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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch5-3</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Command Module: Problems and Progress</h2>
<p>
The lateness of the decision on how to fly to the moon had forced the
Manned Spacecraft Center and the contractor, North American, to delay
work on the command and service modules. Once the choice was made, they
realized that much of what had been done had no place in the lunar-orbit
rendezvous scheme. But that was not the only problem. NASA still
insisted on having an earth-orbital command module, even though it could
not dock with the lunar module, to train crews and flight controllers in
the basic functions of the spacecraft. The definitive contract for that
vehicle, however, had not been negotiated. In late 1961, NASA had issued
a letter contract to North American, which would be extended as
necessary, outlining in general terms what the spacecraft would be like.
When all of Apollo's pieces were finally picked, it was time to reach an
agreement with North American on the precise details of the
spacecraft.<p>
Charles Frick, the Apollo manager in Houston, assigned his special
assistant, Thomas Markley, to negotiate the definitive contract with
North American and its principal contractors. When deliberations
started, on 7 January 1963, the Manned Spacecraft Center was facing
crowded conditions in its temporary locations along the Gulf Freeway.
Markley and his government team therefore met the contractor
representatives in 16 rooms on the 13th floor of the Rice Hotel in
downtown Houston. Signaling the start and finish of 15-hour work days,
Monday through Saturday, with a cow bell, Markley and the groups
completed the "basic contract package" on 26 January. The
proposed contract then had to travel through administrative levels until
it reached Webb for final approval or refusal. As the document journeyed
through channels, the cost figures on the subsystems were revised. On 24
June, the estimated value was $889.3 million (without fee). When it was
finally approved in August, the price, with $50-million fixed fee, was
$934.4 million. For this sum, NASA was to receive 11 mockups (facsimile
models), 15 boilerplate capsules (test vehicles), and 11 flight-ready
spacecraft.<a href = "#source30"><b>30</b></a><p>
Under the letter contract, many of these items had gone into the
manufacturing cycle, with scheduled delivery dates. Immediately after
contract approval, Mueller sent his two deputies, Low and Shea, to
Downey, California, to find out why North American was late on those
deliveries. Harrison Storms, president of the division building the
command module, briefed the visitors on the problems and admitted to a
10-month slip in schedule for the first command module earmarked for
orbital flight. Storms counter-attacked, however, reminding the NASA
customers that some of their decisions had been late in coming and that
orders to change some of the subsystems had slowed factory schedules -
and were still doing so.<a href = "#source31"><b>31</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c132.gif" width=424 height=355 ALT="Transposition and docking">
<p>
<cite>Once the S-IVB stage placed the spacecraft on a trajectory to the
moon, the spacecraft-lunar module adapter panels would blossom outward
45 degrees (later they were discarded by explosion). The Apollo command
and service modules would separate from the stage, pull away, turn
around, dock with the lunar module, and then pull the LM away from the
stage.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Another item changed Apollo manufacturing plans in Downey. NASA
officials learned that North American intended to build the spacecraft-lunar
module adapter<a href = "#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. The Air Force had decided to cancel the Skybolt missile
development program and to keep using Hound Dog missiles, which were
manufactured in Downey. When the Air Force ordered more Hound Dog
vehicles and demanded that production in Downey continue, some Apollo
work had to be done elsewhere.<a href = "#source32"><b>32</b></a><p>
One chief aim of the 1963–1964 period was to get both versions of the
command module far enough along for a formal mockup review board to
accept them as the final configuration. With a great deal of this work
being done simultaneously, the task was extremely onerous. John Paup,
command module manager at North American who had fretted over the
slowness of the mode decision, wanted to get the systems of the
earth-orbital Block I spacecraft set so he could begin production on
that vehicle. At the same time, he was anxious to get the exact
differences between the two vehicles delineated. Joseph Shea, who had by
now replaced Frick as Apollo manager in Houston, told Paup that Block II
definition was not going to be easy to arrive at, with the Block I
configuration still not settled.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c134a.jpg" width=414 height=580 ALT="CM full-scale model">
<p>
<cite>Full-scale model of the command module, above: the strake
aerodynamic devices may be seen at either side of the spacecraft just
above the aft heatshield.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Paup contended that several areas of common interest between the two
vehicles had to be resolved immediately. One of the debates was whether
to use strakes, tower flaps, or canards to stabilize the command module
in the event of a launch abort. Whichever was used, the object was to
get the spacecraft down in what was called the "BEF" (blunt
end forward) position. Strakes were semicircular devices near the top of
the heatshield that would keep the vehicle from landing on its nose.
