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// Zero-Knowledge Authentication System
// Demonstrates GAL's formal verification of cryptographic protocols and chaos testing
import std.crypto
import std.verification
import std.chaos
import std.network
import std.time
// Formal verification contracts for zero-knowledge properties
@verify_invariant("zero_knowledge_property")
fn zero_knowledge_invariant(proof: &ZKProof, secret: &Secret) -> bool {
// Invariant: Proof reveals no information about the secret
// Simulator can produce indistinguishable proofs without knowing the secret
proof.commitment.reveals_no_info_about(secret) &&
proof.response.is_simulatable_without_secret()
}
@verify_invariant("soundness_property")
fn soundness_invariant(proof: &ZKProof, statement: &Statement) -> bool {
// Invariant: Invalid statements cannot produce valid proofs (except with negligible probability)
if !statement.is_true() {
proof.verification_probability() < NEGLIGIBLE_PROBABILITY
} else {
true
}
}
@verify_invariant("completeness_property")
fn completeness_invariant(prover: &Prover, statement: &Statement) -> bool {
// Invariant: Valid statements can always be proven by honest provers
if statement.is_true() && prover.knows_witness() {
prover.can_generate_valid_proof()
} else {
true
}
}
// Zero-knowledge proof system for discrete logarithm
struct SchnorrProof {
commitment: GroupElement, // g^r
challenge: FieldElement, // Fiat-Shamir challenge
response: FieldElement, // r + c*x (where x is secret)
}
impl SchnorrProof {
// Generate proof that prover knows discrete log of public_key
@verify_precondition("valid_secret", |secret| secret.is_valid())
@verify_postcondition("valid_proof", |result| result.is_ok())
fn generate(secret: &SecretKey, public_key: &PublicKey, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CryptoError> {
// Choose random nonce
let r = FieldElement::random();
// Compute commitment: g^r
let commitment = GENERATOR.pow(&r);
// Compute Fiat-Shamir challenge: H(commitment || public_key || message)
let challenge_input = [
commitment.to_bytes(),
public_key.to_bytes(),
message,
].concat();
let challenge = FieldElement::from_hash(&hash_sha256(&challenge_input));
// Compute response: r + c*x
let response = r + challenge * secret.value();
Ok(SchnorrProof {
commitment,
challenge,
response,
})
}
// Verify proof without learning the secret
@verify_precondition("valid_inputs", |_, public_key, message| public_key.is_valid())
@verify_postcondition("correct_verification", |result| result.is_ok())
fn verify(&self, public_key: &PublicKey, message: &[u8]) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
// Recompute challenge
let challenge_input = [
self.commitment.to_bytes(),
public_key.to_bytes(),
message,
].concat();
let expected_challenge = FieldElement::from_hash(&hash_sha256(&challenge_input));
// Check challenge matches
if self.challenge != expected_challenge {
return Ok(false);
}
// Verify: g^response = commitment * public_key^challenge
let left_side = GENERATOR.pow(&self.response);
let right_side = self.commitment + public_key.element() * self.challenge;
Ok(left_side == right_side)
}
fn reveals_no_info_about(&self, _secret: &Secret) -> bool {
// In a real implementation, this would check if the proof
// is indistinguishable from a simulated proof
true
}
fn is_simulatable_without_secret(&self) -> bool {
// Zero-knowledge simulator can produce this without the secret
true
}
fn verification_probability(&self) -> f64 {
// Probability that an invalid proof passes verification
2.0_f64.powf(-256.0) // Negligible for 256-bit security
}
}
// Zero-knowledge proof for range (value is in [0, 2^n))
struct RangeProof {
bit_commitments: Vec<GroupElement>,
bit_proofs: Vec<SchnorrProof>,
aggregated_proof: Option<BulletProof>,
}
impl RangeProof {
@verify_precondition("valid_range", |value, bits| *value < 2_u64.pow(*bits as u32))
@verify_postcondition("proof_generated", |result| result.is_ok())
fn generate(value: u64, bits: usize, randomness: &FieldElement) -> Result<Self, CryptoError> {
let mut bit_commitments = Vec::new();
let mut bit_proofs = Vec::new();
// Commit to each bit of the value
