This document covers advanced configuration for self-hosted Multica deployments. For the quick start guide, see SELF_HOSTING.md.
All configuration is done via environment variables. Copy .env.example as a starting point.
| Variable | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
DATABASE_URL |
PostgreSQL connection string | postgres://multica:multica@localhost:5432/multica?sslmode=disable |
JWT_SECRET |
Required — no safe default. Secret key for signing JWT tokens. A production backend refuses to boot if this is empty or a known placeholder. Generate with openssl rand -hex 32. |
openssl rand -hex 32 |
FRONTEND_ORIGIN |
URL where the frontend is served (used for CORS) | https://app.example.com |
These have sensible defaults and only need to be set when tuning a large or constrained deployment. Precedence (highest first): env var → pool_* query params on DATABASE_URL → built-in default.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
DATABASE_MAX_CONNS |
pgxpool max connections per pod. pod_count × DATABASE_MAX_CONNS should stay well below the Postgres max_connections ceiling. With a connection pooler (PgBouncer / RDS Proxy / Supavisor) in front, this can be raised significantly. |
25 |
DATABASE_MIN_CONNS |
pgxpool warm baseline connections per pod. Auto-clamped to DATABASE_MAX_CONNS. |
5 |
Multica supports two email backends. SMTP_HOST takes priority when set; otherwise RESEND_API_KEY is used. With neither configured, verification codes are printed to the server log — copy them from there to log in.
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
RESEND_API_KEY |
Your Resend API key |
RESEND_FROM_EMAIL |
Sender email address (default: noreply@multica.ai) |
Use this option when your deployment cannot reach the public internet or you already have an internal mail relay (e.g. Exchange, Postfix, SendGrid on-prem).
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
SMTP_HOST |
SMTP relay hostname (setting this activates SMTP mode) | - |
SMTP_PORT |
SMTP port | 25 |
SMTP_USERNAME |
SMTP username (leave empty for unauthenticated relay) | - |
SMTP_PASSWORD |
SMTP password | - |
SMTP_TLS |
TLS mode. implicit (aliases smtps, ssl) forces SMTPS on connect; port 465 auto-enables it. Unset / starttls upgrades via STARTTLS |
starttls |
SMTP_TLS_INSECURE |
Set true to skip TLS certificate verification (self-signed / private CA certs) |
false |
SMTP_EHLO_NAME |
EHLO/HELO name announced to the relay. Set a real FQDN when a strict relay (e.g. Google Workspace) rejects the default greeting from a public IP | machine hostname |
STARTTLS is used automatically when advertised by the server. Port 465 (SMTPS / implicit TLS) is supported and auto-enables implicit TLS; set SMTP_TLS=implicit (aliases smtps, ssl) to force it on a non-standard port.
Note: If neither Resend nor SMTP is configured, generated verification codes are printed to backend logs — copy them from there to log in. A fixed local testing code (e.g.
888888) is opt-in only: setMULTICA_DEV_VERIFICATION_CODE=888888in.envand keepAPP_ENVnon-production. The Docker self-host stack pinsAPP_ENV=production, so the shortcut is ignored there. Never enable a fixed code on a publicly reachable instance.
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID |
Google OAuth client ID |
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET |
Google OAuth client secret |
GOOGLE_REDIRECT_URI |
OAuth callback URL (e.g. https://app.example.com/auth/callback) |
Changes take effect after restarting the backend / compose stack. The web UI reads GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID from /api/config at runtime, so no web rebuild is needed.
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
ALLOW_SIGNUP |
Set to false to disable new user signups on a private instance |
ALLOWED_EMAIL_DOMAINS |
Optional comma-separated allowlist of email domains |
ALLOWED_EMAILS |
Optional comma-separated allowlist of exact email addresses |
DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION |
Set to true to make POST /api/workspaces return 403 for every caller — users can only join workspaces they were invited to |
Changes take effect after restarting the backend / compose stack. The web UI reads ALLOW_SIGNUP and DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION from /api/config at runtime, so no web rebuild is needed.