Recent changes in the subsystems had shifted the vehicle's center of
gravity, which forced a lengthening of the strakes to handle the
aerodynamic change. After heat-resisting ablative material was added to
the longer strakes, however, they weighed too much. North American
suggested using either tower flaps (fixed surfaces near the top of the
launch escape tower) or canards (deployable surfaces on the forward end
of the escape-rocket motor). Paup wanted to know which to install, and
Shea told him to put canards on Block I and then look for some way to
eliminate all these devices on Block II.<a href =
"#source33"><b>33</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c134b.gif" width=514 height=390 ALT="CM and LES drawing">
<p>
<cite>On the drawing of the launch escape system at upper right, the
canard aerodynamic devices are near the top of the escape tower.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c134c.jpg" width=582 height=407 ALT="LES jettison">
<p>
<cite>Jettison of the launch escape system (right) after successful
launch, also pulls away the boost protective cover that protects the
windows from flame and soot.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Another decision that would influence both spacecraft was on whether to
set the vehicle down on land or water, a question that had been under
discussion since mid-1962. During a meeting in early 1964, a North
American engineer reported that "land impact problems are so severe
that they require abandoning this mode as a primary landing mode."
That was all Shea needed to settle that debate. Apollo spacecraft would
land in the ocean and be recovered by naval ships as Mercury had been.<a
href = "#source34"><b>34</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c134d.jpg" width=375 height=582 ALT="SM full-scale model">
<p>
<cite>Full-scale model of the service module, resting on a mockup of a
spacecraft-lunar module adapter, with panels off to reveal part of the
internal arrangement.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Throughout 1963 and 1964, there were frequent meetings on command module
subsystems that were common to both versions of the craft. Because space
missions would be of longer duration, a concept had developed very early
that the astronauts would repair or replace a malfunctioning part in the
spacecraft during flight. This plan would require tools and spare parts
to be carried on the missions and created another weight problem. At a
subsystems discussion in April 1964, Shea told the North American
engineers that NASA no longer favored this method of ensuring good
working components in space. Instead, the contractor was to work toward
reliability through manufacturing and test processes and by installing
redundant systems. If something did go wrong, the crew should be able to
shift to another system that could perform the same function as the
malfunctioning one. Houston also wanted the contractor to upgrade its
reliability program by improving its failure reporting practices,
manufacturing schedules, engineering change controls, test plans,
traceability methods, means of standardizing interface control
documents, and ground support equipment provisioning.<a href =
"#source35"><b>35</b></a><p>
Houston had already taken measures in late 1963 to increase its control
over and improve on subsystem development, chiefly to get the more
advanced Block II command module under way. Shea asked Max Faget, chief
of the Engineering and Development Directorate at the Manned Spacecraft
Center, to pick experts in the engineering shops to act as subsystem
managers. The managers were directed to oversee their components from
design through manufacture and test. They were responsible for cost,
schedules, and reliability. When changes in one unit became necessary,
other systems had to be considered, and any conflicts resolved, before
alterations could be made. The subsystem manager concept was therefore
an excellent device for restraining engineers eternally eyeing good
hardware for chances to make it better.<a href =
"#source36"><b>36</b></a><p>
North American and Grumman also made significant contributions toward
controlling hardware development. As far back as mid-1962, John Disher
had urged Houston to draft hardware development and flight test
schedules through the first manned lunar landing. Houston submitted
these schedules in October 1962. When 1963 rolled around, delays of one
kind or another had made this paper nearly meaningless. Near the end of
the year, North American invited the other two major contractors,
Grumman and MIT, to help settle this issue. The contractors drew up
charts on all three modules - command, service, and lunar - looking at
development tests of subsystems, ground tests of partial and fully
assembled modules, and Saturn-boosted flight tests of completed modules.
Formally known as the "Apollo Spacecraft Development Test
Plan," their report to NASA, outlining the tests and exact uses of
every piece of hardware for the years 1964 through 1968, was called
"Project Christmas Present" by the contractors.<a href =
"#source37"><b>37</b></a><p>
A second move, led by Grumman, was made in the early months of 1964.
