fix: Address PR #21 review feedback - improve safety

This commit addresses the two high-priority issues identified in PR review:

## 1. Fixed .unwrap() on Path Conversion (status.rs:163)

**Issue:** Using `.unwrap()` on `path.to_str()` panics on non-UTF-8 paths.

**Fix:** Replaced with proper error handling:
```rust
let settings_path_str = settings_path
    .to_str()
    .ok_or_else(|| {
        CatalystError::InvalidPath(format!(
            "Settings path contains non-UTF-8 characters: {:?}",
            settings_path
        ))
    })?;
```

Now gracefully handles non-UTF-8 paths with a descriptive error message.

## 2. Added Binary Name Validation (status.rs:534-544)

**Issue:** Potential template injection in `fix_hook_wrapper` where binary_name
is extracted from wrapper_name and used in template substitution without validation.

**Fix:** Added strict validation that only allows safe characters:
```rust
// Validate binary name to prevent potential injection
// Only allow alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and underscores
if !binary_name
    .chars()
    .all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
{
    return Err(CatalystError::InvalidConfig(format!(
        "Invalid binary name '{}': must contain only alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores",
        binary_name
    )));
}
```

This prevents injection of shell metacharacters like `;`, `$`, `|`, `..`, etc.

## Test Coverage

Added comprehensive test `test_fix_hook_wrapper_validates_binary_name`:
- ✅ Valid names accepted: `skill-activation-prompt`, `file-change-tracker`
- ❌ Invalid names rejected: `test;rm-rf`, `test$command`, `test/../etc/passwd`

All tests passing: **36 in catalyst-cli + 28 in catalyst-core = 64 total**

## Security Impact

These fixes eliminate two potential security issues:
1. **Path handling**: No more panics on non-UTF-8 paths
2. **Injection prevention**: Malicious binary names cannot inject commands

The changes maintain backward compatibility while improving robustness.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: dwalleck

catalyst-cli/src/status.rs

@@ -160,7 +160,14 @@ fn validate_hooks(target_dir: &Path, platform: Platform) -> Result<Vec<HookStatu
     }
 
     // Parse settings.json
-    let settings = match ClaudeSettings::read(settings_path.to_str().unwrap()) {
+    let settings_path_str = settings_path.to_str().ok_or_else(|| {
+        CatalystError::InvalidPath(format!(
+            "Settings path contains non-UTF-8 characters: {:?}",
+            settings_path
+        ))
+    })?;
+
+    let settings = match ClaudeSettings::read(settings_path_str) {
         Ok(s) => s,
         Err(_) => {
             // Invalid settings.json - report with issue
@@ -522,6 +529,18 @@ fn fix_hook_wrapper(target_dir: &Path, wrapper_name: &str, platform: Platform) -
         .trim_end_matches(".sh")
         .trim_end_matches(".ps1");
 
+    // Validate binary name to prevent potential injection
+    // Only allow alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and underscores
+    if !binary_name
+        .chars()
+        .all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
+    {
+        return Err(CatalystError::InvalidConfig(format!(
+            "Invalid binary name '{}': must contain only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and underscores",
+            binary_name
+        )));
+    }
+
     // Use the init module's wrapper generation
     // For now, we'll just recreate the wrapper using the same logic
     let hooks_dir = target_dir.join(HOOKS_DIR);
@@ -535,7 +554,7 @@ fn fix_hook_wrapper(target_dir: &Path, wrapper_name: &str, platform: Platform) -
         Platform::Windows => include_str!("../resources/wrapper-template.ps1"),
     };
 
-    // Replace template variable
+    // Replace template variable (safe after validation above)
     let content = template.replace("{{BINARY_NAME}}", binary_name);
 
     // Write wrapper file
@@ -631,4 +650,36 @@ mod tests {
         let content = fs::read_to_string(&version_path).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(content.trim(), env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_fix_hook_wrapper_validates_binary_name() {
+        let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let hooks_dir = temp_dir.path().join(".claude/hooks");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&hooks_dir).unwrap();
+
+        // Valid binary names should work
+        let result = fix_hook_wrapper(
+            temp_dir.path(),
+            "skill-activation-prompt.sh",
+            Platform::Linux,
+        );
+        assert!(result.is_ok());
+
+        let result = fix_hook_wrapper(temp_dir.path(), "file-change-tracker.sh", Platform::Linux);
+        assert!(result.is_ok());
+
+        // Invalid binary names should be rejected
+        let result = fix_hook_wrapper(temp_dir.path(), "test;rm-rf.sh", Platform::Linux);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+        assert!(result
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string()
+            .contains("Invalid binary name"));
+
+        let result = fix_hook_wrapper(temp_dir.path(), "test$command.sh", Platform::Linux);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+
+        let result = fix_hook_wrapper(temp_dir.path(), "test/../etc/passwd.sh", Platform::Linux);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
 }