for i in 0..bits {
let bit = (value >> i) & 1;
let bit_randomness = FieldElement::random();
// Pedersen commitment: g^bit * h^randomness
let commitment = GENERATOR.pow(&FieldElement::from(bit)) +
GENERATOR_H.pow(&bit_randomness);
bit_commitments.push(commitment);
// Prove that committed value is either 0 or 1
let bit_proof = Self::prove_bit(&FieldElement::from(bit), &bit_randomness)?;
bit_proofs.push(bit_proof);
}
// Optional: Use Bulletproofs for logarithmic size
let aggregated_proof = BulletProof::generate(value, bits, randomness)?;
Ok(RangeProof {
bit_commitments,
bit_proofs,
aggregated_proof: Some(aggregated_proof),
})
}
@verify_postcondition("verification_result", |result| result.is_ok())
fn verify(&self, commitment: &GroupElement, bits: usize) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
// Verify each bit proof
for (i, (bit_commitment, bit_proof)) in
self.bit_commitments.iter().zip(&self.bit_proofs).enumerate() {
if !Self::verify_bit(bit_proof, bit_commitment)? {
return Ok(false);
}
}
// Verify that bit commitments aggregate to the main commitment
let aggregated_commitment = self.bit_commitments.iter()
.enumerate()
.fold(GroupElement::identity(), |acc, (i, &comm)| {
acc + comm * FieldElement::from(2_u64.pow(i as u32))
});
if aggregated_commitment != *commitment {
return Ok(false);
}
// Verify Bulletproof if present
if let Some(ref bulletproof) = self.aggregated_proof {
return bulletproof.verify(commitment, bits);
}
Ok(true)
}
fn prove_bit(bit: &FieldElement, randomness: &FieldElement) -> Result<SchnorrProof, CryptoError> {
// Simplified bit proof - in practice would use sigma protocols
let secret_key = SecretKey::new(*bit);
let public_key = PublicKey::from_secret(&secret_key);
SchnorrProof::generate(&secret_key, &public_key, b"bit_proof")
}
fn verify_bit(proof: &SchnorrProof, _commitment: &GroupElement) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
// Simplified verification
Ok(true)
}
}
// Bulletproof for efficient range proofs
struct BulletProof {
a: GroupElement,
s: GroupElement,
t1: GroupElement,
t2: GroupElement,
tau_x: FieldElement,
mu: FieldElement,
inner_product_proof: InnerProductProof,
}
impl BulletProof {
fn generate(value: u64, bits: usize, randomness: &FieldElement) -> Result<Self, CryptoError> {
// Simplified Bulletproof generation
Ok(BulletProof {
a: GroupElement::random(),
s: GroupElement::random(),
t1: GroupElement::random(),
t2: GroupElement::random(),
tau_x: FieldElement::random(),
mu: FieldElement::random(),
inner_product_proof: InnerProductProof::generate()?,
})
}
fn verify(&self, _commitment: &GroupElement, _bits: usize) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
// Simplified verification
Ok(true)
}
}
// Authentication system using zero-knowledge proofs
struct ZKAuthSystem {
users: HashMap<UserId, UserCredentials>,
active_sessions: HashMap<SessionId, AuthSession>,
challenge_store: HashMap<ChallengeId, AuthChallenge>,
proof_verifier: ProofVerifier,
chaos_config: ChaosConfig,
}
impl ZKAuthSystem {
@verify_postcondition("system_initialized", |result| result.users.is_empty())
fn new() -> Self {
ZKAuthSystem {
users: HashMap::new(),
active_sessions: HashMap::new(),
challenge_store: HashMap::new(),
proof_verifier: ProofVerifier::new(),
chaos_config: ChaosConfig::default(),
}
}
// Register user with zero-knowledge credentials
@verify_precondition("valid_password", |password| password.len() >= 8)
@verify_postcondition("user_registered", |result| result.is_ok())
fn register_user(&mut self, username: &str, password: &str, email: &str) -> Result<UserId, AuthError> {
// Derive secret key from password using secure hash
let secret_key = self.derive_secret_key(password)?;
// Generate public key (commitment to secret)
let public_key = PublicKey::from_secret(&secret_key);
// Generate additional ZK credentials
let credentials = UserCredentials {
username: username.to_string(),
public_key,
email_hash: hash_sha256(email.as_bytes()),
registration_date: Time::now(),
proof_parameters: ProofParameters::default(),
};
let user_id = UserId::generate();
self.users.insert(user_id.clone(), credentials);
// Don't store the password or secret key!
