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Windows DFIR Check by MITRE Tactic

T1015 Accessibility Features 

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\utilman.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\AtBroker.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Narrator.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Magnify.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DisplaySwitch.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe" /v "Debugger"
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe

T1098 Account Manipulation 

N/A

T1182 AppCert DLLs 

reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" /v AppCertDlls

T1103 AppInit DLLs 

reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
reg query "HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='System'; Id='11'} | FL TimeCreated,Message

T1138 Application Shimming 

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB"
dir %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom
dir %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-ShimEngine/Operational';}|FL

Note: Some other similar methods exist such as abusing the ‘Command’ value of Windows Telemetry Controller - Special Thanks to TrustedSec.

Hint: Look for a Command not pointing to “CompatTelRunner.exe” or which has ‘-cv’, ‘-oobe’, or ‘-fullsync’ in the command line.

reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController" /s

T1197 BITS Jobs 

bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational'; Id='59'} | FL TimeCreated,Message
ls 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\qmgr.db'

T1067 Bootkit

Note: This exists below the OS in the Master Boot Record or Volume Boot Record. The system must be booted through Advanced Startup Options with a Command Prompt, or through a recovery cd.

bootrec /FIXMBR
bootrec /FIXBOOT

Extra: If your boot configuration data is missing or contains errors the below can fix this.

bootrec /REBUILDBCD

If you’re thinking of a bootkit more as a rootkit (malicious system drivers) you can go with the below.

General Driver Enumeration

gci C:\Windows\*\DriverStore\FileRepository\ -recurse -include *.inf | FL FullName,LastWriteTime,LastWriteTimeUtc
gci -path C:\Windows\System32\drivers -include *.sys -recurse -ea SilentlyContinue
sc.exe query type=driver state=all

Unsigned Drivers

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational'; Id='3001'} | FL TimeCreated,Message
gci -path C:\Windows\System32\drivers -include *.sys -recurse -ea SilentlyContinue | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | where {$_.status -ne 'Valid'}

Previous Unusual Loaded Filter Drivers (Often used by rootkits)

Note: This will likely have false positives, particularly relating to filter drivers which are used by AV products, EDR solutions, or otherwise.

$FilterEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; ProviderName="Microsoft-Windows-FilterManager"} | ForEach-Object {
	[PSCustomObject] @{
		TimeCreated = $_.TimeCreated
		MachineName = $_.MachineName
		UserId = $_.UserId
		FilterDriver = $_.Properties[4].Value
        Message = $_.Message
	}
}
echo "Scanning for suspicious filter drivers. Any found will be displayed below:"
$FilterEvents | where-object {$_.FilterDriver -ine "FileInfo" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "WdFilter" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "storqosflt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "wcifs" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "CldFlt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "FileCrypt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "luafv" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "npsvctrig" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "Wof" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "FileInfo" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "bindflt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "PROCMON24" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "FsDepends"}

Unusual Loaded Filter Drivers (No longer present or filtering registry keys)

$FilterEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; ProviderName="Microsoft-Windows-FilterManager"} | ForEach-Object {
	[PSCustomObject] @{
		TimeCreated = $_.TimeCreated
		MachineName = $_.MachineName
		UserId = $_.UserId
		FilterDriver = $_.Properties[4].Value
        Message = $_.Message
	}
}
echo "Scanning for suspicious filter drivers. Any found will be compared against existing services:"
$SuspectDrivers = $($FilterEvents | where-object {$_.FilterDriver -ine "FileInfo" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "WdFilter" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "storqosflt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "wcifs" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "CldFlt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "FileCrypt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "luafv" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "npsvctrig" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "Wof" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "FileInfo" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "bindflt" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "PROCMON24" -AND $_.FilterDriver -ine "FsDepends"} | select -exp FilterDriver)
$SuspectDrivers
foreach ($driver in $SuspectDrivers){
echo "Checking services for relevant drivers. Any which aren't present may indicate a filter driver which has since been removed, or an active rootkit filtering service registry keys."
gci REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\$driver
}

Safe Boot registry keys

Special Thanks - Didier Stevens, multiple times

Note: These keys specify what services are run in Safe Mode. Sometimes they’ll be modified by malware to ensure rootkits can still function in Safe Mode.