Grumman officials had complained to Shea that the frequent changes in
the lunar mission concept made it impossible for the design and
development engineers to decide what components they needed. The general
outline of the mission was pretty well set, but the haziness about
specific refinements was playing havoc with attempts to design hardware
to cover all normal and contingency operations. Shea told Grumman to see
if it could get the requirements pinned down. North American and MIT
crews soon joined the lunar module contractor team to come up with a
"Design Reference Mission."<p>
First the group looked at what Apollo was supposed to accomplish:
"Land two astronauts and scientific equipment on the
near-earth-side surface of the moon and return them safely to
earth." A second major objective was to carry more than 100
kilograms of scientific equipment to be set up on the moon and to bring
back more than 30 kilograms of lunar soil and rocks. To make sure this
was understood, the study group would have to analyze every moment of a
hypothetical mission - on the ground, in space, on the moon, and during
the return to the earth - from the time the stacked vehicles were rolled
toward the launch pad until the command module was recovered in the
Pacific Ocean. In other words, the North American-led study concentrated
on getting reliable hardware to the launch pad; the Grumman-sponsored
task aimed at making sure that the equipment would be able to handle the
job of getting to the moon and back.<p>
The group soon realized it had to pick out an arbitrary mission launch
date - it chose 6 May 1968 - to give realism to the plan and to focus
attention on every move, every procedure, in the minutest detail.
Working out the specific position of the moon on that date in relation
to the earth, members drew up a precise launch trajectory. Then,
assuming a given number of hours spent in flight and on the moon, they
calculated the corrections in the return trajectory that would have to
be made to accommodate changes in the moon-earth position. The task was
not an easy one. It took four months of "working like hell" to
produce three thick volumes describing the sequence of events and
related actions. The work would have to be updated later, of course, but
the contractors had a better understanding after the exercise of what
their subsystems should be and what they should do. Thus, long before
the astronauts embarked on an actual lunar landing mission, the mission
planners, government and contractor, had spent untold hours agonizing
over every minute of that trip.<a href = "#source38"><b>38</b></a><p>
The design reference mission study led neatly into the requirement for
North American to accelerate Block II command module work. That vehicle
had moved slowly following the lunar-orbit mode decision, but it would
have been almost impossible to increase the speed. Until Grumman got the
lunar module design relatively well set, North American engineers would
have only the most general ideas of how the two vehicles would
rendezvous and dock, which limited them to guesses about the influence
of the docking equipment on the command module weight. The following
spring, however, new mission rules gave them a clearer picture of what
they were designing toward: the crew members would be able to stay in
their couches during docking and the connection between the command and
lunar modules would be rigid enough to maintain a pressurized pathway
through which the astronauts could travel between the craft.<a href =
"#source39"><b>39</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c137.gif" width=593 height=514 ALT="Probe and drogue drawing">
<p>
<cite>North American engineers favored probe and drogue devices to dock
the command module with the lunar module. The CM probe would slip into
the LM's dish-shaped drogue, and 12 latches on the docking ring would
engage, to lock the spacecraft together, airtight. The astronauts could
now remove a hatch, take out the docking devices, and travel between the
two spacecraft. When operations were finished, they would return to the
CM, reinsert the devices, install the hatch, and release the latches to
disengage from the LM.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
By mid-1963, North American engineers had begun work on an extendable
probe on top of the command module that would fit into a dish-shaped
drogue on the lunar module. They considered three possible ways of
docking: (1) soft docking (latching with enough separation between the
craft to make sure that pilot errors could not impair flight safety and
then reeling the vehicles together), (2) hard docking (going straight in
and latching without preliminaries) as a backup mode; and (3)
transferring the crew by extravehicular means (getting out of one
spacecraft in free space and climbing into the other vehicle) in an
emergency situation. It was now apparent that the main difference
between the Block I and Block II spacecraft was that Block II would be
equipped with the means for docking and the pressurized crew transfer
tunnel, but Block I would not.<a href = "#source40"><b>40</b></a><p>
By March 1964, Manned Spacecraft Center and North American were close to
agreement on the design of the Block I command and service modules. A
Mockup Review Board<a href = "#explanation2"><b>**</b></a> was getting
ready to go to Downey, with a team of systems and structural
specialists, to examine every part of the proposed model and decide what
items to accept. Following NASA tradition in engineering inspections,
the board would consider four categories of changes: items (1) approved
for change, (2) accepted for study, (3) rejected outright, and (4) found
not applicable. The review board would rule on the suggested changes on
the basis of technical accuracy, desirability and feasibility, and the
impact on cost and schedules.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c139a.jpg" width=581 height=409 ALT="CM mockup review">
<p>
<cite>NASA and North American engineers at the April 1964 command module
mockup review (above) closely examine all pieces of the Apollo command
and service modules. While several engineers on the platform inspect the
CM recovery system, the forward heatshield waits to be lifted into
position.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
At the end of April 1964, a hundred persons gathered at North American's
Downey plant. After being welcomed by contractor officials, members of
the board and their specialists watched as several astronauts simulated
operating the vehicle. Next came a walk-around for a general examination
of the spacecraft mockup and such special displays as wiring, cutaway
models of subsystems, parachute packing, and electrical connectors.