Ok(user_id)
}
// Initiate authentication challenge
@verify_precondition("user_exists", |user_id| self.users.contains_key(user_id))
@verify_postcondition("challenge_created", |result| result.is_ok())
fn initiate_auth(&mut self, user_id: &UserId) -> Result<AuthChallenge, AuthError> {
let user = self.users.get(user_id)
.ok_or(AuthError::UserNotFound)?;
// Generate random challenge
let challenge_data = SecureRandom::bytes(32);
let challenge_id = ChallengeId::generate();
let challenge = AuthChallenge {
id: challenge_id.clone(),
user_id: user_id.clone(),
challenge_data,
timestamp: Time::now(),
expires_at: Time::now() + Duration::minutes(5),
public_key: user.public_key.clone(),
};
self.challenge_store.insert(challenge_id, challenge.clone());
Ok(challenge)
}
// Complete authentication with zero-knowledge proof
@verify_precondition("valid_challenge", |challenge_id| self.challenge_store.contains_key(challenge_id))
@verify_postcondition("authenticated", |result| result.is_ok())
fn complete_auth(&mut self, challenge_id: &ChallengeId, proof: SchnorrProof) -> Result<SessionToken, AuthError> {
let challenge = self.challenge_store.remove(challenge_id)
.ok_or(AuthError::InvalidChallenge)?;
// Check challenge hasn't expired
if Time::now() > challenge.expires_at {
return Err(AuthError::ChallengeExpired);
}
// Verify zero-knowledge proof
let is_valid = proof.verify(&challenge.public_key, &challenge.challenge_data)?;
if !is_valid {
return Err(AuthError::InvalidProof);
}
// Create authenticated session
let session_token = SessionToken::generate();
let session = AuthSession {
id: SessionId::generate(),
user_id: challenge.user_id.clone(),
token: session_token.clone(),
created_at: Time::now(),
expires_at: Time::now() + Duration::hours(8),
capabilities: vec![Capability::BasicAccess],
};
self.active_sessions.insert(session.id.clone(), session);
Ok(session_token)
}
// Biometric authentication with zero-knowledge
@chaos_test("biometric_spoofing")
fn authenticate_biometric(&mut self, user_id: &UserId, biometric_template: &BiometricTemplate) -> Result<SessionToken, AuthError> {
let user = self.users.get(user_id)
.ok_or(AuthError::UserNotFound)?;
// Generate zero-knowledge proof of biometric match
// without revealing the actual biometric data
let biometric_proof = self.generate_biometric_proof(biometric_template, &user.public_key)?;
// Verify proof
if !self.verify_biometric_proof(&biometric_proof, &user.public_key)? {
return Err(AuthError::BiometricMismatch);
}
// Create session with biometric authentication
let session_token = SessionToken::generate();
let session = AuthSession {
id: SessionId::generate(),
user_id: user_id.clone(),
token: session_token.clone(),
created_at: Time::now(),
expires_at: Time::now() + Duration::hours(4),
capabilities: vec![Capability::BasicAccess, Capability::BiometricVerified],
};
self.active_sessions.insert(session.id.clone(), session);
Ok(session_token)
}
// Multi-factor authentication with ZK proofs
fn authenticate_mfa(&mut self,
user_id: &UserId,
password_proof: SchnorrProof,
totp_code: u32,
device_proof: Option<DeviceProof>) -> Result<SessionToken, AuthError> {
let user = self.users.get(user_id)
.ok_or(AuthError::UserNotFound)?;
// Verify password proof
let challenge_data = b"mfa_password_challenge";
if !password_proof.verify(&user.public_key, challenge_data)? {
return Err(AuthError::InvalidPasswordProof);
}
// Verify TOTP without revealing the shared secret
if !self.verify_totp_zk(user_id, totp_code)? {
return Err(AuthError::InvalidTOTP);
}
// Verify device proof if provided
if let Some(device_proof) = device_proof {
if !self.verify_device_proof(&device_proof, user_id)? {
return Err(AuthError::UnknownDevice);
}
}
// Create high-privilege session
let session_token = SessionToken::generate();
let session = AuthSession {
id: SessionId::generate(),
user_id: user_id.clone(),
token: session_token.clone(),
created_at: Time::now(),
expires_at: Time::now() + Duration::hours(2),
capabilities: vec![
Capability::BasicAccess,
Capability::MultiFactor,
Capability::PrivilegedOperations,
],
};
self.active_sessions.insert(session.id.clone(), session);
Ok(session_token)
}
// Self-modification: Adaptive security based on risk
@chaos_test("adaptive_security")
fn adaptive_security_adjustment(&mut self, user_id: &UserId, risk_score: f64) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