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal /s
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network /s

Unload malicious filter driver

fltmc filters
fltmc volumes
fltmc instances
fltmc unload <filtername>
fltmc detach <filtername> <volumeName> <instanceName>

Note: Common legitimate filter drivers include

  • WdFilter – Windows Defender Filter
  • storqosflt - Storage QoS Filter
  • wcifs - Windows Container Isolation File System Filter
  • CldFlt - Windows Cloud Files Filter
  • FileCrypt - Windows Sandboxing and Encryption Filter
  • luafv – LUA File Virtualization Filter (UAC)
  • npsvctrig – Named Pipe Service Trigger Provider Filter
  • Wof – Windows Overlay Filter
  • FileInfo – FileInfo Filter (SuperFetch)
  • bindflt - Windows Bind Filter system driver
  • FsDepends - File System Dependency Minifilter
  • PROCMON24 - Procmon Process Monitor Driver

T1176 Browser Extensions

Chrome

Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path 'C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions' -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue -include manifest.json | cat
reg query "HKLM\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions" /s
reg query "HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions" /s

Firefox

Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\extensions" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\plugins\" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Mozilla\*\extensions

Edge

Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Packages\ -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue

Internet Explorer

Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\Plugins\" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
reg query 'HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects'
reg query 'HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar'
reg query 'HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\URLSearchHooks'
reg query 'HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars'
reg query 'HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars'
reg query 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions'

T1109 Component Firmware

Note: This is incredibly rare, and doesn’t have an easy detection/remediation mechanism. Using the Windows CheckDisk utility, System File Checker, or Deployment Image Servicing and Management may assist but isn’t guaranteed.

chkdsk /F
sfc /scannow
dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /ScanHealth
dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /RestoreHealth
dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /StartComponentCleanup /ResetBase

T1122 Component Object Model (COM) Hijacking

Note: This involves replacing legitimate components with malicious ones, and as such the legitimate components will likely no longer function. If you have a detection based on DLLHost.exe with /Processid:{xyz}, you can match xyz with the CLSID (COM Class Object) or AppID mentioned below to check for any malicious EXE or DLL.

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{abc} /v AppID /t REG_SZ /d {xyz}
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{abc} /v AppID /t REG_SZ /d {xyz}
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{xyz}
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\AppID\{xyz}
HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Classes\AppID\{xyz}

Example analysis:

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID" /s /f "{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{178167bc-4ee3-403e-8430-a6434162db17}" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}"

Queries:

reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".dll"
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".exe"
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\ /s /f DllSurrogate
gci -path REGISTRY::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\*\shell\open\command 
reg query HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".dll"
reg query HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".exe"
gci 'REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Classes\CLSID\*\TreatAs'
gci 'REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Classes\Scripting.Dictionary'
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\LocalServer32" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\InprocServer32" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\InprocHandler*" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\*Server32" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\ScriptletURL" -ea 0
reg query HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f "ScriptletURL"

Get list of all COM Objects

Original by Jeff Atwood

gci HKLM:\Software\Classes -ea 0| ? {$_.PSChildName -match '^\w+\.\w+$' -and(gp "$($_.PSPath)\CLSID" -ea 0)} | select -ExpandProperty PSChildName

T1136 Create Account 

net user
net user /domain
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts" /s

T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking 

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs"
gci -path C:\Windows\* -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"
gci -path C:\Windows\System32\* -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"
gps | FL ProcessName, @{l="Modules";e={$_.Modules|Out-String}}
gps | ? {$_.Modules -like '*{DLLNAME}*'} | FL ProcessName, @{l="Modules";e={$_.Modules|Out-String}}
$dll = gps | Where {$_.Modules -like '*{DLLNAME}*' } | Select Modules;$dll.Modules;
(gps).Modules.FileName
(gps).Modules | FL FileName,FileVersionInfo
(gps).Modules.FileName | get-authenticodesignature | ? Status -NE "Valid"

Locate Possible DLL Search Order Hijacking

Note: A legitimate clean executable can be used to run malicious DLLs based on how the software searches for them.

More information on Microsoft Docs

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode"

Search order for desktop applications:

If SafeDllSearchMode is enabled (is by default), the search order is as follows:

  • The same directory from which the executable is run.
  • The System Directory (Usually C:\Windows\System32).
  • The 16-bit System Directory.
  • The Windows Directory (Usually C:\Windows).
  • The Current Directory (From the process which executed the executable).
  • The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable.