Managers and counterpart engineers from NASA and the manufacturer then
split up into small groups to examine minutely and evaluate each piece.
More than a hundred requests for changes RFCs were written on the spot
for consideration by the board; 70 were approved, 14 were designated for
further study, and 26 were rejected.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c139b.jpg" width=577 height=406 ALT="Engineers discuss changes">
<p>
<cite>Groups of engineers of the various specialties (right) meet to
discuss and list requests for changes for consideration by the NASA
Review Board.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
The spacecraft couches worried the board members a great deal, since the
crewmen, wearing pressurized suits, fitted too snugly into their seats.
As a matter of fact, an astronaut lying in a couch could not move
easily, even in an unpressurized suit. Three pilots lying side by side
in the couch area would be virtually immobilized. By July, adjustments
had been made to alleviate this situation and to cover other suggestions
by the board and its assistants. After a second mockup review, in
September, NASA told North American to begin production of the Block I,
earth-orbital command and service modules.<a href =
"#source41"><b>41</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c139c.jpg" width=406 height=576 ALT="McDivitt prepares CM checkout">
<p>
<cite>Astronaut James McDivitt receives assistance with a shoe cover
before entering the command module to check out the cabin from a pilot's
viewpoint.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c139d.jpg" width=498 height=509 ALT="CM clearance problem">
<p>
<cite>One of the most worrisome items astronauts found in the CM
arrangement was an "elbow-shoulder clearance problem." Four
years later, in 1968, this problem still vexed astronauts Walter
Schirra, Donn Eisele, and Walter Cunningham, the first crew to fly an
Apollo spacecraft.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
After Project Christmas Present and the decision to use redundant
systems rather than making repairs en route to the moon, work on the
Block II spacecraft began to move a little faster. Since two large
vehicles, the command-and-service-module combination and the lunar
module, would be boosted into space, a weight-reduction program became
of major importance. North American met this challenge principally by
shaving kilograms off the command module heatshield and the service
module structure.<a href = "#source42"><b>42</b></a><p>
During the spring of 1964, continuing problems with the Block I and
Block II vehicles triggered a change in management at North American.
Dale D. Myers, program manager of the Hound Dog missile, took over as
Apollo manager, replacing John Paup. Myers, a company employee since
1943, later remarked: "The first thing I did when I got on the
program was to work out with Joe Shea . . . a program definition phase
for Block II that [lasted from April] till October. We set up all the
milestones we had to go through . . . in getting to the definition of
the Block II vehicle."<a href = "#source43"><b>43</b></a><p>
Shea and Myers assigned teams at Houston and Downey to guide the
definition phase of Block II. Alan Kehlet led the contractor team, and
Owen Maynard headed the NASA group. Both men had worked on Apollo
spacecraft design as far back as the feasibility studies of 1960. Under
their leadership, teams concentrated on such activities as charting and
evaluating changes caused by abandoning the inflight repair concept,
finding places in the cabin for the lunar sample boxes, studying the
design of the pressurized tunnel that permitted the astronauts to move
from one vehicle to the other, eyeing the probe and drogue docking
mechanism, reviewing the heatshield and service module weight-reduction
programs, and modifying the service module design to provide an empty
bay to hold the scientific experiment equipment.<a href =
"#source44"><b>44</b></a><p>
Maynard and Kehlet planned to hold their Block II design review meeting
in August, but it was 29 September before 130 board members<a href =
"#explanation3"><b>***</b></a> and specialists had something at Downey
to examine. But even this was not a complete mockup of the advanced
command module, as some NASA officials had expected. The contractor
presented mockups of the command module interior, including the
arrangement of the upper deck and lower equipment bay, and the service
module with two of its four bays exposed. Although the couches from the
April Block I review were still featured, the harnesses had been
modified to afford roomier seating. The hatches - inner and outer - were
the same as for Block I, and the spacecraft exterior reflected only the
changes from Block I. New systems, such as docking and crew transfer,
were sketched out in little detail.<p>
After the specialists had examined the mockup, they submitted 106
requests for changes. The board accepted 67, recommended 23 for further
study, rejected 12, and returned 4 as not applicable. What worried
everyone, government and contractor employees alike, was the lack of
good, solid information on how this vehicle and the lunar module would
work together on rendezvous and docking. Across the continent at
Grumman's New York plant, however, the lunar module contractor had a
mockup that would be ready for formal review in October. That would give
North American a clearer picture of the exact changes necessary in its
spacecraft. In five months, after these changes had been studied and
incorporated, a formal Block II command and service module review would
