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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
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<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch12-2</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Schedules and Lingering Worries</h2>
<p>
NASA had scheduled six missions in 1968 but had found only four
necessary (see <a href = "ch10-1.html">Chapter 10</a>) (see
<a href = "ch11-1.html">Chapter 11</a>). The agency could also omit a
flight in 1969, if the crew of the G mission listed for 15 July could
touch down, stay awhile, and leave the moon safely. The intervals
between following launches might then be as long as six months to
assimilate more of what had been learned before going on to the next
mission. But until the first landing took place, Mueller and his
management council still planned to launch a mission every two and a
half months.<a href = "#source2"><b>2</b></a><p>
NASA Headquarters continued to emphasize schedules, even while worrying
lest something be overlooked in meeting the deadline. To avert this
possibility, Washington kept adding specialized administrative layers,
and Gilruth shortly complained to Mueller that too many Headquarters
review teams were investigating one thing or another about the
mission.<a href = "#source3"><b>3</b></a> In addition to administrative
actions, two technical suggestions surfaced at Headquarters. The first,
tinged with conservatism, was to land an unmanned lunar module on the
moon before a manned vehicle touched down. Mueller told Acting
Administrator Thomas Paine that modifying the lander for unmanned flight
would take too long and would, in the end, give very little in return
for the costs in time and money. The second idea, proposed by Apollo
Program Director Samuel Phillips, was to ship the command and service
modules to the Cape already assembled and mated, rather than separately.
Houston's Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager George Low informed Phillips
it would save time at Kennedy but would add time at Downey. It would
also cost an extra million dollars.<a href = "#source4"><b>4</b></a><p>
Good reasoning lay behind this paradox of both hurrying and holding
back. Ever-present desk and wall calendars kept reminding the managers
that time was running out, yet they had to guard against another
terrible tragedy in the program. Two areas, however, were viewed with
satisfaction - program costs and spacecraft weights. Both North American
and Grumman were operating within fiscal 1969 financial limits. And,
although fire-related changes in the command and service modules had
increased the weight significantly, NASA and North American had reversed
this trend in the latter half of 1967. In the succeeding months, the
command module's bulk had actually been whittled down. Lunar module
weight, however, did not stabilize until mid-1968, and that machine
still had some lingering technical troubles.<a href =
"#source5"><b>5</b></a><p>
One of the more exasperating problems was the electrical wiring in LM-3.
Kennedy Space Center engineers had complained about the vehicle ever
since its arrival in Florida in June 1968. In late January 1969, Low
asked Martin L. Raines, reliability and quality assurance chief in
Houston, to find out just how bad the wiring was. Raines told the Apollo
manager that he had found hundreds of splices in the vehicle, but it
could still fly safely. Most of the broken wiring, Raines said, was
caused by the low tensile strength of the annealed copper wire. The
wiring in LM-4, ticketed for Apollo 10, should cause fewer problems,
since a high-strength copper alloy would be used.<a href =
"#source6"><b>6</b></a><p>
Another recurring lander ailment was stress corrosion, or metal
cracking. Grumman had no structural failures during testing, but the
cracks worried both NASA and contractor engineers. A number of fittings
were replaced in LMs 3, 4, and 5; by the end of January 1969, the
vehicles for Apollo 9 and 10 were considered ready for launching. If
problems arose later, more fittings could be changed on LM-5 as it
passed through its testing program.<a href = "#source7"><b>7</b></a><p>
Operational as well as component problems raised some issues during this
period. For example, what would happen to the electrical systems in the
spacecraft when the two vehicles docked? Ground tests at Downey and the
Cape revealed that there would be little electromagnetic interference. A
larger question centered on flying the lunar module after the vehicles
separated. About a year before the Apollo 9 mission, astronaut Charles
Conrad had commented to Bill Tindall, a leading Houston mission planner,
that the lander would be hard to handle when a large amount of the
propellant had been used and the descent stage had been dropped off. At
a flight program review in October 1968, Phillips asked about the
problems of steering the lightweight ascent stage manually. Gilruth
directed Warren J. North and Donald C. Cheatham to find out what the
difficulties would be. North and Cheatham reported that docking would
require precise control but that this and other guidance tasks had been
successfully simulated at Bethpage, in Houston, and at Langley.<a href =
"#source8"><b>8</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c288.jpg" width=548 height=407 ALT="Spacecraft docking devices"><p>
<cite>Spacecraft docking devices: the command module probe and docking
ring at right; the lunar module drogue at left.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Perhaps the biggest concern before Apollo 9 was the docking maneuver. A
1972 report revealed that there was little confidence in the docking
system in early 1969. At a January program review, Phillips said that
problems encountered during probe and drogue testing worried him. On
several occasions, when the command module's extendable probe had
nuzzled into the lander's funnel-shaped drogue, the capture latches had
failed to engage. In other tests, they had only partially caught,
raising the specter of "jack-knifing" and possible damage to
one of the spacecraft, probably the lunar module. Phillips was also
concerned that the sharp edges on the probe might scar the drogue when
the craft were reeled together and prevent airtight sealing of the 12
latches on the command module docking ring. Low asked his deputy,
Kenneth Kleinknecht, to investigate. On 14 January, Kleinknecht and six
others<a href = "#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> from the Manned Spacecraft
Center went to Downey to see what was being done about correcting 17
known problem areas. North American personnel responded to each
criticism to the satisfaction of the team.<a href =
"#source9"><b>9</b></a><p>
Although the spacecraft occupied the center ring of concern, Marshall
Space Flight Center focused on a nagging item a little lower in the
stack. Borman and his crew aboard <cite>Apollo 8</cite> had been
grateful when the second (S-II) stage of the Saturn V finished thrusting
and dropped away. Although the launch had been neither particularly
painful nor dangerous, it had shaken them up and bounced them about.
