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SLSA Build Provenance

AegisBPF release artifacts ship with SLSA v1.0 Build Track Level 3 provenance attestations generated by GitHub's actions/attest-build-provenance action, which uses a hardened GitHub-hosted build platform and Sigstore for unforgeable signing.

What you get with every release

For every artifact attached to a GitHub Release tag vX.Y.Z:

Artifact class Signature SBOM Provenance
aegisbpf-*.tar.gz (release archives) cosign keyless (*.sig + *.pem) SPDX 2.3 + CycloneDX 1.6 SLSA v1.0 L3
*.deb / *.rpm cosign keyless Included in release SBOM SLSA v1.0 L3
SHA256SUMS.txt cosign keyless — SLSA v1.0 L3
ghcr.io/ErenAri/aegis-bpf:vX.Y.Z (OCI image) cosign keyless image sig — SLSA v1.0 L3

Provenance is published to the Sigstore Rekor transparency log and is discoverable via gh attestation verify.

How to verify

1. Install the tooling

# GitHub CLI with attestation subcommand (>= 2.49.0)
gh --version

# Cosign 2.x
curl -LO https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/latest/download/cosign-linux-amd64
chmod +x cosign-linux-amd64 && sudo mv cosign-linux-amd64 /usr/local/bin/cosign

2. Download a release

VERSION=v0.1.1
gh release download "${VERSION}" --repo ErenAri/Aegis-BPF \
  --pattern 'aegisbpf-*.tar.gz' \
  --pattern 'SHA256SUMS.txt' \
  --pattern '*.sig' \
  --pattern '*.pem'

3. Verify SLSA provenance

gh attestation verify aegisbpf-0.1.1-ubuntu-24.04-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo ErenAri/Aegis-BPF

A successful verification prints the predicate type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 and the builder identity https://github.com/actions/runner/github-hosted. This is the SLSA v1.0 Build L3 claim:

  • Scripted: build steps are defined entirely in .github/workflows/release.yml.
  • Build service: GitHub-hosted ubuntu-24.04 runners.
  • Isolated: each release job runs in a fresh ephemeral VM.
  • Unforgeable: signing keys are GitHub OIDC identities, never exposed to user-defined build steps; provenance is logged to Rekor and cannot be retroactively altered without detection.

4. Verify Sigstore blob signatures

cosign verify-blob \
  --certificate aegisbpf-0.1.1-ubuntu-24.04-x86_64.tar.gz.pem \
  --signature aegisbpf-0.1.1-ubuntu-24.04-x86_64.tar.gz.sig \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/ErenAri/Aegis-BPF/.*' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com' \
  aegisbpf-0.1.1-ubuntu-24.04-x86_64.tar.gz

5. Verify the OCI image

cosign verify ghcr.io/erenari/aegis-bpf:v0.1.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/ErenAri/Aegis-BPF/.*' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com'

How SLSA L3 is achieved

The AegisBPF release pipeline meets each SLSA v1.0 Build L3 requirement as follows:

SLSA v1.0 requirement AegisBPF implementation
Scripted build .github/workflows/release.yml is the sole build definition
Build service GitHub Actions hosted runners (no self-hosted for release artifacts)
Provenance exists actions/attest-build-provenance@v2 emits in-toto provenance
Provenance authenticated Sigstore keyless (GitHub OIDC) signing; public Rekor entry
Provenance service generated Signer identity is token.actions.githubusercontent.com, not user-controlled
Isolated builds Fresh ephemeral VM per job; no shared state
Unforgeable provenance Signing secret never materialises in build steps; hardware-backed GitHub OIDC
Non-falsifiable Rekor transparency log is append-only and publicly auditable

Verifying the build source ref

gh attestation verify by default validates the source repository. To additionally pin to a specific tag or commit:

gh attestation verify aegisbpf-0.1.1-ubuntu-24.04-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo ErenAri/Aegis-BPF \
  --source-ref refs/tags/v0.1.1

References