be held. Meanwhile, one engineer from Houston and one from Downey would
be assigned to each of the 67 requests for changes that the board
considered critical.<a href = "#source45"><b>45</b></a> Essentially,
then, waiting for the lunar module to settle into its final form became
a way of life for North American engineers.<p>
But some of the decisions on what would constitute the North American
spacecraft were not influenced by the lunar module, nor were they based
on theoretical studies and ground tests. Some came from actual
missions.<p>
At White Sands, New Mexico, on the morning of 13 May 1964, a Little Joe
II launch vehicle rammed Boilerplate (BP) 12 to an altitude of 4,700
meters, to see if the launch escape system could propel the spacecraft
away from the booster after it had reached transonic speed. Only one
incident marred an otherwise successful flight. A parachute riser broke
during descent, collapsing one of the three main parachutes. The
boilerplate landed safely on the two remaining parachutes, in what one
engineer later called "a welcome unplanned result of the
test."<a href = "#source46"><b>46</b></a><p>
As 1964 drew to a close, the Little Joe II abort test program at White
Sands was nearing its third<a href = "#explanation4"><b>****</b></a>
and, in many ways, most crucial launch. Because of their fixed fins, the
first two solid-fueled rockets had been somewhat erratic in flight. Jack
B. Hurt's people at the Convair plant of General Dynamics in San Diego
then built a relatively simple attitude control and autopilot system for
the rest of their vehicles to allow hydropneumatic operation of
"elevons," like ailerons, in each of the four fins while in
flight. In addition, for the "max q" (maximum dynamic
pressure) and high-altitude abort tests coming up, small reaction
control motors were installed in the fin fairings to increase the
precision of aiming control to the test points desired. Vehicle No.
12-51-1, as it was called, with four Recruit and two Algol motors, was
the most powerful Little Joe II yet flown, intended to develop 1,500
kilonewtons (340,000 pounds of thrust) to lift itself and its cargo -
BP-23 and the launch escape tower - more than 9 kilometers high. The
whole assemblage, weighing 41,500 kilograms, was pointed toward the
north at a point in space where the launch escape system, fitted with
canards, would pull the capsule and boost protective cover away from the
Little Joe II while traveling at a speed of mach 1.5. This area was in
the middle of the region where a Saturn V ought to experience max q.<p>
At precisely 8:00 on the morning of 8 December, Little Joe II roared
upward, straight and true. Thirty-six seconds later - almost out of
sight and two seconds, or 900 meters, early - the planned abort took
place. After an 11-second coast period, the canards deployed, and the
capsule tumbled four times in its turnaround before stabilizing
blunt-end forward and jettisoning the escape system. The boost
protective cover shattered slightly more than expected, but the two
drogue parachutes deployed. Its three main parachutes opened, and BP-23
drifted gently to rest, 11,000 meters uprange from the launch site,
after 7.5 minutes of flight. Max q had been higher than predicted, but
all else had worked well; at the end of 1964, Little Joe II, with its
payload, was ready for more stringent flight tests.<a href =
"#source47"><b>47</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c142a.jpg" width=579 height=411 ALT="Apollo models at KSC">
<p>
<cite>Full-scale models of the Apollo command and service modules and
launch escape tower (foreground) are received in a hangar at the Kennedy
Space Center for the first launch of an Apollo spacecraft by a Saturn
vehicle - mission SA-6, 28 May 1964.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Across the country, in Florida, engineers and technicians from
California, Texas, Alabama, and elsewhere were grooming the first
Apollo-configured spacecraft model to ride aboard a Saturn I booster.
Although Saturn I was no longer part of the manned Apollo program, the
SA-6 launch on 28 May did prove that Marshall could build a booster to
fit the command module. In the jargon of the trade, "The mission
was nominal." After 54 earth circuits, BP-13 reentered the
atmosphere east of Canton Island in the Pacific Ocean on 1 June. No
spacecraft recovery was planned. Just three and a half months later, on
17 September, a nearly identical test of the seventh Saturn I and BP-15
had equally satisfactory results.<a href = "#source48"><b>48</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c142b.jpg" width=409 height=579 ALT="SA-6 ready to go">
<p>
<cite>SA-6 spacecraft and launch vehicle ready to go.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Thus, in the closing months of 1964, the final form of the command ship
was emerging, the management team was in better shape to handle the
program, and the mission planners had a clearer picture of the multitude
of steps necessary in the performance of a lunar mission. During this
two-year period, the lunar module also assumed definite shape.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> The lunar module nestled inside
the adapter (SLA) from launch through separation of the service module
from the S-IVB. The honeycomb panels of the adapter were then
explosively fired to allow the command and service modules, after
turning around and docking with the lunar module, to pull the lander
from the booster's third stage.<p>
<a name = "explanation2"><b>**</b></a> Christopher C. Kraft, Donald K.
