diff --git a/test/test_invariant_dump_win_syms.py b/test/test_invariant_dump_win_syms.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..301abbed50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/test_invariant_dump_win_syms.py
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+import pytest
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+# Import the actual module
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '..'))
+from tools.dump_win_syms import main
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("payload", [
+    "../../../etc/passwd",           # Classic path traversal
+    "....//....//etc/passwd",        # Double-encoded traversal
+    "%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",         # URL-encoded traversal
+    "subdir/file.txt",               # Valid relative path within root
+    "file.txt",                       # Valid filename
+])
+def test_path_traversal_blocked(payload, tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys):
+    """Invariant: File operations never resolve paths outside the declared root directory"""
+    
+    # Create a temporary root directory for file operations
+    root_dir = tmp_path / "root"
+    root_dir.mkdir()
+    
+    # Create a test file inside root
+    test_file = root_dir / "file.txt"
+    test_file.write_text("test content")
+    
+    # Create a sensitive file outside root (should not be accessible)
+    outside_file = tmp_path / "sensitive.txt"
+    outside_file.write_text("secret data")
+    
+    # Mock sys.argv to pass the payload as argument
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sys, 'argv', ['dump_win_syms.py', str(root_dir), payload])
+    
+    # Attempt to access the file
+    try:
+        main()
+    except (SystemExit, FileNotFoundError, ValueError, OSError) as e:
+        # Expected: traversal attempts should fail or be rejected
+        pass
+    
+    # Verify that sensitive file outside root was never read
+    captured = capsys.readouterr()
+    assert "secret data" not in captured.out, \
+        f"Path traversal payload '{payload}' allowed access outside root directory"
+    
+    # For valid payloads, verify they resolve within root
+    if not payload.startswith(("../", "....//", "%2e")):
+        resolved = (root_dir / payload).resolve()
+        assert str(resolved).startswith(str(root_dir.resolve())), \
+            f"Valid path '{payload}' resolved outside root directory"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tools/dump_win_syms.py b/tools/dump_win_syms.py
index 009feed44d..6de10bdb2f 100644
--- a/tools/dump_win_syms.py
+++ b/tools/dump_win_syms.py
@@ -1,6 +1,18 @@
 import sys, os
 import subprocess
 
+def safe_open(path, mode):
+  norm = os.path.normpath(path)
+  if any(part == '..' for part in norm.split(os.sep)):
+    raise ValueError("Path traversal detected: " + path)
+  return open(norm, mode)
+
+def safe_call(cmd, **kwargs):
+  for arg in cmd:
+    if isinstance(arg, str) and any(p == '..' for p in os.path.normpath(arg).split(os.sep)):
+      raise ValueError("Path traversal in subprocess arg: " + arg)
+  return subprocess.call(cmd, **kwargs)
+
 nw_exe = os.path.normpath(sys.argv[1])
 nw_dll = os.path.normpath(sys.argv[2])
 node_dll = os.path.normpath(sys.argv[3])
@@ -9,8 +21,8 @@
 dll_sym_file = nw_dll + ".sym"
 node_sym_file = node_dll + ".sym"
 dump_exe = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__)), 'dump_syms.exe')
-subprocess.call([dump_exe, nw_exe], stdout=open(sym_file, 'w'))
-subprocess.call([dump_exe, nw_dll], stdout=open(dll_sym_file, 'w'))
-subprocess.call([dump_exe, node_dll], stdout=open(node_sym_file, 'w'))
+safe_call([dump_exe, nw_exe], stdout=safe_open(sym_file, 'w'))
+safe_call([dump_exe, nw_dll], stdout=safe_open(dll_sym_file, 'w'))
+safe_call([dump_exe, node_dll], stdout=safe_open(node_sym_file, 'w'))
 lzma_exe = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__)), '..', '..', '..', 'third_party', 'lzma_sdk', 'bin', 'win64', '7za.exe')
-subprocess.call([lzma_exe, 'a', '-t7z', out_file, sym_file, dll_sym_file, node_sym_file])
+safe_call([lzma_exe, 'a', '-t7z', out_file, sym_file, dll_sym_file, node_sym_file])