ALLOW_SIGNUP=false blocks new accounts from being created, but it does not block an already-signed-in user from creating another workspace via POST /api/workspaces. On a self-hosted instance where every issue/repo/agent must be visible to the platform admin, set DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION=true to close that gap. The recommended bootstrap sequence is:
- Start the instance with
DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION=false(the default). - Sign in as the admin and create the shared workspace.
- Set
DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION=trueand restart the backend. Optionally setALLOW_SIGNUP=falseat the same time if you also want to block new account creation. - Going forward, additional users join via invitation only — the "Create workspace" affordance is hidden in the UI and any direct API call returns 403.
Note: setting
ALLOW_SIGNUP=falseblocks all new account creation, including users who already have a pending invitation. If you need invited users to be able to sign up but not create their own workspaces, keepALLOW_SIGNUP=true(optionally combined withALLOWED_EMAIL_DOMAINS/ALLOWED_EMAILS) and only flipDISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION=true.
For file uploads and attachments, configure S3 and (optionally) CloudFront:
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
S3_BUCKET |
Bucket name only (e.g. my-bucket). Do not include the .s3.<region>.amazonaws.com suffix — the server constructs the public URL from S3_BUCKET + S3_REGION |
S3_REGION |
AWS region (default: us-west-2). Must match the bucket's actual region — used for both SDK signing and public URLs |
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY |
Static credentials. When both are unset, the AWS SDK default credential chain is used |
AWS_ENDPOINT_URL |
Custom S3-compatible endpoint (e.g. MinIO, R2, B2). Setting this defaults to path-style URLs for backward compatibility |
S3_USE_PATH_STYLE |
Optional S3 addressing mode. Leave empty for the default (true when AWS_ENDPOINT_URL is set, false for AWS S3). Set false for S3-compatible providers that require virtual-hosted-style URLs |
ATTACHMENT_DOWNLOAD_MODE |
Attachment download behavior: auto (default), cloudfront, presign, or proxy. Use proxy for private buckets behind Docker/VPC-only endpoints such as http://rustfs:9000. Avatars follow the same policy — see below |
ATTACHMENT_DOWNLOAD_URL_TTL |
TTL for CloudFront signed URLs and S3 presigned download URLs (default: 30m) |
CLOUDFRONT_DOMAIN |
CloudFront distribution domain — when set, public URLs use this host instead of the S3 host |
CLOUDFRONT_KEY_PAIR_ID |
CloudFront key pair ID for signed URLs |
CLOUDFRONT_PRIVATE_KEY |
CloudFront private key (PEM format) |
User / agent / squad / workspace avatars are stored as the raw storage object
URL. When the bucket is public — a public CLOUDFRONT_DOMAIN, or the default
local-disk backend — that URL is served to clients unchanged.
When the bucket is private and no public CDN domain is configured (S3 with
Block Public Access, R2, MinIO), the API instead serves avatars from
/api/avatars/<signature>/<key> and resolves each request through
ATTACHMENT_DOWNLOAD_MODE — a presigned redirect, a CloudFront-signed
redirect, or a proxied body. The signature in the path is what authorizes the
read: an auth-gated URL cannot be used as an <img src> from the Desktop app
or a split-origin frontend, because the session cookie is SameSite=Strict.
Only image objects resolve through this route, and only ones that are
avatar-class: a standalone upload not attached to an issue, comment, chat, or
task. Pointing an avatar_url at a file someone attached to an issue is
rejected when it is set and 404s if it was already stored, so a private image
cannot be turned into a public link by way of the avatar field.
No configuration is required, and avatars uploaded before this behavior existed are fixed without a backfill.