Slayton, Caldwell C. Johnson, Owen E. Maynard, and Clinton L. Taylor
would act for NASA, and H. Gary Osbon and Charles H. Feltz for the
contractor.<p>
<a name = "explanation3"><b>***</b></a> Board membership had changed
considerably. Maynard (Chairman), Faget, Slayton, Owen G. Morris,
Taylor, and Sigurd A. Sjoberg represented NASA, and Norman J. Ryker,
Jr., and Kehlet acted for North American.<p>
<a name = "explanation4"><b>****</b></a> The first Little Joe II, a
qualification test vehicle without a payload, was launched successfully
on 28 August 1963.<p>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source30"><b>30</b>.</a> Frick memo, "Reorganization of
the Apollo Spacecraft Project," 11 Jan. 1963; Frick and Hjornevik
memo, "NAS 9-150 Contract Negotiation," 4 Jan. 1963; Markley,
interview, Houston, 17 Jan. 1968; Daniel A. Linn to William Risso,
"Weekly Activity Report through Period Ending Monday, June 24,
1963," 25 June 1963; Frick to NASA Hq., Attn.: D. B. Holmes,
"Apollo Spacecraft Definitization Status," 29 Jan. 1963, with
enc.; Henry W. Flagg, Jr., to JSC History Off., "Review of Comment
Draft of <cite>Chariots for Apollo: A History of Lunar
Spacecraft,"</cite> 24 Nov. 1966.<p>
<a name = "source31"><b>31</b>.</a> Low and Shea to Harrison A. Storms,
Jr., 16 Aug. 1963; Robert P. Young memo for record, "Meeting with
Mr. H. Storms," 21 Aug. 1963; Storms to Low and Shea, 4 Sept.
1963.<p>
<a name = "source32"><b>32</b>.</a> North American, "CSM
Cost/Schedule/Technical Characteristics Study: Final Report," 4
vols., NAA SID7135, 30 April 1971, 2: 24; Bothmer, minutes of 7th
Meeting of MSFMC, 22 June 1962, p. 5; Sack to MSC, Attn.: Sword,
"Research and Development for Project Apollo Spacecraft,
NAA/Douglas Joint Use Agreement, Tulsa Oklahoma Facilities," 4 Dec.
1962; Storms to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, "Research and Development for
Project Apollo Spacecraft, Assignment of Work to S&ID-Tulsa
Facility," 26 Dec. 1962; Low to Dir., OMSF, "Extension of GAM
77 (Hound Dog) Program," 14 Jan. 1963; Piland to NASA Hq., Attn.:
Phillips, "Transport of Apollo Spacecraft-Launch Vehicle
Adapter," 16 Sept. 1964; R. L. Barber TWX to MSC, Attn.: Shea, 30
Oct. 1964; Markley interview.<p>
<a name = "source33"><b>33</b>.</a> NASA, "Shea to Head Apollo
Spacecraft Development at Manned Spacecraft Center," news release
63-226, 8 Oct. 1963; John G. Zarcaro to Chief, FOD, MSC, "Change in
Configuration of the Apollo Command Module," 26 Feb. 1963; Hammock
to ASPO, MSC, "Evaluation of the strakes on the dynamic behavior of
the Apollo Command Module (CM)," 8 May 1963; Calvin H. Perrine to
Actg. Mgr., ASPO, "Report on Trip to NAA S&ID on June 27 and
28," 15 July 1963; abstract of Flight Technology Systems Meeting
No. 19, 24 July 1963; Piland to Ames Research Center, Attn.: Asst. Dir.
for Aeronautics and Flight Mechanics, "Dynamic Tests of an Apollo
Command Module in the 7′ × 10′ Tunnel," 1 Aug. 1963; Hammock TWX to
North American, Attn.: Sack, 12 Dec. 1963; Perrine memo, "Minutes
of meeting on tower flap and canards, February 7, 1964," 12 Feb.
1964; Perrine to Mgr., ASPO, "Recommended ASPO position on canard
versus tower flap," 24 Feb. 1964; Perrine to Asst. Chief, Systems
Engineering Div. (SED), MSC, "Visit to NAA on February 24 and 25 to
discuss tower flap vs canard," 26 Feb. 1964; minutes of NASA-NAA
Technical Management Meeting, 25 Feb. 1964, pp. 2, 3; Perrine to Asst.