If SafeDllSearchMode is disabled (SafeDllSearchMode has a reg value of 0), the search order is as follows:

  • The same directory from which the executable is run.
  • The Current Directory (From the process which executed the executable).
  • The System Directory (Usually C:\Windows\System32).
  • The 16-bit System Directory.
  • The Windows Directory (Usually C:\Windows).
  • The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable.

T1133 External Remote Services 

N/A

T1044 File System Permissions Weakness 

Get-WmiObject win32_service | FL name,PathName
get-acl "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe" | FL | findstr "FullControl"

T1158 Hidden Files and Directories 

dir /S /A:H

T1179 Hooking

Finding EasyHook Injection

tasklist /m EasyHook32.dll;tasklist /m EasyHook64.dll;tasklist /m EasyLoad32.dll;tasklist /m EasyLoad64.dll;

More Material:

T1062 Hypervisor 

N/A

T1183 Image File Execution Options Injection 

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit" /s /f "MonitorProcess"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options" /s /f "Debugger"

T1037 Logon Scripts 

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Environment" /v UserInitMprLogonScript

T1177 LSASS Driver 

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id='4614';} | FL TimeCreated,Message
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id='3033';} | FL TimeCreated,Message
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id='3063';} | FL TimeCreated,Message

T1031 Modify Existing Service 

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ImagePath"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ServiceDLL"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "FailureCommand"
Get-ItemProperty REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\*\* -ea 0 | where {($_.ServiceDll -ne $null)} | foreach {filehash $_.ServiceDll}
Get-ItemProperty REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\*\* -ea 0 | where {($_.ServiceDll -ne $null)} | select -uniq ServiceDll -ea 0 | foreach {filehash $_.ServiceDll} | select -uniq -exp hash

T1128 Netsh Helper DLL 

reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh

T1050 New Service 

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ImagePath"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ServiceDLL"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "FailureCommand"
Get-WmiObject win32_service | FL Name, DisplayName, PathName, State
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='System'; Id='7045';} | FL TimeCreated,Message

Note: If not examining the registry directly and looking at services in a ‘live’ capacity you may encounter ‘hidden services’ which aren’t shown due to a SDDL applied to them. You can find solely these services using the following (Special thanks - Josh Wright)

Compare-Object -ReferenceObject (Get-Service | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Name | % { $_ -replace "_[0-9a-f]{2,8}$" } ) -DifferenceObject (gci -path hklm:\system\currentcontrolset\services | % { $_.Name -Replace "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\","HKLM:\" } | ? { Get-ItemProperty -Path "$_" -name objectname -erroraction 'ignore' } | % { $_.substring(40) }) -PassThru | ?{$_.sideIndicator -eq "=>"}

Some common legitimate hidden services are:

WUDFRd
WUDFWpdFs
WUDFWpdMtp

T1137 Office Application Startup 

Get-ChildItem -path C:\Users\*\Microsoft\*\STARTUP\*.dotm -force
Get-ChildItem -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\*\STARTUP\* -force
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf" /s
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf" /s
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\*\Addins\*
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432node\Microsoft\Office\*\Addins\*
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432node\Microsoft\Office\*\Addins\*
Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\*" -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\*" -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path C:\ -recurse -include Startup -ea 0
ls 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\*\XLSTART\*'
ls 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\*\STARTUP\*'
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\WebView\Inbox
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\Security
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\Today\UserDefinedUrl
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\WebView\Calendar\URL
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft Office Alerts'; Id='300';} | FL TimeCreated,Message

T1034 Path Interception 

N/A

T1013 Port Monitors 

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors" /s /v "Driver"

T1504 PowerShell Profile 

ls C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Profile.ps1
ls C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Microsoft.*Profile.ps1
ls C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Microsoft.*Profile.ps1
gci -path "C:\Users\*\Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1"
gci -path "C:\Users\*\Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.*Profile.ps1"

T1108 Redundant Access 

N/A

T1060 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder 

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v Userinit
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v Shell
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" /v BootExecute
gci -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*" -include *.lnk,*.url
gci -path "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*" -include *.lnk,*.url
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core/Operational'; Id='9707'} | FL TimeCreated,Message
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core/Operational'; Id='9708'} | FL TimeCreated,Message