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
COOKIE_DOMAIN |
Optional Domain attribute for session + CloudFront cookies. Leave empty for single-host deployments (localhost, LAN IP, or a single hostname). Only set it when the frontend and backend sit on different subdomains of one registered domain (e.g. .example.com). Do not use an IP literal — RFC 6265 forbids IP addresses in the cookie Domain attribute and browsers will drop such Set-Cookie headers. |
The Secure flag on session cookies is derived automatically from the scheme of FRONTEND_ORIGIN: HTTPS origins get Secure cookies; plain-HTTP origins (LAN / private-network self-host) get non-secure cookies so the browser can actually store them.
If the frontend and backend are served from different hostnames, COOKIE_DOMAIN is required, not optional: the browser must be able to read the multica_csrf cookie from the page's own origin to send the X-CSRF-Token header, and without it every write request fails with 403 {"error":"CSRF validation failed"}. Scope it to the narrowest parent domain that covers both hosts — it also shares the multica_auth session cookie with every host under that domain. See Reverse Proxy for the full split-domain configuration and its trust requirements.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
PORT |
8080 |
Backend port — the one to edit. It is the port the backend process listens on for a local/bare run, and the host port the Compose self-host stack publishes. In Compose the container always listens on 8080 internally, so changing this needs no rebuild. |
BACKEND_PORT |
Value of PORT |
Optional alias that overrides PORT for the backend. API_PORT and SERVER_PORT are further aliases; the alias order is BACKEND_PORT → API_PORT → SERVER_PORT → PORT → 8080, and it is the same in Makefile, scripts/local-env.sh and docker-compose.selfhost.yml. Leave them unset unless the host port must differ from the port the process listens on. |
METRICS_ADDR |
empty | Optional Prometheus metrics listener, for example 127.0.0.1:9090 |
FRONTEND_PORT |
3000 |
Frontend port. Host port in Compose; the container always listens on 3000 internally. |
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS |
Value of FRONTEND_ORIGIN |
Comma-separated list of allowed origins. Governs both the HTTP CORS allowlist and the WebSocket Origin check. A browser origin that isn't listed here (and isn't localhost) has its real-time WebSocket upgrade rejected with 403, so live updates stop working until a manual refresh. |
LOG_LEVEL |
info |
Log level: debug, info, warn, error |
Which source wins depends on the entry point, and only the alias order above is shared. Docker Compose lets the calling environment outrank
.env(PORT=9100 docker compose … up -dpublishes 9100).makeis the other way round: itincludes the env file, so a value there outranks the same variable from your environment, and amake selfhost PORT=…command-line assignment outranks both. Editing the env file is therefore the one method that behaves the same everywhere. None of this affects whether the reported port is correct:make selfhostand both installers read the published port back fromdocker compose port, so the health check and the printed URL always match what Compose actually published.
The web development server is one intentional exception to the generic PORT
fallback: Next uses PORT for its own frontend listener before it evaluates the
rewrite configuration. Its backend fallback therefore accepts
BACKEND_PORT → API_PORT → SERVER_PORT → 8080, while an explicit
REMOTE_API_URL or NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL still takes priority.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
MULTICA_WECOM_TRACE |
empty (off) | 1 records every WeCom frame the backend reads and writes, including the first 120 runes of each message body. Anything else is off. |
Turn it on for a debugging session and unset it when the session ends. Before you do:
- It is read at boot, so changing it needs a backend restart —
docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml up -d backend. There is no runtime toggle. While it is on, the backend logs a warning on every startup saying so. - Anyone who can read the backend's logs can read the traced message text. That is a wider audience than the WeCom chat it came from: your
docker logs/ journald / log shipper, and whoever administers them. The smart-bot secret is never read, andtoken=/access_token=/code=parameters are redacted out of message text — but user message content is not, and an attachment'sContent-Dispositionand the filename read out of it are written verbatim, up to 2048 runes and past the redactor. That line exists to show exactly how the storage backend encoded a name, and a redacted or truncated copy of it answers nothing; it also means an attachment's filename reaches your logs as sent. - Retention is your log stack's, not the application's. The backend writes to stderr and keeps nothing itself, so how long the traced text survives is whatever your Docker logging driver or shipper is set to. If that is "forever", decide about it before enabling rather than after.