Chief, SED, "Trip Report - Visit to NAA on 24 April on WSMR
program," 27 April 1964.<p>
<a name = "source34"><b>34</b>.</a> Minutes, Technical Management
Meeting, 25 Feb. 1964, p. 3; Raymond L. Zavasky, recorder, minutes of
MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 28 Feb. 1964; William E. Stoney, Jr., to
Chief, Advanced Spacecraft Technology Div., MSC, "Apollo land
landing," 10 March 1964; Freitag memo, "MSF Position on Land
versus Water Landings - Apollo and Gemini," 5 March 1964; James C.
Cozad, NAA, to MSC, Attn.: John B. Alldredge, "R&D for Project
Apollo Spacecraft, Design of Apollo Command Module for Earth
Impact," 27 April 1965.<p>
<a name = "source35"><b>35</b>.</a> Minutes of NASA-NAA Technical
Management Meeting, 7–8 April 1964; Piland memo, "Sparing
Concept," 19 Aug. 1963; David W. Gilbert to Mgr., ASPO,
"Implementation of Built-in Redundancy for Spacecraft
Sub-systems," 30 Oct. 1963.<p>
<a name = "source36"><b>36</b>.</a> MSC, "Apollo Subsystem
Management Plan," 16 Dec. 1963; minutes of Structures and Mechanics
Div. Apollo Subsystem Management Meeting, 29 Jan. 1964; MSC,
"Apollo Operating Procedures," 10 April 1964, signed by Shea
and Maxime A. Faget.<p>
<a name = "source37"><b>37</b>.</a> Disher TWX to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth,
"Establishment of Guidelines for First Formal Call for Development
and Flight Schedules for the Manned Space Flight Program," 12 July
1962; Low to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, "Manned Space Flight Program
Launch Schedule for Apollo and Saturn Class Vehicles" [October
1962], with enc., subj. as above, OMSF directive M-D M 9330, 15 Oct.
1962; Storms to Low and Shea, 4 Sept. 1963; North American, "Apollo
Spacecraft Development Test Plan," AP 63-86, December 1963; North
American, "CSM Characteristics Study," vol. 2. Cf. an earlier
plan, MSC, "Command and Service Module Test Program through the
First Manned Apollo Mission," 15 July 1963; Kehlet to Grimwood, 7
Jan. 1977.<p>
<a name = "source38"><b>38</b>.</a> James L. Decker to Grumman, Attn.:
Robert S. Mullaney, "Apollo Project Spacecraft Integration Review
Action Items - Line Item 13," 24 Sept. 1963; idem,
"Development of Apollo Lunar Landing Mission Design Plan," 11
Sept. 1963; Hammock TWX to North American, Attn.: Sack, 3 Dec. 1963; D.
R. Treffeisen to Apollo Mission Planning Task Force Members,
"Minutes of 1st Direction Group Meeting - 12/16/63," 17 Dec.
1963; Thomas G. Barnes et al., "Apollo Mission Planning Task Force,
Phase I Progress Report," Grumman LED-540-7, 4 May 1964, 3 vols.,
especially 1: 3-1 and 3-5, 2: 7-2, 3: A-7; Arnold B. Whitaker,
interview, Bethpage, N-Y., 12 Feb. 1970; John Boynton, interview,
Houston, 27 April 1970.<p>
<a name = "source39"><b>39</b>.</a> Minutes of MSC-NAA Apollo Spacecraft
Design Review no. 7, 13–14 Dec. 1962, p. 4; Caldwell C. Johnson memo,
"Docking Ground Rules: and Design Criteria," 1 April 1963,
with enc., "Docking Concept Ground Rules and Design Criteria,"
SSS-DC304, 25 March 1963; Rene A. Berglund to Hammock, "Docking
Study Background and Report on Trip to NAA to Review Their Docking
Mechanisms Studies," 8 May 1963, with enc.<p>
<a name = "source40"><b>40</b>.</a> Piland TWX to North American, Attn.:
Sack, and MSC-RASPO, Attn.: George M. Lemke, "Docking
Simulation," 26 June 1963; Owen E. Maynard to Piland,
"Docking," 9 July 1963; Decker to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney,
"LEM-CM Docking Concept Selection," 16 July 1963; H. Gary
Osbon TWX to MSC, Attn.: Piland, 26 July 1963; Maynard to Dep. Mgr.,
LEM, "Extendible Boom Docking Simulation Plans," 20 Aug. 1963;
J. R. Berry TWX to Grumman, Attn.: P. Gardner, "Confirmation of
Telecon between R. Gustavson and P. Gardner re Columbus Docking
Simulation Study," 15 Aug. 1963; Hammock to North American, Attn.:
