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We say "most years" because there were temporary lapses from the gold or silver standard.
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@@ -120,21 +114,21 @@ Despite these temporary lapses, a striking thing about the figure is that price
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Two other features of the figure attracted the attention of leading economists such as Irving Fisher of Yale University and John Maynard Keynes of Cambridge University in the early century.
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* there was considerable year-to-year instability of the price levels despite their long begin anchored to the same average level in the long term
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*There was considerable year-to-year instability of the price levels despite their long begin anchored to the same average level in the long term
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* while using valuable gold and silver as coins was a time-tested way to anchor the price level by limiting the supply of money, it cost real resources.
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*While using valuable gold and silver as coins was a time-tested way to anchor the price level by limiting the supply of money, it cost real resources.
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* that is, society paid a high "opportunity cost" for using gold and silver as coins; gold and silver could instead by used as valuable jewelry and also as an industrial input
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* that is, society paid a high "opportunity cost" for using gold and silver as coins; gold and silver could instead be used as valuable jewelry and also as an industrial input
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Keynes and Fisher argued that there was a socially efficient way to achieve a price level that would
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be at least as well anchored, and would also exhibit less year-to-year short-term fluctuations.
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In particular, they argued that a well-managed central bank could achieve price level stability by
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* issuing a **limited supply** of paper currency
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* guranteeing that it would not print money to finance government expenditures
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*guaranteeing that it would not print money to finance government expenditures
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Thue, the waste from using gold and silver as coins prompted John Maynard Keynes to call a commodity standard a “barbarous relic.”
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Thus, the waste from using gold and silver as coins prompted John Maynard Keynes to call a commodity standard a “barbarous relic.”
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A paper fiat money system disposes of all reserves behind a currency.
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@@ -153,8 +147,6 @@ We didn't need to take logarithms in our earlier graphs that had stopped in 19
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All four of the countries eventually permanently left the gold standard by modifying their monetary and fiscal policies in several ways, starting the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.
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```{code-cell} ipython3
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# create plot
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cols = ['UK', 'US', 'France', 'Castile']
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plt.show()
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```
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The graph shows that achieving price level system with a well-managed paper money system proved to be more challenging than Irving Fisher and Keynes perhaps imagined.
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The graph shows that achieving a price level system with a well-managed paper money system proved to be more challenging than Irving Fisher and Keynes perhaps imagined.
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Actually, earlier economists and statesmen knew about the possibility of fiat money systems long before
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Keynes and Fisher advocated them in the early 20th century.
@@ -194,23 +186,20 @@ We present four graphs from "The Ends of Four Big Inflations" from chapter 3 o
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The graphs depict logarithms of price levels during the early post World War I years for four countries:
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* Figure 3.1, Retail prices Austria 1921-1924 (page 42)
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In practice, their currencies were largely “fiat,” or unbacked. The governments of these countries resorted to the printing of new unbacked money to finance government deficits. (The notes were "backed" mainly by treasury bills that, in those times, could not be expected to be paid off by levying taxes, but only by printing more notes or treasury bills.) This was done on such a scale that it led to a depreciation of the currencies of spectacular proportions. In the end, the German mark stabilized at 1 trillion ($10^{12}$) paper marks to the prewar gold mark, the Polish mark at 1.8 million paper marks to the gold zloty, the Austrian crown at 14,400 paper crowns to the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown, and the Hungarian krone at 14,500 paper crowns to the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown.
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Chapter 3 of {cite}`sargent2002big` focuses on the deliberate changes in policy that Hungary, Austria, Poland, and Germany made to end their hyperinflations.
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The hyperinflations were each ended by restoring or virtually restoring convertibility to the dollar or equivalently to gold.
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The hyperinflations were each ended by restoring or virtually restoring convertibility to the dollar or equivalently to gold.
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