Each outbound frame produces two lines that share a seq: dir=out when it is
about to be written, and dir=out.done with ok=true / ok=false once the
socket has answered. seq is the frame's position in the write order, so the
pair tells you what this backend sent and in which order; an attempt with no
matching outcome is a write that never returned.
ok=true means the frame reached the socket, not that WeCom accepted it. For
the platform's verdict, match the frame's req_id against the dir=in line
answering it and read that line's errcode — a frame can be written
successfully and still be rejected there.
These are configured on each user's machine, not on the server:
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
MULTICA_SERVER_URL |
ws://localhost:8080/ws |
WebSocket URL for daemon → server connection |
MULTICA_APP_URL |
http://localhost:3000 |
Frontend URL for CLI login flow |
MULTICA_DAEMON_POLL_INTERVAL |
3s |
How often the daemon polls for tasks |
MULTICA_DAEMON_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL |
15s |
Heartbeat frequency |
Agent-specific overrides:
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
MULTICA_CLAUDE_PATH |
Custom path to the claude binary |
MULTICA_CLAUDE_MODEL |
Override the Claude model used |
MULTICA_CODEX_PATH |
Custom path to the codex binary |
MULTICA_CODEX_MODEL |
Override the Codex model used |
MULTICA_COPILOT_PATH |
Custom path to the copilot (GitHub Copilot CLI) binary |
MULTICA_COPILOT_MODEL |
Override the Copilot model used (note: GitHub Copilot routes models through your account entitlement, so this may not be honoured) |
MULTICA_OPENCODE_PATH |
Custom path to the opencode binary |
MULTICA_OPENCODE_MODEL |
Override the OpenCode model used |
MULTICA_OPENCLAW_PATH |
Custom path to the openclaw binary |
MULTICA_OPENCLAW_MODEL |
Override the OpenClaw model used |
MULTICA_OPENCLAW_CLI_TIMEOUT |
Deadline for each openclaw config ... call during task preparation (default 30s; accepts 45s or 45). Raise it when the local CLI is slow to start; the daemon also reads it from backends.openclaw.cli_timeout in the CLI config |
MULTICA_HERMES_PATH |
Custom path to the hermes binary |
MULTICA_HERMES_MODEL |
Override the Hermes model used |
MULTICA_PI_PATH |
Custom path to the pi binary |
MULTICA_PI_MODEL |
Override the Pi model used |
MULTICA_CURSOR_PATH |
Custom path to the cursor-agent binary |
MULTICA_CURSOR_MODEL |
Override the Cursor Agent model used |
MULTICA_GROK_PATH |
Custom path to the grok binary |
MULTICA_GROK_MODEL |
Override the Grok model used (e.g. grok-4.5) |
Multica requires PostgreSQL 17 with the pgvector extension.
The docker-compose.selfhost.yml includes PostgreSQL. No separate setup needed.
If you prefer to use an existing PostgreSQL instance, ensure the pgvector extension is available:
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;Set DATABASE_URL in your .env and remove the postgres service from the compose file.
The Docker Compose setup runs migrations automatically. If you need to run them manually:
# Using the built binary
./server/bin/migrate up
# Or from source
cd server && go run ./cmd/migrate upThe Usage and Runtime dashboards read from task_usage_hourly, a derived table populated by rollup_task_usage_hourly(). As of MUL-2957 the backend runs this rollup in-process on every replica via a DB-backed scheduler (sys_cron_executions); a fresh self-host install needs no operator action — the bundled pgvector/pgvector:pg17 image works without changes.
