *all* arithmetic is worst for performance (and indeed was previously
+  rejected on these grounds in RFC 560), but best for protection. It's very
+  predictable.
+- A data-flow analysis based insertion of overflow checks where the result
+  flowed into an allocation would be good for performance, because it would
+  avoid unnecessary checks. It would be ok for protection, depending on how
+  advanced it was (e.g. would it be inter-procedural?) However it would be
+  extremely unpredictable and difficult for programmers to reason about either
+  the performance or protection they were getting.
+
+Given these criteria, here's how this proposal fares:
+
+**Protection**: because most of the sinks for APIs which are dangerous when
+combined with overflows and unsafe operate on `usize`, this will cover the
+majority of cases at risk of becoming vulnerabilities. A review of historical
+integer-overflow vulnerabilities in Rust found that they were *all* `usize`
+arithmetic, and thus protected by this proposal.
+
+**Performance**: This has a more mild performance impact than the previously
+rejected check-all-arithmetic. I hypothesize that programs which rely most
+heavily on arithmetic are not using `usize` (e.g. `curve25519-dalek`, which
+was suggested to me as a good test of a such a crate, does not use `usize` for
+representing limbs), however validating that the performance impact is
+acceptable will require implementing this and measuring.
+
+**Predictability**: This proposal makes it relatively easy to look at a piece of
+code and see whether it is protected, but the behavior may not be the most
+intuitive to those not familiar with it. The biggest challenges I anticipate are
+with code that looks like:
+
+```
+fn explode(x: u32, y: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let v = vec![0; (x * y) as usize];
+    for i in 0..x {
+        for j in 0..y {
+            unsafe {
+                v.set_unchecked(i * y + j, VALUE);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return v;
+}
+```
+
+Which someone may expect to be protected, but is not.
+
+# Prior art
+[prior-art]: #prior-art
+
+This builds on RFC 560, which defined the current semantics for integer
+overflows. In many respects I see this as the minimal change to advance towards
+the world I see as the desired-but-not-yet-realistic consequence of that RFC -
+checking for overflow by default everywhere.
+
+I'm not aware of any other language which varies its overflow behavior by type.
+This suggests that the behavior may be surprising to many users.
+
+My assessment is that this is balanced by the fact that this would have
+prevented all the vulnerabilities that have been seen thus far.
+
+# Unresolved questions
+[unresolved-questions]: #unresolved-questions
+
+There are three major questions I see:
+
+- Is the performance really within the acceptable bounds? What are the
+  acceptable bounds?
+- Do we need a method for obtaining the previous behavior of `panic` in
+  `debug_assertions` builds, but no checks in `release` builds? None of the
+  overflow methods currently provide this behavior, and so for people who
+  explicitly want it, under this proposal they'd need to write their own.
+- Are additional options for controlling overflow behavior at the sub-crate
+  level required?
+
+# Future possibilities
+[future-possibilities]: #future-possibilities
+
+The natural evolution would be towards overflow checking all arithmetic. It is
+my hope that one product of this effort will be identifying small places that
+optimizations and code generation can be improved further minimize the overhead
+of overflow checks, and thus help enable this future. Nevertheless, I do not
+believe that checking all arithmetic by default is a realistic short-term
+possibility.