T1053 Scheduled Task 

gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks | Select-String Command | FT Line, Filename
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | where {$_.CreationTime -ge (get-date).addDays(-1)} | Select-String Command | FL Filename,Line
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | where {$_.CreationTime -ge (get-date).addDays(-1)} | where {$_.CreationTime.hour -ge (get-date).hour-2}| Select-String Command | FL Line,Filename
gci -path 'registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\'
gci -path 'registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
ls 'C:\Windows\System32\WptsExtensions.dll'

Note: thanks to Markus Piéton for the WptsExtensions.dll one.

T1180 Screensaver 

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Control Panel\Desktop" /s /v "ScreenSaveActive"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Control Panel\Desktop" /s /v "SCRNSAVE.exe"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Control Panel\Desktop" /s /v "ScreenSaverIsSecure"

T1101 Security Support Provider 

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" /v "Security Packages"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" /v "Security Packages"

T1505 Server Software Component 

N/A

T1058 Service Registry Permissions Weakness 

get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL
get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename |FL

T1023 Shortcut Modification 

Select-String -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.lnk" -Pattern "exe"
Select-String -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.lnk" -Pattern "dll"
Select-String -Path "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*" -Pattern "dll"
Select-String -Path "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*" -Pattern "exe"
gci -path "C:\Users\" -recurse -include *.lnk -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "exe" | FL
gci -path "C:\Users\" -recurse -include *.lnk -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "dll" | FL

T1198 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking 

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy" /s /v "`$DLL"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy" /s /v "`$DLL"

T1019 System Firmware 

reg query HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS
Confirm-SecureBootUEFI
Get-WmiObject win32_bios

T1209 Time Providers 

reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders" /s /f "Dll"

T1078 Valid Accounts 

net users
net group /domain "Domain Admins"
net users /domain <name>

T1100 Web Shell

Note: The presence of files with these values isn’t necessarily indicative of a webshell, review output.

gci -path "C:\inetpub\wwwroot" -recurse -File -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "runat" | FL
gci -path "C:\inetpub\wwwroot" -recurse -File -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "eval" | FL

ProxyShell - May reveal evidence of mailbox exfil or Web Shell being dropped:

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='MSExchange Management';} | ? {$_.Message -match 'MailboxExportRequest'} | FL TimeCreated, Message
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='MSExchange Management';} | ? {$_.Message -match 'aspx'} | FL TimeCreated, Message

T1084 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription

Get WMI Namespaces

Function Get-WmiNamespace ($Path = 'root')
{
	foreach ($Namespace in (Get-WmiObject -Namespace $Path -Class __Namespace))
	{
		$FullPath = $Path + "/" + $Namespace.Name
		Write-Output $FullPath
		Get-WmiNamespace -Path $FullPath
	}
}
Get-WMINamespace -Recurse

Query WMI Persistence

Get-WmiObject -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Namespace root\subscription
Get-WmiObject -Class __EventFilter -Namespace root\subscription
Get-WmiObject -Class __EventConsumer -Namespace root\subscription

T1004 Winlogon Helper DLL 

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify" /s
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify" /s
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Userinit"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Userinit"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Shell"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Shell"
reg query "HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /s

T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading

Locate Possible Dll Side Loading

Note: A legitimate clean executable can be used to run malicious DLLs based on issues with a manifest file used by the application to load DLLs.

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\Winners"

By placing a malicious DLL in the below locations legitimate binaries may have been used to sideload these malicious DLLs.

  • C:\Windows\WinSxS
  • C:\Windows\SXS

Unique Sideload DLL hashes (may take some time)

(gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll|gi -ea SilentlyContinue|filehash).hash|sort -u

Unsigned or Invalid Sideload DLLs (there will be a lot)

gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"

Unsigned Sideload DLLs (Less noise)

gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -E "NotSigned"
gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.ocx | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"

Hash of Unsigned Sideload DLLs

gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -E "NotSigned" | Select Path | gi -ea SilentlyContinue | filehash | sort -u
gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.ocx | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid" | Select Path | gi -ea SilentlyContinue | filehash | sort -u