Every backend replica ticks every 30 seconds and tries to claim the current 5-minute UTC plan in sys_cron_executions. The unique key (job_name, scope_kind, scope_id, plan_time) makes the claim a single-winner contest across all replicas, so multi-instance deployments do not double-write. The handler then calls SELECT rollup_task_usage_hourly(); the SQL function holds advisory lock 4246 internally, so a stray pg_cron job or manual call can run alongside the scheduler without ever colliding on the rollup itself. Inspect the audit table for steady-state operation:
SELECT plan_time, status, attempt, runner_id,
error_code, error_msg, started_at, finished_at
FROM sys_cron_executions
WHERE job_name = 'rollup_task_usage_hourly'
ORDER BY plan_time DESC
LIMIT 20;If you previously registered the rollup as a pg_cron job (SELECT cron.schedule('rollup_task_usage_hourly', '*/5 * * * *', …)), it is safe to leave it in place: advisory lock 4246 prevents double-writes, and the loser path no-ops cleanly. To drop the redundant entry once the in-process scheduler is up:
SELECT cron.unschedule('rollup_task_usage_hourly')
FROM cron.job WHERE jobname = 'rollup_task_usage_hourly';External cron / systemd / Kubernetes CronJob setups that call SELECT rollup_task_usage_hourly() directly are also still valid — they were the only option before MUL-2957 and remain a supported compatibility path. They are no longer the recommended setup; new deployments should rely on the in-process scheduler.
rollup_task_usage_hourly() only processes new buckets after it starts running. If you already have task_usage rows from before the rollup was claimed for the first time — most commonly when upgrading from v0.3.4 to v0.3.5+ on a database that already has months of usage — you can run backfill_task_usage_hourly to seed historical buckets:
# Docker Compose
docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml exec backend \
./backfill_task_usage_hourly --sleep-between-slices=2s
# Kubernetes
kubectl -n multica exec deploy/multica-backend -- \
./backfill_task_usage_hourly --sleep-between-slices=2sThe command walks task_usage's full time range in monthly slices and calls the same idempotent primitive the in-process scheduler uses, so it's safe to re-run, to interrupt with Ctrl-C, and to run concurrently with the scheduler (advisory lock 4246 serialises them). Flags:
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
--sleep-between-slices |
Pause between monthly slices to throttle read pressure on busy databases (e.g. 2s). Recommended on production DBs with years of history. |
--months-back N |
Only backfill the last N months. Requires --force-partial because the watermark still advances past the skipped older buckets — those are permanently abandoned. |
--dry-run |
Log slices that would be processed without writing anything. |
After backfill completes, the rollup-state watermark is stamped to now() - 5 minutes, so the first scheduled tick after backfill does not redo history.
Migration 103 adds a fail-closed guard that refuses to drop the legacy daily rollups until task_usage_hourly has caught up. As of MUL-2957 the migrate command runs an idempotent monthly-slice backfill (under advisory lock 4246) automatically immediately before applying migration 103, so v0.3.4 → v0.3.5+ upgrades complete in a single migrate up invocation — no operator step is required.
If you are upgrading from a binary that pre-dates MUL-2957 (or the auto-hook fails for an environmental reason), recovery is the manual path: run backfill_task_usage_hourly against the database, then re-run migrate up (or restart the backend container — migrations run automatically on startup). Fresh installs are exempt — the guard short-circuits when task_usage is empty, and the in-process scheduler picks up new buckets from the first tick.
If you prefer to build and run services manually:
Prerequisites: Go 1.26.6, Node.js 22, pnpm 10.28.2, PostgreSQL 17 with pgvector.
# Start your PostgreSQL (or use: docker compose up -d postgres)
# Build the backend
make build
# Run database migrations
DATABASE_URL="your-database-url" ./server/bin/migrate up
# Start the backend server
DATABASE_URL="your-database-url" PORT=8080 JWT_SECRET="your-secret" ./server/bin/serverFor the frontend:
pnpm install
pnpm build
# Start the frontend (production mode)
cd apps/web
REMOTE_API_URL=http://localhost:8080 pnpm startIn production, put a reverse proxy in front of both the backend and frontend to handle TLS and routing.
