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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
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<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch1-9</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>The Challenge</h2>
<p>
In the aftermath of Gagarin's flight, President Kennedy asked Vice
President Johnson to find a way to regain American technological
prestige through space flight. NASA top management was in almost
constant communication with the White House staff, Bureau of the Budget
officials, and congressional leaders. Apollo was about to pass from
planning to action. Less than a month and a half after the Russian feat,
NASA's new manned space flight project was approved.
<blockquote><p>Now it is time to take longer strides - time for a great new
American enterprise - time for this nation to take a clearly leading
role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our
future on earth.<p>
. . . I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the
goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and
returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this
period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the
long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or
expensive to accomplish.</blockquote><p>
With these words, on 25 May 1961, President Kennedy proclaimed before
Congress and the world that manned lunar landing belonged in the
forefront of an expanded American space program.<a href =
"#source73">73</a> And Congress obviously agreed with him. With almost
no internal opposition, both the Senate and the House of Representatives
responded to Kennedy's challenge by increasing funds for the agency that
was to undertake this bold program. At this juncture, the Americans had
chalked up 15 minutes and 22 seconds of manned space flight experience.
The Russians had clocked 108 minutes.<p>
On 5 May 1961, NASA had launched Freedom 7, the first manned U.S.
spacecraft. Pilot Alan Shepard became the forerunner of a new genre of
American adventurer-hero, the astronaut.<a href = "#explanation1">*</a>
Shepard's flight, a lob shot up over the Atlantic, was a far from
spectacular demonstration of this country's spacefaring capabilities
when compared to Gagarin's single orbit of the earth. But, as only the
third flight of a Mercury-Redstone, it was a dangerous and daring
feat.<a href = "#source74">74</a><p>
NASA officials maintained that the agency was ready and eager to take on
the lunar landing, even though it added enormously to the challenge of
Apollo. Following the President's speech on 25 May, Webb, Dryden, and
Seamans told newsmen that much of the additional funding Kennedy had
requested would be spent on advanced launch vehicles, particularly Nova,
the key to manned lunar landings. Nova was so crucial to Apollo, Webb
declared, that the agency planned a parallel approach to the development
of propellants for the big booster. NASA would continue its work on
liquid propellants, while the Department of Defense would pursue
solid-fueled-rocket development as an alternative for Nova's first
stage. "As soon as the technical promise of each approach can be
adequately assessed," he said, "one will be selected for final
development and utilization in the manned space program."<a href =
"#source75">75</a><p>
Dryden expanded on Webb's statement. Asked if the agency considered
orbital rendezvous a serious alternative to use of Nova, he replied,
"We are still studying that, but we do not believe at this time
that we could rely on [it]." He stressed that Kennedy's decision
had forced NASA to begin work on Nova prematurely:
<blockquote><p>This illustrates the real nature of the decision. We could
make some of these decisions better two years from now than we can now,
if the program had gone along at the ordinary pace. But if we are going
to accelerate this we have got to do some parallel approaches, at least
for a time. The solid and the liquid propellant are going to be carried
forward full steam. We have a certain amount of effort on rendezvous. If
it looks like this presents any opportunity, we will certainly take
advantage of it.<a href = "#source76">76</a></blockquote><p>
Both Dryden and Seamans freely admitted that NASA lacked the immediate
scientific knowledge needed for lunar landings. Another use of the
additional funding would be to speed up research into the unknowns.
Development of hardware - boosters, spacecraft, and equipment - must be
built upon this scientific and technical foundation. At this juncture,
nobody had any really firm idea about how NASA was going to implement
Kennedy's decision. Techniques for leaving the earth and flying to the
moon - even more, landing there and returning - were open to
considerable debate and much speculation.<p>
There was a vague feeling within the agency (though with several notable
exceptions) that direct ascent would eventually be the answer, but no
one had worked out the tradeoffs in much detail. Subsequently, as Apollo
planning progressed, the question of how to fly to the moon and back
loomed ever larger. In the end, the choice of mode was perhaps the
single greatest technical decision of the entire Apollo program. The
selection was inextricably linked to launch vehicles, spacecraft,
facilities, cost, development schedules, and the future of America's
posture in space. Ultimately, the mode question shaped the whole of
Apollo. Many possible methods were carefully considered, and a Pandora's
box of problems was opened. At the time, however, technical thinking had
not matured to that degree. The United States was just on the threshold
of manned space flight, and orbital flights around the earth were in
themselves mind-boggling. A program to land men on the moon, 400,000
kilometers away, and bring them safely home was nearly too stupendous
for serious contemplation.<p>
One participant charged with transforming the concepts drafted by
committees and study groups to hardware later described his reactions.
Acutely aware that NASA's total manned space flight experience was
limited to one ballistic flight and that he was being asked to commit
men to a 14-day trip to the moon and back, Robert Gilruth said he was
simply aghast.<a href = "#source77">77</a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1">*</a> The first astronauts were military test
pilots: from the Navy, Lieutenant Commanders Walter M. Schirra, Jr., and
Alan B. Shepard, Jr., and Lieutenant M. Scott Carpenter; from the Air
Force, Captains L. Gordon Cooper, Virgil I. Grissom, and Donald K.
Slayton; and from the Marines, Lieutenant Colonel John H. Glenn, Jr.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source73"><b>73</b>.</a> Rosen to Webb, "Reflections on the
Present American Posture in Space," 19 April 1961; Webb to Kenneth
O'Donnell, The White House, no subj., 21 April 1961; John F. Kennedy to
the Vice-President, no subj., 20 April 1961; L. B. Johnson to the
President, "Evolution of the Space Program," 28 April 1961;
DeMarquis D. Wyatt, "Research and Development," 24 May 1961,
annotated "Prepared for use at press conf. 5/25/61"; White
House, "John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Special
Message to Congress, May 25, 1961," news release.<p>
<a name = "source74"><b>74</b>.</a> Congress, <cite>An Act to authorize
appropriations to [NASA], Public Law 87-98,</cite> 87th Cong., 1st
sess., 21 July 1961; NASA with National Institutes of Health and
National Academy of Sciences, <cite>Proceedings of a Conference on
Results of the First U.S. Manned Suborbital Space Flight, June 6,
1961</cite> (Washington, 1961); NASA, "Introduction to the
Astronauts," news conference, 9 April 1959; Low to Admin., NASA,
"Pilot Selection for Project Mercury," 23 April 1959.<p>
<a name = "source75"><b>75</b>.</a> NASA, "Statement by James E. Webb,
Administrator," news release 61-112, 25 May 1961.<p>
<a name = "source76"><b>76</b>.</a> NASA, "Budget Briefing," news
release 61-115, 25 May 1961.<p>
<a name = "source77"><b>77</b>.</a> Gilruth, interview, Houston, 21 March 1968.
Cf. Charles W. Mathews to staff, Flight Ops. Div., "Formation of
Apollo Working Group," 29 May 1961.<p>
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