if risk_score > 0.8 {
// High risk: Require additional proofs
self.require_additional_zk_proofs(user_id)?;
} else if risk_score > 0.5 {
// Medium risk: Shorten session duration
self.reduce_session_duration(user_id, Duration::minutes(30))?;
}
// Low risk: Normal operation
Ok(())
}
// Chaos engineering tests
#[chaos_scenario("proof_forgery_attempt")]
fn test_proof_forgery(&mut self) {
// Simulate attacker trying to forge proofs
let fake_secret = SecretKey::random();
let fake_public = PublicKey::from_secret(&fake_secret);
let legitimate_user = self.users.keys().next().unwrap().clone();
// Try to forge a proof for legitimate user
let forge_attempt = SchnorrProof::generate(&fake_secret, &fake_public, b"forged");
// Should fail verification against legitimate user's public key
if let Ok(proof) = forge_attempt {
let user = &self.users[&legitimate_user];
let verification = proof.verify(&user.public_key, b"forged");
assert!(verification.is_err() || !verification.unwrap());
}
}
#[chaos_scenario("timing_attack")]
fn test_timing_attack_resistance(&mut self) {
// Ensure verification time is constant regardless of input
let start_time = Time::now();
let _ = self.verify_constant_time_operation();
let duration1 = Time::now() - start_time;
let start_time = Time::now();
let _ = self.verify_constant_time_operation();
let duration2 = Time::now() - start_time;
// Timing should be similar (within reasonable bounds)
assert!((duration1 - duration2).abs() < Duration::milliseconds(10));
}
#[chaos_scenario("memory_exhaustion")]
fn test_memory_exhaustion_resistance(&mut self) {
// Test system behavior under memory pressure
for _ in 0..1000 {
let _ = SchnorrProof::generate(
&SecretKey::random(),
&PublicKey::random(),
&vec![0u8; 1024]
);
}
// System should still function correctly
assert!(self.users.len() >= 0);
}
// Private helper methods
fn derive_secret_key(&self, password: &str) -> Result<SecretKey, CryptoError> {
// Use Argon2 or scrypt for password-based key derivation
let salt = b"zk_auth_salt_unique_per_system";
let key_material = argon2_hash(password.as_bytes(), salt, 100000, 32)?;
Ok(SecretKey::from_bytes(&key_material))
}
fn generate_biometric_proof(&self, template: &BiometricTemplate, public_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BiometricProof, CryptoError> {
// Generate proof that biometric matches without revealing template
Ok(BiometricProof {
commitment: GroupElement::random(),
proof: SchnorrProof::generate(&SecretKey::random(), public_key, b"biometric")?,
})
}
fn verify_biometric_proof(&self, proof: &BiometricProof, public_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
proof.proof.verify(public_key, b"biometric")
}
fn verify_totp_zk(&self, user_id: &UserId, totp_code: u32) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
// Zero-knowledge verification of TOTP without revealing shared secret
// In practice, this would use a commitment scheme
Ok(true) // Simplified
}
fn verify_device_proof(&self, proof: &DeviceProof, user_id: &UserId) -> Result<bool, CryptoError> {
// Verify device is associated with user without revealing device fingerprint
Ok(true) // Simplified
}
fn require_additional_zk_proofs(&mut self, user_id: &UserId) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
// Require additional zero-knowledge proofs for high-risk users
Ok(())
}
fn reduce_session_duration(&mut self, user_id: &UserId, new_duration: Duration) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
// Reduce session duration for medium-risk users
for session in self.active_sessions.values_mut() {
if session.user_id == *user_id {
session.expires_at = session.created_at + new_duration;
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn verify_constant_time_operation(&self) -> bool {
// Perform cryptographic operation in constant time
let dummy_key = SecretKey::random();
let dummy_public = PublicKey::from_secret(&dummy_key);
let dummy_proof = SchnorrProof::generate(&dummy_key, &dummy_public, b"timing_test");
dummy_proof.is_ok()
}
}
// Supporting structures
struct UserCredentials {
username: String,
public_key: PublicKey,
email_hash: [u8; 32],
registration_date: Timestamp,
proof_parameters: ProofParameters,
}
struct AuthChallenge {
id: ChallengeId,
user_id: UserId,
challenge_data: Vec<u8>,
timestamp: Timestamp,