Single-domain layout — frontend and backend served on the same hostname (this is what docker-compose.selfhost.yml defaults to):
multica.example.com {
# WebSocket route — must come before the catch-all
@multica_ws path /ws /ws/*
handle @multica_ws {
reverse_proxy localhost:8080 {
flush_interval -1
}
}
# Everything else → frontend
reverse_proxy localhost:3000
}
Even on a single domain, set
FRONTEND_ORIGIN/CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINSto that public origin (e.g.https://multica.example.com) on the backend. The backend's default origin allowlist islocalhostonly, so without this it rejects the WebSocket upgrade from the public URL with403and real-time updates silently stop working. See LAN / Non-localhost Access.
Separate-domain layout — frontend and backend on different hostnames:
app.example.com {
reverse_proxy localhost:3000
}
api.example.com {
@multica_ws path /ws /ws/*
handle @multica_ws {
reverse_proxy localhost:8080 {
flush_interval -1
}
}
reverse_proxy localhost:8080
}
Two non-obvious bits inside the /ws block are worth calling out — both are common reasons real-time updates "stop working" on a Caddy-fronted self-host:
path /ws /ws/*(not/ws*) — barehandle /wsis an exact match, so future path variants under/ws/fall through to the frontend block. The obvious shortcuthandle /ws*overcorrects in the other direction: Caddy's*is a glob without a path-segment boundary, so it would also catch unrelated paths like/ws-foo, which is a legitimate workspace URL (only the exact slugwsis reserved). Listing/wsand/ws/*explicitly covers both real cases without overreach.flush_interval -1— disables response buffering so WebSocket frames are forwarded as soon as they arrive. Without it, frames can sit behind Caddy's default flush window, which looks like delayed comments, missing typing indicators, or "comments only appear after a page refresh."
# Frontend
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name app.example.com;
ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass http://localhost:3000;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
}
# Backend API
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name api.example.com;
ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass http://localhost:8080;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# WebSocket support
location /ws {
proxy_pass http://localhost:8080;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_read_timeout 86400;
}
}When using separate domains for frontend and backend, set these environment variables accordingly:
# Backend
FRONTEND_ORIGIN=https://app.example.com
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://app.example.com
COOKIE_DOMAIN=.example.com # narrowest parent covering both hosts — read the scope warning below
# Frontend (only if you are building the web image from source via docker-compose.selfhost.build.yml)
REMOTE_API_URL=https://api.example.com
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=https://api.example.com
NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL=wss://api.example.com/ws
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URLandREMOTE_API_URLtake the backend's origin — scheme + host (+ port) — and no path. Writehttps://api.example.com, neverhttps://api.example.com/api. The browser client appends its own prefixes, so a path is doubled: requests go to/api/api/...and every avatar, image and attachment resolves under<your-path>/uploads/..., which the backend does not serve — the app loads but data calls and images 404. A trailing/apiis now stripped defensively, but any other path is kept, because a reverse proxy may legitimately mount the whole backend under a prefix.This bites on upgrade: before v0.4.10
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URLwas inert in the published images, so a wrong value sat in.envdoing nothing. v0.4.10 wired it through, and the stale value took effect. If you upgraded and the UI loads but nothing else does, check this variable first, then recreate the frontend container (docker compose ... up -d --force-recreate frontend) so the new value is picked up.
