Where is the natural boundary of RLM as a reasoning primitive? #59
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Hi @matomoniwano. In practice, I’ve found it much cleaner to keep:
In rlm-runtime, the model interacts with state through a persistent REPL and deterministic helpers, but it doesn’t “own” long-horizon state or execution. That separation keeps the system understandable and debuggable. I think some light structure at the interface level (explicit termination signals, bounded recursion, structured intermediate outputs) makes sense, as long as it stays declarative. What I’d avoid is pushing implicit planning or hidden control flow into the RLM itself. My mental model is basically: That boundary keeps the recursive reasoning idea clear, while still letting it plug into larger systems without turning it into a black-box agent. Here my implementation: https://github.com/apenab/rlm-runtime Cheers. |
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I’ve been reading the RLM paper and thinking about the scope of recursion as a reasoning primitive.
One question I keep coming back to is where the authors see the natural boundary of RLM:
Should RLM be treated strictly as a pure reasoning operator — operating over a provided state and returning a trace/output — with all control, memory, and orchestration handled externally?
Or do you imagine a future direction where some aspects of control flow (e.g. termination signals, intermediate state shaping, or recursive depth adaptation) become part of the RLM abstraction itself?
I’m especially curious how you think about preserving the conceptual clarity of recursive reasoning while integrating it into larger systems that necessarily maintain state and long-horizon context.
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