expires_at: Timestamp,
public_key: PublicKey,
}
struct AuthSession {
id: SessionId,
user_id: UserId,
token: SessionToken,
created_at: Timestamp,
expires_at: Timestamp,
capabilities: Vec<Capability>,
}
struct BiometricProof {
commitment: GroupElement,
proof: SchnorrProof,
}
struct DeviceProof {
device_commitment: GroupElement,
proof: SchnorrProof,
}
struct ProofVerifier {
parameters: SystemParameters,
}
impl ProofVerifier {
fn new() -> Self {
ProofVerifier {
parameters: SystemParameters::secure_default(),
}
}
}
// Cryptographic primitives and types
struct GroupElement([u8; 32]);
struct FieldElement([u8; 32]);
struct SecretKey([u8; 32]);
struct PublicKey(GroupElement);
struct InnerProductProof;
struct BiometricTemplate;
struct ProofParameters;
struct SystemParameters;
// Placeholder implementations for cryptographic operations
const GENERATOR: GroupElement = GroupElement([1u8; 32]);
const GENERATOR_H: GroupElement = GroupElement([2u8; 32]);
const NEGLIGIBLE_PROBABILITY: f64 = 2.0_f64.powf(-128.0);
impl GroupElement {
fn random() -> Self { GroupElement([0u8; 32]) }
fn identity() -> Self { GroupElement([0u8; 32]) }
fn pow(&self, _exp: &FieldElement) -> Self { *self }
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> { self.0.to_vec() }
}
impl std::ops::Add for GroupElement {
type Output = Self;
fn add(self, _other: Self) -> Self { self }
}
impl std::ops::Mul<FieldElement> for GroupElement {
type Output = GroupElement;
fn mul(self, _scalar: FieldElement) -> GroupElement { self }
}
impl FieldElement {
fn random() -> Self { FieldElement([0u8; 32]) }
fn from(val: u64) -> Self { FieldElement([val as u8; 32]) }
fn from_hash(hash: &[u8]) -> Self { FieldElement([0u8; 32]) }
fn value(&self) -> Self { *self }
}
impl std::ops::Add for FieldElement {
type Output = Self;
fn add(self, _other: Self) -> Self { self }
}
impl std::ops::Mul for FieldElement {
type Output = Self;
fn mul(self, _other: Self) -> Self { self }
}
impl SecretKey {
fn new(val: FieldElement) -> Self { SecretKey(val.0) }
fn random() -> Self { SecretKey([0u8; 32]) }
fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Self { SecretKey([0u8; 32]) }
fn value(&self) -> FieldElement { FieldElement(self.0) }
fn is_valid(&self) -> bool { true }
}
impl PublicKey {
fn from_secret(secret: &SecretKey) -> Self { PublicKey(GENERATOR.pow(&secret.value())) }
fn random() -> Self { PublicKey(GroupElement::random()) }
fn element(&self) -> GroupElement { self.0 }
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> { self.0.to_bytes() }
fn is_valid(&self) -> bool { true }
}
impl InnerProductProof {
fn generate() -> Result<Self, CryptoError> { Ok(InnerProductProof) }
}
impl SystemParameters {
fn secure_default() -> Self { SystemParameters }
}
// Main demonstration function
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
println!("🔐 Zero-Knowledge Authentication System Demo");
// Initialize authentication system
let mut auth_system = ZKAuthSystem::new();
// Register a new user
println!("\n👤 Registering new user...");
let user_id = auth_system.register_user("alice", "secure_password123", "alice@example.com")?;
println!("User registered with ID: {:?}", user_id);
// Initiate authentication challenge
println!("\n🎯 Initiating authentication challenge...");
let challenge = auth_system.initiate_auth(&user_id)?;
println!("Challenge created: {:?}", challenge.id);
// Generate zero-knowledge proof (simulated user-side operation)
println!("\n🔑 Generating zero-knowledge proof...");
let secret_key = SecretKey::random(); // In practice, derived from user's password
let public_key = PublicKey::from_secret(&secret_key);
let auth_proof = SchnorrProof::generate(&secret_key, &public_key, &challenge.challenge_data)?;
// Complete authentication
println!("\n✅ Completing authentication...");
let session_token = auth_system.complete_auth(&challenge.id, auth_proof)?;
println!("Authentication successful! Session token: {:?}", session_token);
// Demonstrate biometric authentication
println!("\n👁️ Testing biometric authentication...");
let biometric_template = BiometricTemplate; // Simulated biometric data
let bio_session = auth_system.authenticate_biometric(&user_id, &biometric_template)?;
println!("Biometric authentication successful!");
// Demonstrate multi-factor authentication
println!("\n🔒 Testing multi-factor authentication...");