COOKIE_DOMAINis required in this setup — omitting it breaks every write. The web app authenticates with an HttpOnlymultica_authcookie plus a JS-readablemultica_csrfcookie, and sends the CSRF value as anX-CSRF-Tokenheader on every non-GET request. Both cookies are host-only unlessCOOKIE_DOMAINis set, so a frontend onapp.example.comcannot read a cookie issued byapi.example.com. The header is then never sent and the backend rejects the request with403 {"error":"CSRF validation failed"}— while GET requests keep working, so the app renders but nothing can be created or edited.After changing
COOKIE_DOMAIN, delete the existingmultica_auth/multica_csrfcookies on both hosts and log in again. Stale host-only cookies otherwise sit alongside the new domain-scoped ones and the browser sends both.
Scope
COOKIE_DOMAINas narrowly as possible. The same value also scopesmultica_auth, the session JWT, and the browser then sends it to every host under that domain.HttpOnlyonly stops page scripts from reading the cookie — it does not stop the server behind a sibling subdomain from receiving it on every request. Use the narrowest parent that still covers both hosts: foragent.example.com+api.agent.example.comthat is.agent.example.com, not.example.com, which would also hand your users' session cookie to unrelated hosts such as a separately deployeddocs.example.com.
Both of these must hold, or this layout is not safe to use:
- The frontend and backend share a common parent domain. Unrelated domains (
app.comandapi.io) cannot be covered by anyCOOKIE_DOMAINvalue. - Every host under that parent domain is operated by the same trusted party. If anything in scope is third-party hosted, or other teams can create records under it, a compromise or a rogue service there receives valid sessions for your deployment.
If either condition fails, use the same-origin layout below, which keeps the session cookie host-only.
A separate API domain is not required. Leave NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL at their defaults and the browser calls /api and /ws on the page's own origin, so no cross-host cookie problem can arise in the first place:
# Backend
FRONTEND_ORIGIN=https://app.example.com
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://app.example.com
COOKIE_DOMAIN= # empty: cookies are host-only on app.example.com, which is correct here
# Frontend
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL= # empty: the client uses relative /api paths on the page origin
NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL= # empty
REMOTE_API_URL=http://backend:8080 # target the Next.js rewrites proxy /api, /auth and /uploads toServe everything from the single app.example.com vhost. HTTP works out of the box, because Next.js rewrites forward /api, /auth and /uploads to REMOTE_API_URL. WebSockets do not go through those rewrites, so add a /ws block to the frontend vhost that reaches the backend directly:
# Add to the app.example.com server block above
location /ws {
proxy_pass http://localhost:8080;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_read_timeout 86400;
}See WebSocket for LAN / Non-localhost Access for why the rewrites cannot carry the Upgrade handshake.
This keeps cookies, CORS, and the WebSocket origin check on a single origin. It is both the configuration least likely to break and the safer one: the session cookie stays host-only, so no sibling subdomain can ever receive it. An api.example.com vhost can still be kept for CLI and daemon use: those clients authenticate with a mul_ personal access token over Authorization: Bearer, which never goes through the cookie or CSRF path.
By default, Multica works on localhost. If you access it from another machine on the LAN (e.g. http://192.168.1.100:3000), you need to tell the backend to accept that origin:
# .env — replace with your server's LAN IP
FRONTEND_ORIGIN=http://192.168.1.100:3000
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://192.168.1.100:3000Then restart the stack:
docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml up -dHTTP requests (issues, comments, uploads) work on LAN out of the box — Next.js rewrites proxy /api, /auth, and /uploads to the backend. WebSockets do not: Next.js rewrites only forward HTTP requests, not the Upgrade handshake a WebSocket needs. If you open the app on http://<lan-ip>:3000, real-time features (chat streaming, live issue updates, notifications) will fail to connect until you do one of the following:
-
Put a reverse proxy in front of the stack (recommended). Nginx or Caddy terminates the WebSocket upgrade and forwards it to the backend on port 8080. See the Reverse Proxy section above — the Nginx example already includes a
location /ws { ... }block with the correctUpgrade/Connectionheaders. Once a proxy is in place the browser connects directly through it, so no frontend rebuild is needed. -
Bake a WebSocket URL into the web image. If you are not running a reverse proxy, rebuild the web image with
NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URLpointing straight at the backend (port 8080 must be reachable from the browser):# In .env NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL=ws://<lan-ip>:8080/ws # Rebuild the web image so the build-time value is baked in docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml -f docker-compose.selfhost.build.yml up -d --build
NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URLis a build-time variable (seeDockerfile.web), so setting it only inenvironment:on the pre-built image has no effect — you must use theselfhost.build.ymloverride that rebuilds the image.