Sack, "Apollo Docking Concept," 31 Dec. 1963.<p>
<a name = "source41"><b>41</b>.</a> Clinton L. Taylor TWX to North
American, Attn.: Sack, 9 March 1964; Shea memo, "Apollo Mockup
Review," 11 March 1964; Maynard memo, "Mockup Review of Block
I Command and Service Modules," 23 April 1964, with enc.; MSC,
"Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of Block I Mock-up
Command and Service Modules, April 23–30, 1964"; Osbon to MSC,
Attn.: Taylor, "R&D for Project Apollo Spacecraft, Transmittal
of Minutes, Block I Coordination Meeting NASA/NAA, July 9–10, 1964 at
Downey, California," 20 Aug. 1964, with encs., minutes, "NAA
Comments - Block I Definition," 9 July 1964, and "Block I
Definition Milestones," 10 July 1964; minutes of NASA-NAA Technical
Management Meeting, 17 Sept. 1964; Maynard memo, "Distribution of
Block I Specification Negotiation Minutes, dated 28 September 1964 and
Review of Negotiated Block I Specifications, dated 1 October 1964,"
9 Oct. 1964.<p>
<a name = "source42"><b>42</b>.</a> Kehlet to Grimwood, 7 Jan. 1977.<p>
<a name = "source43"><b>43</b>.</a> Ralph B. Oakley, "Historical
Summary: S&ID Apollo Program," 20 Jan. 1966, p. 10; NASA,
"Dale D. Myers," biographical data, February 1971; Myers,
interviews, Downey, Calif., 12 May 1969, and Washington, 11 Sept.
1970.<p>
<a name = "source44"><b>44</b>.</a> Kehlet to Grimwood, 7 Jan. 1977.<p>
<a name = "source45"><b>45</b>.</a> Maynard memo, "CSM Block II
changes transmitted to NAA for implementation," 19 June 1964; MSC,
"Board Report for NASA Inspection and Review of Block II Mockup,
Command and Service Modules, September 29–October 1, 1964,"
especially app. I, Yschek letter to North American, ["Contract
Change Authorization No. 224"], with enc., "Apollo C&SM
Block II Changes," and Appendix 4; MSC, "Board Report for NASA
Inspection and Review of M-5 Mockup, Lunar Excursion Module, October
5–8, 1964."<p>
<a name = "source46"><b>46</b>.</a> Maynard memos, "Mission A-001
preflight launch phase trajectory input data," 20 April 1964, and
"Launch Escape Vehicle trajectory input data for Mission A-001
(Boilerplate 12) flight test," 6 May 1964; MSC, "Postlaunch
Report for Apollo Mission A-001 (BP-12), MSC-R-A-64-1," 28 May 1964, pp.
1-1, 3-1, 3-2, 4-111 through 4-118; MSC, "Apollo Boilerplate
12," news conference, 13 May 1964; Emory F. Harris to Chief, Mgmt.
Analysis Div., Attn.: Clarence Presswood, "Significant Accidents
and Failures," 10 Dec. 1964; Carl R. Huss memo, 2 Nov. 1976.<p>
<a name = "source47"><b>47</b>.</a> Perrine to Apollo Support Group,
Attn.: John P. Bryant, "Request for trajectory analysis in support
of the BP-23 flight test," 19 May 1964; Paul E. Fitzgerald and
Phillip L. Suttler, Jr., memo, "Minutes of meeting on BP-23,"
25 May 1964; Fitzgerald memo, "Mission requirements for mission
A-002 (BP-23)," 16 June 1964; Taylor TWX to North American, Attn.:
Sack, 16 June 1964; Fitzgerald and Zack H. Byrns memo, "Minutes of
meeting on BP-23," 29 June 1964; MSC, "Postlaunch Report for
Apollo Mission A-002 (BP-23)," MSC-R-A-65-1, 22 Jan. 1965; General
Dynamics, Convair Div., "Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA
Project Apollo: Final Report," 1, May 1966.<p>
<a name = "source48"><b>48</b>.</a> North American, "Project Apollo
Flight-Test Report, Boilerplate 13," SID 63-1416-3, August 1964,
pp. 2-1, 2-2; "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-101
(BP-13)," MSC-R-A-64-2, 18 June 1964, pp. 2-1, 3-2 through 3-5, 4-1
through 4-3, 7-1; KSC, "Apollo Spacecraft BP-13: A Chronology of
Technical Progress at Kennedy Space Center," SP-188, 7 May 1965;
MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-102 (BP-15),"
MSC-R-A-64-3, 10 Oct. 1964 pp. 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2.
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