https://app.aave.com/governance/proposal/?proposalId=399
https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-gho-technical-incident-13-11-2023/15642
🔧 💻 contract-upgrade
This proposal upgrades the variable debt GHO implementation, fixing an issue reported via the Aave <> Immunefi program.
Transaction: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x03053a4f79ebea76708c7c7f504cfcf0f3e0c870ee3aad0645b48b9c15ea6507
- id: 399
- creator: 0x8938be93f45c0da5d26894fe115d989149a90732
- executor: 0xee56e2b3d491590b5b31738cc34d5232f378a8d5
- targets: [0x9aee0b04504cef83a65ac3f0e838d0593bcb2bc7]
- values: [0]
- signatures: [forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))]
- calldatas: [0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000dabad81af85554e9ae636395611c58f7ec1aaec50000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000021]
- withDelegatecalls: [false]
- startBlock: 18744316
- endBlock: 18763516
- strategy: 0xb7e383ef9b1e9189fc0f71fb30af8aa14377429e
- ipfsHash: 0xf4aa6f8da161b0c4bbc086bf0012fb29282e511226bc72c91e50ab58471a7044
Proposal report
Payloads report
We have verified the proposal payload properly upgrades the vGHO (variable debt GHO token) implementation with this one.
On the new implementation, we have reviewed the following:
- The
DEBT_TOKEN_REVISION
is correctly set to3
, from the current2
value. - Even if this is part of the scope of Certora who reviewed the code, the change is pretty isolated and consistent with what high-level seems like a proper fix. For transparency, as reviewers on the Aave <> Immunefi program, we have visibility into the bug reported, and we helped reviewing its validity.
- Nothing else changes compared with the previous implementation.
The proposal is consistent with the discussions on the Aave governance forum.
✅ The code on the proposal payload corresponds to the proposal specification.
❓ The proposal includes a proper tests suite, checking all necessary post-conditions.
✅ BGD reviewed the payload before the proposal was submitted.
✅ Only one payload used via delegatecall
✅ BGD reviewed the procedure followed to submit the proposal.