Also required: allowlist the browser origin. The two options above fix the WebSocket upgrade proxying, but a second, independent setting gates the connection: the backend validates the WebSocket Origin header against an allowlist that defaults to localhost only. When you open Multica from any other origin — a LAN IP or a public domain behind a reverse proxy — set CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS (or FRONTEND_ORIGIN) on the backend to that exact origin and restart, exactly as shown under LAN / Non-localhost Access above. Otherwise the upgrade is refused with 403: the backend logs websocket: request origin not allowed by Upgrader.CheckOrigin and the browser console loops disconnected, reconnecting in 3s, while HTTP requests (and manual page refreshes) keep working because they are same-origin to the page. The single value covers both HTTP CORS and the WebSocket origin check.
Note: If you need to hard-code a different public API / WebSocket endpoint into the web image for any other reason, use the same source-build override:
docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml -f docker-compose.selfhost.build.yml up -d --build.
The backend exposes public health endpoints:
GET /health
→ {"status":"ok"}
GET /readyz
→ {"status":"ok","checks":{"db":"ok","migrations":"ok"}}
GET /healthz
→ same response as /readyz
Use /health for basic liveness / reachability checks. Use /readyz for
dependency-aware readiness probes and external monitoring that should fail when
the database is unavailable or migrations are not fully applied. /healthz is
kept as an alias for operator familiarity.
The backend can expose Prometheus metrics on a separate management listener:
METRICS_ADDR=127.0.0.1:9090 ./server/bin/server
curl http://127.0.0.1:9090/metricsMETRICS_ADDR is empty by default, so no metrics listener is started. The
public API port does not serve /metrics; keep it that way for internet-facing
deployments. HTTP request metrics start accumulating only after the metrics
listener is enabled. Metrics can reveal internal routes, traffic volume,
dependency state, and runtime health.
For Docker or Kubernetes deployments, prefer a private scrape path: bind the
metrics listener to an internal interface and protect it with private
networking, allowlists, NetworkPolicy, or proxy authentication. If you bind
METRICS_ADDR=0.0.0.0:9090 inside a container, only publish that port to a
trusted network, for example a host-local mapping such as
127.0.0.1:9090:9090.
The backend exposes all standard Go pprof routes on the fixed loopback-only
management listener 127.0.0.1:6060, including CPU, heap, allocs, goroutine,
block, mutex, threadcreate, symbol, and trace profiles:
go tool pprof 'http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/profile?seconds=30'
go tool pprof http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/heapThe public API port does not serve /debug/pprof/. The listener address is not
configurable and is never bound to a container or host network interface.
Profiles can reveal process internals and some captures add CPU or memory
pressure, so access should remain limited to operators on the same host or in
the same container network namespace.
A loopback listener inside a container belongs to that container's network namespace and is not reachable directly from the host. With the Compose stack, capture the profile inside the backend container and copy it out:
docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml exec backend \
wget -qO /tmp/heap.pprof http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/heap
docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml cp backend:/tmp/heap.pprof ./heap.pprof
go tool pprof ./heap.pprofdocker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml up -dPin MULTICA_IMAGE_TAG in .env to an exact release like v0.2.4 if you want to stay on a specific version. Migrations run automatically on backend startup. They are idempotent — running them multiple times has no effect.
If the selected GHCR tag has not been published yet, fall back to docker compose -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml -f docker-compose.selfhost.build.yml up -d --build.