let password_proof = SchnorrProof::generate(&secret_key, &public_key, b"mfa_password_challenge")?;
let totp_code = 123456; // Simulated TOTP code
let device_proof = Some(DeviceProof {
device_commitment: GroupElement::random(),
proof: SchnorrProof::generate(&SecretKey::random(), &PublicKey::random(), b"device")?,
});
let mfa_session = auth_system.authenticate_mfa(&user_id, password_proof, totp_code, device_proof)?;
println!("Multi-factor authentication successful!");
// Test adaptive security
println!("\n🧠 Testing adaptive security...");
auth_system.adaptive_security_adjustment(&user_id, 0.9)?; // High risk score
println!("Security level adapted based on risk assessment");
// Run chaos engineering tests
println!("\n🔥 Running chaos engineering tests...");
auth_system.test_proof_forgery();
auth_system.test_timing_attack_resistance();
auth_system.test_memory_exhaustion_resistance();
// Demonstrate range proof
println!("\n📊 Testing range proof...");
let age = 25u64; // Prove age is in valid range without revealing exact value
let age_randomness = FieldElement::random();
let range_proof = RangeProof::generate(age, 8, &age_randomness)?; // Age fits in 8 bits (0-255)
let age_commitment = GENERATOR.pow(&FieldElement::from(age)) + GENERATOR_H.pow(&age_randomness);
let range_valid = range_proof.verify(&age_commitment, 8)?;
println!("Range proof verified: {}", range_valid);
println!("\n🎉 Zero-Knowledge Authentication Demo Completed!");
println!("✓ User registration with ZK credentials");
println!("✓ Challenge-response authentication");
println!("✓ Zero-knowledge proof generation and verification");
println!("✓ Biometric authentication without template exposure");
println!("✓ Multi-factor authentication with ZK proofs");
println!("✓ Adaptive security based on risk assessment");
println!("✓ Range proofs for privacy-preserving age verification");
println!("✓ Chaos engineering tests for security resilience");
println!("✓ Formal verification of cryptographic properties");
Ok(())
}
// Error types and additional supporting code
#[derive(Debug)]
enum AuthError {
UserNotFound,
InvalidChallenge,
ChallengeExpired,
InvalidProof,
BiometricMismatch,
InvalidPasswordProof,
InvalidTOTP,
UnknownDevice,
CryptoError(CryptoError),
}
#[derive(Debug)]
enum CryptoError {
InvalidParameters,
RandomnessError,
VerificationFailed,
}
impl From<CryptoError> for AuthError {
fn from(e: CryptoError) -> Self {
AuthError::CryptoError(e)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct UserId(u64);
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct SessionId(u64);
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct ChallengeId(u64);
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct SessionToken(String);
impl UserId {
fn generate() -> Self { UserId(42) }
}
impl SessionId {
fn generate() -> Self { SessionId(42) }
}
impl ChallengeId {
fn generate() -> Self { ChallengeId(42) }
}
impl SessionToken {
fn generate() -> Self { SessionToken("token_123".to_string()) }
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
enum Capability {
BasicAccess,
BiometricVerified,
MultiFactor,
PrivilegedOperations,
}
// Chaos configuration
struct ChaosConfig {
proof_forgery_enabled: bool,
timing_attack_simulation: bool,
memory_pressure_testing: bool,
}
impl Default for ChaosConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
ChaosConfig {
proof_forgery_enabled: true,
timing_attack_simulation: true,
memory_pressure_testing: true,
}
}
}
// Helper functions
fn hash_sha256(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
[0u8; 32] // Simplified
}
fn argon2_hash(password: &[u8], salt: &[u8], iterations: u32, output_len: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
Ok(vec![0u8; output_len]) // Simplified
}
struct SecureRandom;
impl SecureRandom {
fn bytes(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
vec![0u8; len] // Simplified
}
}
// Additional type aliases
type Timestamp = u64;
type Duration = std::time::Duration;
type Time = u64;
// Statement and proof types for formal verification
struct Statement;
struct Secret;
struct Prover;
impl Statement {
fn is_true(&self) -> bool { true }
}
impl Secret {
fn reveals_no_info_about(&self, _secret: &Secret) -> bool { true }
}
impl Prover {
fn knows_witness(&self) -> bool { true }
fn can_generate_valid_proof(&self) -> bool { true }
}