Launch vehicle engineers concluded that the shaking had been a form of
pogo, since the pulsing engines had increased the vibrations. The
Marshall and Rocketdyne troops pounced on the problem, trying out
various fuel-feeding combinations through the propellant valve. Another
suggested cure was to increase the pressure to the inlet of the oxidizer
pump. Time was too short for tests of this method before the scheduled
launch, and there were some objections; but the managers decided to
raise the pressure in the propellant tanks a little and hope for the
best. The crew on Apollo 9 might very well encounter just as much pogo
as the crew of the preceding flight, but that was not enough to delay
the launch.<a href = "#source10"><b>10</b></a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> The team members were Maxime A.
Faget, Engineering and Development; Joseph N. Kotanchik, Structures and
Mechanics; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Flight Operations; Raines,
Reliability and Quality Assurance; Donald K. Slayton, Flight Crew
Operations; and Harmon L. Brendle (secretary), the Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source2"><b>2</b>.</a> Mueller to Gilruth, Wernher von Braun,
MSFC Dir., and Kurt H. Debus, KSC Dir., 14 Feb. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source3"><b>3</b>.</a> Gilruth to Mueller, 18 Nov. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source4"><b>4</b>.</a> Robert L. Wagner, NASA routing slip,
to Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, 11 Feb. 1969, with att., Mueller draft
memo to Actg. Admin., NASA, "Unmanned LM Landing," n.d.;
George M. Low, MSC, to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Shipment of
command and service modules in a mated configuration," 2 Oct.
1968.<p>
<a name = "source5"><b>5</b>.</a> Phillips to Low, "Apollo Program
Fiscal Year 1969 Costs," 11 Feb. 1969; Low to Phillips, 5 April
1969; Caldwell C. Johnson to Low, "Apollo weight growth," 8
April 1969.<p>
<a name = "source6"><b>6</b>.</a> Low to Martin L. Raines, "LM-3
wiring problems," 23 Jan. 1969; Raines to Mgr., ASPO, subj, as
above, 5 Feb. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source7"><b>7</b>.</a> [Grumman], "Statement of Stress
Corrosion," 29 Jan. 1969; NASA, "LM Fittings Changed,"
news release 69-24, 31 Jan. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source8"><b>8</b>.</a> Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips,
"Response to Block II DCR [Design Certification Review] and LM-3
DCR action items concerning CSM/LM EMC (electromagnetic
compatibility)," 26 Oct. 1968; Gilruth to DCR Board Members,
"Spacecraft electromagnetic compatibility," 29 Jan. 1969, with
enc., B. D. Cooperstein and R. H. Parry, "Apollo CSM/LM
Computerized Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis," TRW
11176-H111-RO-OO, 21 Jan. 1969; Howard W. Tindall, Jr., memo,
"Light weight LM attitude control is too sporty," 7 Dec. 1967;
Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips, "Manual control of the light
Lunar Module ascent configuration," 27 Nov. 1968, with encs.;
Phillips to Gilruth, subj. as above, 16 Dec. 1968; Chester A. Vaughan et
al., "Lunar Module Reaction Control System," Apollo Experience
Report (AER) NASA Technical Note (TN) S-315 (MSC-04567), review copy,
December 1971.<p>
<a name = "source9"><b>9</b>.</a> Robert D. Langley, "The Docking
System," AER TN S-325 (MSC-05137), review copy, March 1972, p. 19;
North American Space Div., PR Dept., <cite>Apollo Spacecraft News
Reference</cite> (Downey, Calif., rev. ed., 1969), p. 119; Low TWX to
North American and Grumman, Attn.: Milton I. Drucker and Robert L.
Tripp, "Pre-FRR [Flight Readiness Review] Docking Probe Review
Board," 8 Jan. 1969; Kenneth S. Kleinknecht memo, subj. as above, 8
Jan. 1969; Aaron Cohen memo, "CSM 104 Drogue and Probe
Review," 17 Jan. 1969; OMSF Report to the Admin., NASA, signed by
Mueller (hereafter cited as Mueller Report), 13 Jan. 1969; Low to
Phillips, 28 Jan. 1969, with enc., Harmon L. Brendle, secy., minutes of
meeting, Pre-FRR Review of the Drogue and Probe, CSM 104, 15 Jan.
1969.<p>
<a name = "source10"><b>10</b>.</a> Donald F. Seaton, Jr., Apollo
Program Weekly Status Reports, OMSF, 24 Jan. and 14 Feb. 1969; Mueller
Report, 27 Jan. 1969; David B. Pendley to Mgr., ASPO, "S-II stage
oscillation," 31 Jan. 1969, and "AS-504 Pre-Flight Review at
MSFC on January 29, 1969," 31 Jan. 1969; Donald C. Wade, telephone
interview, 4 Feb. 1976; Sally D. Gates, NASA routing slip, to Wade, with
Wade's annotation, 4 Feb. 1976.
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